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Purpose: Greater accountability within the Ontario medical laboratory sector is a high priority 
and desirable. This sector provides approximately 80% of the objective data for diagnosis, 
monitoring and treatment. The goal of this study is to determine how accountability is defined, 
and the advantages and challenges of the approaches used in this sector.  
Methodology: A case study design based on a mix methods approach incorporating quantitative 
(i.e., scoping review of documents) and qualitative data (i.e., 20 semi-structured interviews) to 
examine the approaches to accountability in the medical laboratory sector and the implication of 
core independent variables on the approaches used. Key stakeholders in the medical laboratory 
sector were interviewed to determine views on the advantages and challenges of the possible 
approaches.  
Results  
 The four approaches to accountability used in the medical laboratory sector are: financial 
incentives, regulations, information directed towards potential users, reliance on professionalism 
and stewardship. Regulation is the main approach to accountability in the medical laboratory 
sector. Ontario Laboratory Accreditation and licensing by the Ontario government is mandatory 
in all laboratories except those found in physicians’ offices.  
There were variations in the approaches to accountability based on core independent factors such 
as: policy goal being pursed, the governance /ownership structures and the goods and services 
being delivered and their production characteristics. Laboratory services are delivered by public 
health, hospitals, large community based laboratories and small laboratories often found in 
physicians’ offices.  
Key informants identified quality and safety as top priorities regardless of the approach that is 
used. Concern for costs and resources exists within the sector as a whole. Laboratory results gain 
much of their value by being embedded within a system of care, in which providers order tests 
appropriately and are aided in interpreting and acting upon their results. The pre/post analytical 
stages are just as important as the analytical stage in measuring performance and ensuring 
validity, reliability and accountability.  
Conclusion: 
While the medical laboratory sector is highly regulated, the implementation of additional 
mechanisms to enhance accountability in the pre/post analytical phases is needed. The 
importance of this is further highlighted by the advancement of point of care testing at the 
bedside, the pharmacy and at home which is not fully captured by the accountability mechanisms 
currently in place. Advances in new technologies such as molecular and genetic testing will also 
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Definition of Key Terms and Concepts 
 As this research will address major approaches to accountability currently being used in the 
health sector in Canada and internationally, one must recognize the context in which these 
concepts are employed. All terms are defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
 Accountability: the quality or state of being accountable; especially an obligation or 
willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one's actions. 
 Incentives:  something that incites or has a tendency to incite to determination or action.   
 Regulations: an authoritative rule dealing with details or procedure e.g. safety regulations or a 
rule or order issued by an executive authority or regulatory agency of a government and having 
the force of law.   
 Professionalism: the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a profession or a 
professional person. 
 Stewardship: the conducting, supervising, or managing of something; the careful and 








1.1 Statement of the problem 
Accountability in health care has become a topic of great interest. Governments, 
researchers and the tax-paying public are paying closer attention to quality indicators such as 
patient outcomes, decreased wait times, cost containment, and quality of care (Deber, 2010). 
Canadian citizens themselves issued a strong challenge for greater accountability within the 
healthcare sector (The Romanow Inquiry, 2002). The recent Nanos poll shows that Canadians 
ranked keeping our health care system strong as the number one priority. (IRPP Nanos Survey, 
2012).  In 2001, Listening for Direction: A National Consultation on Health Services and Policy 
Issues, identified governance and accountability as a major research theme (Listening for 
Directions, 2012).  
Strengthening accountability is central to the recommendations made in all recent studies 
on the future of health care (Brown,
 
2004). The Excellent Care for All Act, 2010 highlights the 
commitment of the government of Ontario to accountability in healthcare by stating that it will 
“put patients first by improving the quality and value of the patient experience through the 
application of evidence-based health care” (The Excellent Care for All Act, 2010). 
 Demand for greater accountability within the medical laboratory sector became a priority 
following a number of recently publicised cases. The Krever’s Commission of Inquiry in 1994 
examine issues of accountability relating to the transmission of HIV and Hepatitis C through 
contaminated blood from the Canadian Red Cross. It was estimated that close to 30,000 
Canadians were exposed to the Hepatitis C virus through transfusion of contaminated blood or 
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blood products (Krever commission, 1994).  Further, there was the Walkerton Inquiry in 2000, in 
which seven persons died and over two thousand more became ill after drinking water 
contaminated with E. coli bacteria in Walkerton, Ontario. The investigations revealed that the 
laboratory tests conducted were accurate and valid. The errors occurred in the pre and post 
analytical phases of testing due mainly to operator negligence. The Cameron Commission of 
Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing (2009) undertaken by the Government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador examined accountability for laboratory test results for breast cancer patients. It was 
determined that between 1997 and 2005, 383 patients received wrong results which impacted the 
treatment program for their breast cancer (Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing, 
2009).
  
The more recent example occurred in a number of Alberta hospitals in December 2011. 
Systematic errors in testing negatively impacted the diagnosis and treatment of cancer patients in 
that province (Komarnicki, 2012; Canadian Association of Pathologist, 2012). 
 In the past, it was believed that accountability processes in the medical laboratory sector 
were simple and easy to monitor, but the recent Cameron Inquiry noted, “there was a failure of 
both accountability and oversight at all levels” (Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor 
Testing, 2009). Many stakeholders, including the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term 
Care (MOHLTC), have indicated that accountability is an area of great importance to them and 
highlight the need for more empirical and theoretical evidence to guide the approaches to 
accountability measures that are used (MOHLTC, 2012).   
1.2 What is Accountability? 
Accountability, simply defined means having to answer to someone for meeting defined 
objectives (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1996; Marmor & Morone, 1980; Fooks & Maslove, 2004). The 
result of the literature review indicated that many scholarly papers have been written on 
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accountability (Fooks & Maslove, 2004; Abelson & Gauvin, 2004; Minkler, 2004).  However, 
much of this work did not focus on accountability in healthcare and more specifically in the 
medical laboratory sector. The literature indicates that accountability has financial, performance 
and political/democratic implications, (Binkerhoff, 2004) and can be ex ante or ex post (Klein, 
1993). Within healthcare, this may translate into fiscal accountability to payers, clinical 
accountability for quality of care, (Binkerhoff, 2004) and accountability to the public.  The 
players involved may include various combinations of providers, patients, payers, and regulators 
who are connected in various ways (Fooks & Maslove, 2004; Binkerhoff, 2004; Klein, 1993).  
One of the ways that many healthcare organisations inform the public on accountability issues is 
through a variety of quality indicators such as hospital mortality rates, emergency department 
length of stay, and readmission rates.  The medical laboratory sector uses a variety of 
performance indicators such as quality assurance and assessment to inform providers on 
accountability.  
1.3 The novelty of this thesis 
As indicated in the literature, there is need for more research on approaches to 
accountability and an increasing recognition that variation exists between healthcare sectors and 
within sectors (e.g., medical laboratory sector- ML sector).  A more nuanced understanding 
necessarily begins with clarifying what is meant by accountability, including specifying for what, 
by whom, to whom and how (Deber, 2010). One conceptual innovation of this thesis is that it 
will draw upon several theoretical frameworks, which, although highly relevant, have existed in 
silos, and have not necessarily been applied to issues of accountability within the healthcare 
sector in general and the medical laboratory sector specifically.  
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This thesis is part of a large Partnership for Health System Improvement (PHSI) study 
funded by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR). The purpose of this PHSI study 
was to examine and compare the approaches to accountability across eleven different healthcare 
sectors. The importance of this issue was endorsed by the government and various community 
partners. The MOHLTC stated that “accountability is a vitally important area to the MOHLTC 
and the proposed work is particularly timely.” Strong letter of support for research of this kind 
was also received from the Quality Management Program-Laboratory Services (QMP-LS), an 
organization operated by the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) with special responsibilities 
for quality assurance in Ontario’s medical laboratories. The ML sector provides approximately 
80% of data used by physicians in the diagnosis, treatment and monitoring of patients, as well as 
disease surveillance. The majority of laboratory testing in this province is publicly funded and 
therefore this sector should be held accountable for its use of tax-payers money. The lack of 
significant research in this field was a motivating factor for the researcher to choose medical 
laboratories as the study sample. Working on an interdisciplinary team will provide an 
opportunity to compare and contrast approaches to accountability across healthcare sectors to 
clarify what is known about best practices. 
1.4 Research Hypothesis 
The impact of the approaches to accountability present in the ML sector is a function of three 
independent core variables: policy goal being pursed, the governance /ownership structures and 
the goods and services being delivered and their production characteristics. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
1. To classify various approaches to accountability using policy/ governing instruments. 
2. To describe the ML sector. 
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3. To ascertain which approaches to accountability is being used in the ML sector. 
4. To describe core independent variable present in the ML sector. 
5. To analyze the views of key informants on the advantages and disadvantages of approaches to 
accountability in the ML sector. 
1.6 Research Goals 
The goals of this study are to determine: 
1. To identify the approaches to accountability in Ontario’s ML sector.  
2. To determine the implications of the core independent variables on: 
a) The policy goal being pursed 
 b) The governance/ownership structures and relationship in place, which in turn affects 
who will   be accountable, and to whom 
 c) The goods and services being delivered, and their production characteristics 
     3. To ascertain key informants views on the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches 
used. 
The investigation of accountability in the Ontario medical laboratory sector will be based on a 
multistage analysis guided by the following research questions:  
1) Description of the Ontario medical laboratory sector 
a. Who is involved in the funding and delivery of medical laboratory services in 
Ontario? 
b. What are the goods and services being delivered, and their production 
characteristics? 
c. What are the ownership and governance structures in place?  
d. What are the policy goals in the medical laboratory sector? 
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e. How is quality defined in the medical laboratory sector? 
 
 Stage 1 will provide an overview of the Ontario medical laboratory sector within the framework 
of the three main independent core variables: a) policy goals being pursued; b) 
governance/ownership structure and c) the goods and services being delivered. The overview 
will also provide information on the funding models for medical laboratory services in Ontario. 
Stage II will present and describe the approaches to accountability in Ontario’s medical 
laboratory sector. This will include identifying variations, if any, within the ML sector. (i.e., 
hospital versus community laboratories).  Stage III will present the views of key stakeholders on 
the potential barriers for the implementation of accountability measures in the ML sector. It will 
examine the advantages, disadvantages and benefits, if any, of accountability approaches that are 
being used, noting variations.  
1.7 Overview of Thesis Chapters 
The following overview illustrates how the remaining chapters of the thesis address the 
research questions identified above.  
Chapter two provides a review of the relevant literature and the conceptual framework 
upon which this thesis is based. This will include the conceptualization of accountability in 
healthcare, the description of the core independent variables, an examination of the role of the 
public and private sector in health care, and a description of the governing instruments used to 
ensure accountability.  
Chapter three provides an overview of the Canadian healthcare system, a description of 




  Chapter four details the methodological approaches used for this study. This thesis is 
based on a mixed methods case study approach. Data collection is based on document review 
and semi-structured interviews. A discussion on data sources and analytical techniques used is 
presented. Included in this chapter is a discussion of the limitations of this study. 
 Chapter five presents the results of data collected from the documents reviewed and the 
semi-structured interviews.  
Chapter six provides a discussion of the research findings within the analytical 
framework presented in Chapter three. The chapter ends with the lessons learned and suggestions 
for future research. 
Chapter seven consist of a conclusion to the thesis. It returns to the core issue of 
approaches to accountability and articulates that although all four approaches are present, 















Conceptual Framework and Literature Review  
This chapter examines the concept of accountability and how it applies to the healthcare 
sector. The chapter will start with the conceptual framework used for this thesis. A number of 
concepts will be discussed under the headings: 1) A general overview of accountability 2) 
Governing instruments used to influence behaviour to achieve accountability in the Canadian 
health care context with special emphasis on the Ontario ML sector, and 3) a description of the 
independent variables.  
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
   This thesis is a part of a lager study on Approaches to Accountability that is funded by 
Partnership for Health System Improvement (PHSI). It is collaboration among an accomplished 
interdisciplinary team, working in partnership with senior policy makers across multiple health 
care sub-sectors. The conceptual framework used in this thesis was adopted (with slight 
modifications to respond to the ML sector) from existing conceptual framework used by Dr. 
Raisa Deber, the principal investigator. 
Political scientists have noted that decision makers are able to use a number of “policy 
instruments” or “governing instruments,” to guide them in their choice of policy directions 
(Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). These instruments vary considerably in their degree of coercion 
(Doern & Phidd, 1992) or intrusiveness (Baxter-Moore, 1987). According to Doern et al., at the 
extreme non-intrusive end of the scale, they may choose not to act. The next level that they can 
choose is symbolic responses. Doern et al. called this level of intervention “exhortation.” 
Government may choose to discreetly intervene by using incentives for action.  The kind of 
incentives used can vary. Government may try to secure voluntary compliance with its objectives 
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without accompanying threats or inducements. Another strategy that they may choose to use is 
‘expenditure’ and/or ‘taxation’ policies. A still more intrusive set of instruments may be termed 
“directives” or what Doern et al. call “regulation.” These often shift compliance costs from the 
regulators to those being regulated (Doern & Phidd, 1992).   
 Most writings on policy instruments theorize them as the extent to which government 
directly intrudes on private decision making. This analysis can be extended to examining the 
potential intrusiveness of one level of decision makers upon others (Deber, 1991). The policy 
instrument framework also includes the literatures on ways of enforcing these agreements, 
including information, licensure/accreditation, payment, and legal sanctions. This literature has 
been linked to the literature on the new public management (Hood, 2000). Before selecting a 
policy instrument, special attention should be paid to the interaction between public and private 
forces, as well as the implications of the type of policy network for selection of policy instrument 
(Bresser, 1998).
 
 Policy instrument models have been widely applied to the field of environmental 
regulation, particularly in the European Union (Zito, 2003; Jordan, 2005).  There are few 
examples of them been used in primary healthcare in Switzerland (Braun & Etienne, 2004) and 
social services such as child health policy in Australia (Leggat, 2004).
 
 However the literature 
review indicated that there was no record of any efforts to apply them to accountability. 
  This thesis examines the following four major approaches to accountability currently 
being employed in the health sector in Canada and internationally. The research goal was to be 
able to identify which of these approaches to accountability has been used in the ML sector. It is 
hypothesized that these approaches will have differing success when applied to various 
categories of services within the ML sector, with the likely outcome depending upon the policy 
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goal being pursed, the governance/ownership structures and relationship in place, which in turn 
affects who will be accountable, and to whom and the goods and services being delivered, and 
their production characteristics. 
Approaches to Accountability 
1. Financial incentives: are approaches which modify payments to encourage providers 
to behave in the desired manner (Robinson, 2001; Evans, 1984). To achieve this they use the 
‘expenditure’ governing instrument. One example, which was reviewed in detail, is the family of 
Pay for Performance (P4P) experiments for physician services underway in such jurisdictions as 
the UK, US, Australia, and Ontario (Epstein, 2007; Pink et al., 2006; Doran et al., 2006; 
Donaldson et al., 2005). The use of financial incentives and purchasing for hospitals and other 
sub-sectors, including laboratory services was also highlighted in the literature (Baranek, Deber 
& Williams, 2004). For example, Ontario’s hospital accountability agreements contain financial 
incentives for balanced budgets. 
2. Regulations: which employ the ‘regulation’ governing instrument (Walshe, 2003) play 
a major role in health care. These also require providers to behave in a certain way. Regulations 
may be supported through the signing of binding agreements. They may also rely on agency 
theory, and be enforced using professional regulatory bodies (Eisenhardt, 1989). This thesis will 
examine the accountability agreements being used in the medical laboratory sub-sector. The 
literature notes the ongoing tension of balancing market forces and regulation, and the 
implications of regulatory and medico-legal barriers for achieving such goals as inter-
professional practice (Lahey & Currie, 2004). Regulation plays an important role in the delivery 
of laboratory services in Ontario. 
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3. Information: directed towards potential users (patients, public and private payers) 
within a context of allowing market forces to work more effectively by encouraging rational 
choice of the ‘best’ care (Howells, 2005; Morris & Zelmer, 2005). Examples of the use of this 
approach include ongoing activities in performance measurement and improvement (Bansley et 
al., 2005). One challenge that was highlighted in the literature was the issue of establishing and 
enforcing these guidelines. Particular attention will be paid to the use of report cards, audit 
reports, publicly-available inspection reports (e.g., lab accreditation reports) and quality 
indicators, including adverse events (Saltman & Ferroussier- Davis, 2000). The use of this 
instrument may work indirectly and produce some unintended consequences. For example, 
providing information to interest groups and media may affect the reputation of various 
providers, which in turn affect the willingness of patients and payers to purchase their services.  
    4. Reliance on professionalism/stewardship: This approach employs a second variant of the 
exhortation governing instrument, but directs the information to providers rather than to payers 
or consumers (Abelson & Guavin, 2004).  It relies on high trust and the expectation that 
providers, as a group, wish to do the right thing. One barrier detected in the literature is the need 
for support in clarifying what are best practices. Best practice is “adopting a method or technique 
that has consistently produced results that are better than those obtained by using other means” 
(Bogan & English, 1994). Clinical guidelines and other forms of evidence-based practice are 
currently being used in such sub-sectors as: hospitals, medical laboratories (inspections), and 
primary health care. Under some circumstances, report cards may also fall into this category of 
approach, depending upon the indicators used and the way the information is shared. In this 
thesis, particular emphasis will be placed on the applications to clinical accountability.  
Whenever the professionalism/stewardship approach is used, it is often backed up by self-
12 
 
regulation through professional colleges. Many of the professionals who work in the laboratory 
sector are members of a regulated college in the province.  
 An additional nuance is the extent to which blended approach model of policy 
instruments may be used. This is particularly evident in the use of additional policy instruments 
for enforcement. A government policy aimed at enforcing a piece of legislation may include 
various combinations of exhortation (e.g., efforts to evaluate and improve the quality of 
information, citizen engagement to widen the scope of inputs);
 
expenditure (e.g., fiscal 
penalties); taxation (e.g., tax breaks to encourage desired activities), and regulation (e.g., audit, 
accreditation, professional self -regulation, and legal sanctions) (Deber, 2011).
 
  The enforcement of desired policy instruments at the strongest level is backed by government 
legislation. An example is the country of Norway that has a “Patient’s Bills of Rights” as a part 
of its formal appeal mechanism for patients. The objective of the Act is “to help ensure that all 
citizens have equal access to good quality health care by granting patients’ rights in their 
relations with the health service and promote a relationship of trust between the patient and the 
health service and safeguard respect for the life, integrity and human dignity of each patient.” 
(Legislation Norway, 2013). This law gives the citizens of Norway the legal rights to quality 
health care.  
 In Ontario, there are a number of initiatives aimed at enforcing government policy. One 
initiative is a review procedure for getting out-of-province coverage for medically insured 
services. Out-of-province service is usually provided as emergency or non-emergency care to 
Ontarian outside of the province but within Canada. There are legislations and regulations for the 
administration of compensation by Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). Another initiative is 
to examine the public complaints process for nursing homes. There is also an initiative to have a 
13 
 
patient’s “Bill of Rights” that would provide guarantees to patients such acceptable wait time for 
surgeries. Other enforcement mechanisms may rely upon litigation (e.g., malpractice, human 
rights). The office of the Ontario Ombudsman provides service to persons who maybe having 
difficulty accessing the healthcare services that they need. The Auditor General reports fall 
within the information category. The report released in 2007 provided detailed assessment and 
recommendation for the laboratory sector in Ontario and will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
 
 2.2 An Overview of Accountability 
Healthcare is a top priority for both citizens and governments of Canada (Deber, 2010; 
McGregor, 2012).  Opinion polls show that Canadians continue to support a publicly funded 
healthcare system (National Union of Public and General Employees, 2012; Nanos research, 
2012). However the delivery of universal medicare is not without cost. In 2012 total government 
spending on healthcare nationwide was expected to reach C$ 207 billion (CIHI, 2012). The 
province of Ontario was expected to spend $47.6 billion on healthcare in 2012 (CIHI, 2012). It is 
essential that individuals and organizations that are spending taxpayers’ dollars be held 
accountable for their use of resources in the provision of quality service within the healthcare 
sector. 
Accountability is an important issue in healthcare as evident by recent healthcare reports 
identifying accountability as a major issue for Canadians (McGregor, 2012; Brown, 2006; The 
Romanow Inquiry, 2002; McIntosh, Forest & Marchildon, 2004).  There are many advantages to 
having better accountability such as better leadership and governance, stronger operational and 
clinical management, improved access to care and greater worker and customer satisfaction 
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(Relman, 1988).  The challenge is to define exactly what high-quality accountability entails 
because the healthcare system in Canada is complex and there is an increasing recognition that 
one size does not fit all (Deber, 2010). 
 Accountability is defined as “the obligation to answer to an authority that conferred a 
responsibility, by an agent who accepted it, with the resources and delegated authority necessary 
to achieve it, and with the understanding that inadequate performance will result in an 
intervention”(Shortt & MacDonald, 2002). The accountability process requires establishing 
relationships among a number of different stakeholders. For example, medical laboratories 
receive funding from the Ontario provincial government to perform laboratory testing for other 
health providers (e.g., physicians) to assist in the diagnosis and treatment of patients. As a result 
the medical laboratories are accountable to: the government who is responsible for funding and 
regulation, to the tax payers who pay though taxation, to providers who order the tests, and 
ultimately to the patient who is the recipient of care. 
The Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability stated that 
“accountability, like electricity, is difficult to define, but possesses qualities that make its 
presence in a system immediately detectable” (Hartle, 1979). This definition is captured in the 
total management system recommended by the Quality Management Program-Laboratory 
Services (QMP-LS). It is based on the philosophy that similar to electricity, “quality is not 
inspected but rather built into every phase of laboratory test” (QMP-LS, 2012). 
According to Fooks and Maslove, there are five components on which accountability is 
built: 1) define roles and responsibility 2) delegation of authority to take action 3) being 
answerable to the decisions and actions taken 4) evaluation of performance and 5) the use of 
sanctions and corrective solutions (Fooks & Maslove, 2004). The Ontario Laboratory 
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Accreditation (OLA) program requires that all laboratories have proper documentation to 
demonstrate compliance within all five components. Failure to meet the requirements of OLA 
will result in warnings and/or suspension of the laboratories licence to operate.  
Accountability is very important to the healthcare sector and there is growing demand for 
greater accountability at all levels (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2006; Marchildon, 2011; 
Flood & Archibald, 2005). However there is little scientific evidence regarding what to measure 
or how and when measurement should take place. Policy analysts usually look to policy 
instruments or governing instruments to influence behaviour in the selection of preferred policy 
directions (Howlett & Ramesh, 1993). The next section will examine the governing instruments 
that have been used in healthcare based on the typology of Deber et al. (Deber, 2010).   
 
2.3 Governing or policy instruments used to achieve accountability in the Canadian health 
care context with special emphasis on the Ontario medical laboratory sector  
 
  The literature review indicated that accountability has multiple definitions and therefore 
may mean different things to different people. In its simplest form, accountability is being 
answerable to someone for meeting specific goals and objectives (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1996). 
An accountability framework is an important tool that is used to provide information about an 
organization. It is the medium though which information about the mission, vision, values, and 
goals are shared with stakeholders such as the public, patients and payers (Brinkerhoff, 2003). 
Accountability framework provides transparency as to what an organization is accountable for 
and who in the organization is being held accountable (Ableson & Gauvin, 2006). The tools for 
establishing, monitoring and enforcing accountability are different depending on what, whom, 
why and how it is being measured. This next section will examine five types of accountability: 1) 
Vertical and horizontal, 2) Financial, 3) Managerial, 4) Political, and 5) Professional. The 
16 
 
purpose of this is to demonstrate the types of relationships that exist between government and its 
citizens. In a democracy like Canada, accountability ensures that those who govern (individual or 
organization) are answerable to those whom they govern (Day & Klein, 1986).  
Vertical and Horizontal Accountability 
  In describing accountability relationships between actors (e.g., government, medical 
laboratories, physicians, patients, etc.), the literature identified two types:  vertical accountability 
and horizontal accountability (Schedler, 1999; Schacter, 2000).  Vertical accountability 
mechanisms include electoral processes, strong civic organizations and an independent news 
media (Schedler, 1999). Horizontal accountability mechanisms include the arms-length public 
institutions, judiciary, legislatures, auditor generals, public ombudsmen, offices of the privacy 
commissioner; human rights commissions (Schacter 2000). Elements of both horizontal and 
vertical accountability are easily identified in Ontario’s healthcare system.
 
 An example of 
vertical accountability in the laboratory would be the hierarchical relationship between the 
laboratory manager, director and the hospital’s administration for clinical practice and patient 
safety.  An example of horizontal accountability is the relationship with the College of Medical 
Laboratory Technologists of Ontario (CMLTO) which acts as a monitor or watchdog to protect 
the public interest.  
 Financial Accountability  
The majority of healthcare services in Canada are publicly funded (CIHI, 2012). The total 
amount that Canada was expected to spend on health care in 2012 was $207 billion. This is an 
average of $5,948 per person (CIHI, 2012). As previously mentioned, healthcare spending in 
Ontario was expected to reach $47.6 billion in 2012 representing approximately 42% of the 
Ontario provincial budget (CIHI, 2012). Considering that financial resources are finite and are 
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provided by tax payers, healthcare providers are responsible for demonstrating the judicious use 
of these resources (Fenn, 2006).  
Managerial Accountability  
Managers are responsible for the coordination and organization of work (Robbins, 
Coulter & Stauart-Kotze, 2003). This involves more than financial accountability as managers 
are responsibility for demonstrating effective and efficient management of services or systems. 
The focus tends to be on performance as well as the use of resources. For example, in the public 
health laboratories, mangers are accountable to “support health care providers, the public health 
system and partner ministries in making informed decisions and taking informed action to 
improve the health and security of all Ontarians”( OAHPP, 2012).  
 
Political Accountability  
This is the responsibility for demonstrating responsiveness to citizens and delivering on 
commitments (Fooks & Maslove). The MOHLTC represented by elected officials and members 
of the civil service are morally responsible to the citizens of Ontario for the decisions made and 
actions implemented.  For example, the inappropriate practices by the Walkerton’s Public 
Utilities Commission (PUC) operators resulted in the deaths of seven individuals who drank 
contaminated water that was deemed safe by the PUC (Walkerton Inquiry, 2000). The Minister 
of Health had to take responsibility of the actions of the PUC and provide answers to the 
residents of Ontario during question period in the Parliament. 
Professional Accountability  
Healthcare professionals are expected to follow standards that ensure the delivery of safe 
and quality services. In Ontario, the Regulated Health Professions Act provides guidelines which 
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Regulatory Colleges are to use to protect the public (RHPA, 2012). The College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) and The College of Medical Laboratory Technologists of 
Ontario (CMLTO) are responsible for the regulation of doctors and medical laboratory 
technologists who work in Ontario medical laboratories. The Colleges “protects the public’s 
right to safe, competent, and ethical healthcare” (CMLTO, 2012).  
Many decision makers in healthcare rely on a number of policy or governing instruments 
to help them achieve their desired goals. The following section will expand on the four major 
policy instruments mentioned in the conceptual framework that are being used in the healthcare 
sector. 
2.3.1 Policy Instruments  
There are important reasons why the Canadian public should be concerned with 
approaches to accountability in healthcare. Maintaining a sustainable healthcare system is a most 
pressing problem for our time. As the life expectancy of Canadians continue to increase 
(Marchildon, 2012) there is concern as to whether our present system will be able to meet the 
needs of an aging population. There is also concern regarding the increase in chronic diseases 
and the burden that they will place on the healthcare system (CIHI, 2012).  The rising cost of 
healthcare (Marchildon, 2012) and the concerns about inefficiencies, duplication, waste and wait 
times are all driving forces. It is the responsibility of governments to respond to these concerns 
by implementing policies that will frame the future of healthcare. Typically, governments in 
Canada tend to use regulatory or economic policy instruments to influence different actors in 
order to achieve a desired goal (Deber, 2010). 
  This thesis will use the analytical framework created by Deber et al. One dimension of 
the framework classified potential approaches to accountability in terms of the political science 
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concept often referred to as ‘policy instruments’ or ‘governing instruments.’ The second 
dimension looks at the independent variable that affects the impact of these instruments on 
accountability approaches. The thesis will focus on four policy or governing instruments: 1) 
financial incentives, 2) regulations, 3) information to taxpayers, and 4) 
professionalism/stewardship.  These were chosen in order to be able to compare the findings 
from this research (which is a part of a larger study) with that of other researchers working in 
different healthcare sub-sectors. 
 
1) Financial Incentives 
Financial incentive is the adjustment of payment in order to influence providers of 
healthcare to behave in a certain way. One example is the family of Pay for Performance (P4P) 
that is been used in this province to reward physicians for meeting certain pre-determined 
performance measures for quality of service (Devlin, Sarma & Hogg, 2006). Another example is 
government providing a tax incentive to industry to locate in a specific area to provide jobs 
and/or service.  Government has also chosen to offer financial incentives for balanced budget, as 
a way of influencing the actions of hospitals boards in Ontario (Abelson & Gauvin, 2004). 
Financial Incentives and the Ontario medical laboratory sector 
The majority of the medical laboratory sector is publicly funded and privately delivered 
as for-profit or not-for-profit entities.  In the Canadian healthcare context, public usually means 
government owned and private means owned by the people (Deber, 2010). Publicly funded 
implies that the service is paid for using tax payers’ dollars under universal medicare. Since 
laboratories are users of public funds, they are accountable to their stakeholders. The main 
methods of delivery for laboratory services are: public-not-for-profit, private-not-for-profit and 
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private-for-profit.  A full description on the medical laboratory sector will be presented in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.  The literature review indicated that financial incentives differ 
according to the sub-sector within the medical laboratory sector.   The following section will 
present the results of financial incentives based on sub-sector groupings. 
Public health laboratories 
The 11 Public Health Laboratories that operate in Ontario are publicly funded and 
delivered. They have their funds transferred directly from the Ministry of Health and Long Term 
Care (Deber, 2010). The financial incentive is prudent use of allocated resources to ensure 
continued government funding. The employees are civil servants. 
Hospital laboratories 
   Laboratories that are situated in hospitals are categorized as publicly funded, privately 
delivered. They operate as not-for-profit entities and provide service for hospital-based inpatients 
and outpatients. Laboratory tests done in hospitals are funded by the hospitals’ global budget 
through what is termed a “public-contract model,” in which public payers (the government) 
contract with private health- services care providers such as hospitals (Deber, 2010). The 
expense for the medical laboratory services is a part of the total budget submissions made to 
Local Health Integration Networks (Deber, 2010).   In hospital laboratories, the main financial 
incentive is operating within the budget allocated by the hospital board (MOHLTC, 2012). 
Community Laboratories 
 Laboratories that are situated in the community are categorized as publicly funded, 
privately delivered. They operate as for-profit entities and are reimbursed by the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan (OHIP) on a per-test basis. In 1996 the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
(MOHLTC) and the Ontario Association of Medical Laboratories (OAML) introduced the 
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corporate cap payment for for-profit laboratories (Sutherland, 2011). A corporate cap is the 
maximum total amount that a particular laboratory could be paid by OHIP in a fiscal year. The 
amount paid is decided on through direct negotiation with the government and the Ontario 
Association of Medical Laboratories (OAML).  The amount a laboratory bills over its corporate 
cap is not funded by OHIP and is therefore absorbed by the laboratory (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2013). Within the for-profit community laboratories sub-sector, the 
financial incentive is on making profit for their shareholders (Gamble & Deber, 2004; Deber, 
2010). 
2) Regulations 
Regulation is the most commonly used policy instrument in Canadian healthcare (Deber 
et al., 2010) Regulations influence how actors or providers behave.  According to Deber, 
“regulation is the extent to which government directly intrudes on private decision making” 
(Deber, 1991). The regulatory policy instrument when applied usually shift compliance cost from 
the regulators to those that are being regulated. There are several organizations involved in the 
regulation of the medical laboratory sector. The major ones will now be discussed.  
 Government Regulations through the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
(MOHLTC) 
The MOHLTC is responsible for the licensing, inspection and accreditation of all medical 
laboratories in Ontario. The duties are divided between two departments. The Laboratory Branch 
of the MOHLTC is responsible for the licensing and inspection of the medical laboratories. The 
Ontario Medical Association (OMA) working through the QMP-LS, is responsible for 




   Licensing and Inspection 
The licensing and inspection of medical laboratories falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. The Laboratory and Specimen Collection Center 
Licensing Act sets out the guidelines that are used to determine who owns, operate and licenses a 
specimen collection center or a laboratory in Ontario. The Act outlines the type of license that 
may be issued which in turn determines the type of tests that can be performed. A laboratory that 
is issued a series 4000 license will be paid from public funds for testing done on specimens from 
patients who are admitted to a hospital. A laboratory that is issued with a 5000 series license will 
be reimbursed for laboratory test done on both in-patient and out-patient specimens.   The 
Laboratory and Specimen Collection Center Licensing Act sets out the time for inspection, the 
fees for inspection and the consequences for non-compliance (The Laboratory and Specimen 
Collection Center Licensing Act, 2012) 
Accreditation and Assessment 
The Quality Management Program—Laboratory Services (QMP-LS) is a mandatory 
program for all medical laboratories in Ontario. The work of QMP–LS is conducted under two 
umbrellas: 1) External Quality Assessment (EQA), 2) Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA). 
Laboratories are accredited based on the OLA 15189Plus
TM 
standards.  The EQA division is 
responsible for performing proficiency testing that evaluates the medical laboratory based on 
pre-analytical, analytical and post-analytical criteria.  
 The Regulated Health Professional Act (RHPA) 
RHPA provides the framework for the regulation of Ontario’s 23 health professions 
under their respective colleges. This legislation was enacted in 1991. It includes a general Act, a 
Procedural Code for all the regulated health professions and profession-specific Acts (RPHA, 
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2012). The Act allows for the self- regulation of Ontario’s Medical Laboratory Technologists 
(MLTs) under their respective college, The College of Medical Laboratory Technologists of 
Ontario (CMLTO). Pathologists and other medical doctors who work in the laboratory sector are 
regulated by their college, The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO). 
Regulatory colleges are responsible for: a) regulating the practice of a health profession, b) 
developing and maintaining standards of qualification for those who apply for certificates of 
registration, c) developing and maintaining standards of professional practice, knowledge, and 
skill for its members and, d) have statutory committees such as a complaints committee that 
deals with complaints against a health professional (RHPA, 2012).  The Medical Laboratory 
Technology Act,1991  falls under the umbrella of the RHPA and  provide information on the 
scope of practice and controlled act that MLTs are licensed to perform. The Medical Laboratory 
Technology Act specifies the conditions under which MLTs may perform the controlled act “to 
take blood samples from veins or by skin pricking” (CMLTO, 2012). The purpose of the colleges 
is to protect the public by ensuring that only qualified persons are licensed to practice a particular 
profession. Members of the college are expected to maintain the professional competencies. 
3) Information provided to payers and patients 
Information provided to private payers, public, and patients can take the form of report 
cards, annual reports, and performance measurement (Baker et al., 2004). Information sharing 
requires providers to report publicly and be responsible for their actions and decisions. While the 
transparency involved in information sharing is generally regarded as good for accountability it 
may lead to some unintended consequences. The sharing of “bad reports” can affect the 
willingness of patient and payers to continue to use the services of a particular provider. On the 
other side of the coin it may drive a provider to make sweeping changes to improve the quality of 
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the service that it provides. This thesis will examine the most common ways that the medical 
laboratory sector shares information with the stakeholders through quality indicators, financial 
reports, annual or quarterly reports, audit reports, and accreditation reports.  
4) Professionalism/Stewardship 
 Professionalism/stewardship is an instrument for achieving accountability. It directs the 
information to providers rather than to payers and patients. It is based on the high trust that 
professionals as a group or as an individual intend to do the right thing to benefit the patient. 
Health professionals rely on evidence-based practice and best-practice guidelines to help them 
make the best decisions for their patients. In the medical laboratory sector, medical laboratory 
technologists (MLT) and physicians rely on their regulated college, the CMLTO and CPSO to 
set the standards for professional, legal, and ethical scope of practice. Many MLT and doctors 
also belong to other voluntary professional organization such as the Canadian Society of Medical 
Laboratory Science (CSMLS) and the Ontario Society of Medical Technologist (OSMT).  
Professional associations represent the voice of their members and are able to lobby for their best 
interest collectively. They provide best practice information to their members and work to raise 
the public profile of their profession. 
2.4 Independent variables  
A number of independent variables directly or indirectly influence the approaches to 
accountability that is used by an organization.  This thesis will focus on three: a) the policy goals 
being pursued e.g., access, quality, cost control and effectiveness, and customer satisfaction, b) 
the governance/ownership structures e.g., public versus private, c) the goods and services being 
delivered e.g., contestability, measurability, and complexity. This thesis chose to focus on these 
variables because it hypothesized that they will have a greater influence on the approaches to 
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accountability that will be used and set the stage to determine who will be accountable, and to 
whom, and for what. This framework is also easily adapted to other researchers working across 
different sub-sectors of healthcare in the large study. At the conclusion of the larger study it will 
be relatively easy to compare and contrast across a series of related sub-studies, and examine the 
impact of the similarities and differences in their governance/ownership, and the production 
characteristics of the services they deliver.   
   
a) Policy goals  
Policy goals may include elements such as: the delivery of quality care in a safe 
environment, the delivery of care in a cost effective manner, greater transparency, and improved 
stakeholders (patients, payers, customers) satisfaction (Myers & Lacey, 2012). In the literature, 
Behn highlighted improved performance, fairness, and financial stewardship as key objectives in 
achieving accountability (Behn, 2001). 
 The Ontario medical laboratory sector is not homogenous. The literature review 
indicated that there are variations in policy goals based on the sub-sector. For example, private 
for-profit laboratories have a policy of goal making a profit for their shareholders, while the 
private not-for-profit laboratories are not concerned with making a profit but maintaining a 
balance budget (Deber, 2010). 
 Another policy goal is greater transparency. Transparency in healthcare refers to an open 
communication of information to all stakeholders including patients, consumers, providers, 
employers, and policy makers (Behn, 2001).  All organizations that use public money have a 
responsibility to be as open and transparent at all levels to ensure proper accountability.  
Financial transparency ensures that tax payer money is being spent in a cost effective, cost 
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efficient manner. The literature found that private not-for-profit (hospital) laboratories tend to be 
more transparent in providing information to stakeholders about how services are delivered and 
at what cost (Sutherland, 2011).  Private for-profit (community) laboratories are concerned that 
providing sensitive business information could be used by a competitor and generally tend to be 
less transparent (Sutherland, 2011).  
 The policy goal of delivering laboratory services in a cost effective manner was found in 
the literature. Cost effectiveness is a way of comparing cost and health effects of an intervention 
of two or more outcomes (Preker & Harding, 2000). The information obtained can then be used 
to make a decision as to where the best place is to allocate healthcare resources. According to 
Culhane, cost effectiveness is a tool that can be used to achieve accountability (Culhane, 2013). 
Because laboratory services are paid for with taxpayers’ money, every effort should be taken to 
ensure that the procedures are done at the lowest cost to the taxpayers.  
 In the literature, Sutherland made some comparisons between the cost of delivering 
laboratory services in the for-profit and not-for-profit laboratory sector (Sutherland, 2011). The 
problems that are associated with any attempt to measure cost within the ML sector is that there 
are multiple meanings of cost, how and what should be measured. For example, a laboratory 
seeking to reduce cost may decide to contract out a specific test to another laboratory. While this 
action may reduce the unit cost of doing the test, there could be potential adverse effects such as 
a longer turn-around time, which could translate into longer a hospital stay for the patient. In this 
scenario the laboratory may have saved money but the overall cost to the healthcare system may 
have actually increased, while patient outcome and satisfaction may have also decreased.  
According to Deber at el., it is possible that within an organization, policy goals may clash 
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(Deber, 2012,). The challenge is to ensure that conflicting goals are achieved without sacrificing 
quality patient care (Deber, Topp & Zakus, 2004). 
 Providing quality care in a safe environment is a policy goal that is shared across 
healthcare and the ML sector. The recent report from the National Consultation on Health 
Services and Policy Issues: Listening for Directions 111, identified quality and safety as priority 
themes for research in healthcare (National Consultation on Health Services and Policy Issues: 
Listening for Directions 111, 2012). However, the definition and measurement of quality within 
healthcare is difficult because it is based on both the perception of the user and provider of the 
service and each one may have a different perspective as to what comprises quality service. 
Despite these challenges, providing quality service in healthcare should remain an important 
policy goal. According to Donabedian, measuring quality should involve looking at structure 
(e.g., is there a lab policy in place for sample collection), process (e.g., is there a system for 
recording and reporting critical results in a timely manner) and outcome (e.g., does prompt 
reporting lead to improved patient outcome) (Donabedian, 2005). In the ML sector, quality is 
broadly defined to include technical (e.g., performing daily QC) and clinical proficiency (e.g., 
reporting critical reports), and the suitability of testing performed (Shahangian, & Snyder, 2009).  
The quality of laboratory services can be assessed using quality indicators or performance 
measures found in a total quality management system.  Quality management is an active and 
continuous process that validates, monitors, resolves, and documents every step of a procedure. 
In a laboratory that practices quality management, quality is not inspected but built into the job 
of every worker (Harmening, 2012). The literature indicated that quality in a medical laboratory 
should extend beyond the analytical phase to include pre and post analytical phase (Harmening, 
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2012). For example, the quality of results obtained for a throat swab cultured in the microbiology 
laboratory depends on the quality of swab taken by the doctor (i.e. throat and not mouth). 
 The ordering of appropriate tests is another area of concern in pre-analytical testing.  The 
literature indicated that there were a number of provincial inquiries across Canada directly 
related to the quality of laboratory testing (Krever’s Inquiry, Cameron Inquiry, and Walkerton 
Inquiry). The following sub-headings provide a summary account of each one of the inquiries 
conducted.  
The Krever’s Commission of Inquiry 
The Krever’s Commission of Inquiry in 1994 looked at issues of accountability relating to 
the contamination of the blood system with the HIV and Hepatitis C viruses from the Canadian 
Red Cross (Krever’s Commission of Inquiry, 1994). The Commission’s report concluded that the 
relationship between the Red Cross and the federal and provincial governments was poorly 
defined and often dysfunctional.  It stated that: 
“The Red Cross, coupled with the federal and provincial governments, failed to create a 
national blood policy. As a result, no one authority was clearly in charge of, or accountable 
for, the safety of the blood supply” (Krever’s Commission of Inquiry, 1994).  
In response to the lack of accountability identified, the report made several essential 
recommendations concerning how Canada’s blood supply system should be organized, as well as 
the need to compensate those who were infected by the tainted blood supply. These included the 
need for a “national operator” that would manage the blood system, implementation of national 
standards, and compensation for those affected.  The Government took action to implement the 
recommendations of the Inquiry. Two of the actions taken that are very relevant to this thesis 
were: 1) the establishment of the Canadian Blood Services (CBS) in 1998.  The CBS has 
instituted many of the recommendations of the Krever’s Inquiry, including stronger 
29 
 
accountability and safety mechanisms, as well as remaining at arm’s length from the government 
in its daily operations (Krever Inquiry, 1980),  2) Implementing National Standards. In 2004, 
federal, provincial, and territorial governments announced the first national standards for the 
quality and safety of the blood system. This included guidelines for the handling of blood from 
“vein-to-vein,” as well as the collection, storage, distribution and labeling of blood (CBS, 2012). 
The newly formed organization named the Canadian Blood Services (CBS) adopted two guiding 
principles: the safety of the blood system is paramount, and accountability and transparency in 
the operation of the blood system must be clear (CBS, 2012). 
The Walkerton Inquiry 
 In May 2000, seven persons died and over two thousand more became ill after drinking 
water contaminated with E. coli bacteria in Walkerton, Ontario.  The Walkerton Inquiry was 
convened and headed by Justice Dennis O’Connor, to examine the circumstances that lead to the 
outbreak and to look into the future safety of the water supply in Ontario (Walkerton Inquiry, 
2000). There were 93 recommendation made in the second report of the Inquiry. The one that is 
of interest in this thesis is the role of laboratory testing services in municipalities. In 1996, the 
testing of water was transferred from the public health laboratories to the private for profit 
laboratory sector. In this thesis, it is hypothesized that the type of governance/ownership 
structures and relationships in place, will affect who will be accountable, and to whom, and the 
goods and services being delivered, and their production characteristics. In his report Justice 
O’Connor stated that: 
“When water testing was privatized in 1996, private sector laboratories were not 
regulated by the provincial government. There were no established criteria governing 
quality of testing, no requirements regarding the qualifications or experience of 
laboratory personnel, and no provisions for the licensing, inspection, or auditing of such 
laboratories by the government” (Walkerton Inquiry, 2000). 
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It was determined by the Walkerton inquiry that the errors in laboratory test results were 
due to more than analytical procedures, but included errors in pre-analytical and post- analytical 
stages. The inquiry report recommends that accreditation be just one element in an oversight 
regime that also includes licensing and possibly inspection by the provincial environment 
ministry. The report calls for the results of laboratory audits to be available to the public 
(Walkerton Inquiry, 2000; Waterprotection.com, 2011).    
The Cameron Commission 
The Cameron Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing (2009) established 
by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador examined accountability for laboratory test 
results for breast cancer patients (Cameron Commission of Inquiry, 2009). As noted by Justice 
Cameron “...had proper quality assurance and control policies been put in place and had been 
followed, the problem with ER/PR [estrogen and progesterone receptors in breast cancer] testing 
would certainly have been discovered much earlier” (Cameron Commission of Inquiry, 2009). In 
the past, it was the belief that accountability processes in the medical laboratory sector were 
simple and easy to monitor, but the  Cameron Inquiry determined that “there was a failure of 
both accountability and oversight at all levels”
 
(Cameron Commission of Inquiry, 2009). 
Alberta Hospitals 
 As recent as December 2011, there was another report after a series of misdiagnoses and 
misread laboratory tests at hospitals in Drumheller, Edmonton, and Calgary, Alberta. These 
systematic testing errors negatively impacted the treatment of cancer patients and resulted in a 
provincial review of testing in that province (Komarnicki, 2012). 
 All of these cases clearly show that there is a need to examine the approaches to 
accountability that have been used across the laboratory sector in Ontario.  Doctors and other 
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healthcare professionals rely on laboratory services for diagnosis, monitoring, and treatment of 
their patient, (CSMLS, 2012) therefore providing high quality laboratory services should 
translate into better quality patient care. 
b) Governance/Ownership 
According to Denis et al. “Governance deals principally with the adaptation of 
organizations to new contingencies and deals with the roles of all regulatory, administrative, 
professional, and clinical authorities in the pursuit of collective goals” (Denis, 2005). There are 
two ownership models for laboratories in Ontario: public (government) and private (hospital and 
community). There are 11 public health laboratories that are owned by the government. Public 
health laboratories are directly funded by the government and operate in a non-partisan manner.  
There are about 200 accredited laboratories that are privately owned (QMP-LS, 2012) as 
well as laboratories that are situated in physicians’ offices. Deber et al. describes the funding 
arrangements between government and the rest of the laboratory sector as a “public-contract 
model” in which there is third party accountability arrangements between government and 
owners (Deber, 2012). Medical laboratories located in hospitals are owned by the hospital and 
usually operate as a private not-for-profit organization. Each laboratory has a hierarchical 
organizational structure of governance that includes: a director, manager, department supervisor, 
medical laboratory technologist, and laboratory technicians. Each member of the team plays a 
very distinct yet important role. For example, laboratory technicians are often employed in the 
pre-analytical phase of sample collection and processing. The quality of their work has direct 
implications on the role that medical laboratory technologists play in the analytical phase of 
testing of the patient’s sample.  
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  Private for-profit community laboratories increased in numbers with the implementation 
of the Medical Care Insurance Act (1966) which provided universal insurance coverage for 
laboratory services (Sutherland, 2011). Community laboratories operate as a business and are 
funded on fee-for-service basis by Ontario Health Insurance Plan (Sutherland, 2011). As for-
profit organizations they are expected to provide a return on investment to their shareholders. 
For-profit organizations are able to access capital by issuing equity and are able to use this 
money to make investments in equipment such as fully automated laboratories and buildings. 
Even though they may have the same goal of quality services for their patients, they often use a 
different model from the not-for hospital laboratories to accomplish this. This is reflected in 
ownership/governance models found in many community laboratories.  In order to remain viable, 
for-profit laboratories have to offer services at rates and quality that are comparable to that 
offered in the public health or hospital laboratories (Deber, 2002). Some of the ways that they do 
this by having better management, freedom from labour agreement, sacrifice of difficult to 
measure intangibles and risk/cream skimming i.e. offer only tests that are deemed to be 
profitable (Deber, 2002). For example, community laboratories usually make money by 
performing high volume, routine, easily automated laboratory tests.  
The literature review indicated that the private community laboratory sector in Ontario is 
controlled by three multinational corporations: Life Labs (formerly MDS), Gamma-Dynacare 
and CML Health Care (Sutherland, 2011). The Ontario Health Coalition (OHC), report stated 
that “as of 2006, these three corporations controlled 93% of Ontario's $564 million community 
laboratory market, up from 43% in 1985” (Ontario Health Coalition, 2012).  The remaining 
community laboratories are medium to small investor owned and operated.  The number of 
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community laboratories in Ontario fell from 17 to 11 between 1999 and 2006"(Ontario Health 
Coalition, 2012). 
c) Production Characteristics and the Goods and Services Delivered. 
According to the literature, it is important to examine the production characteristics of 
goods and services because it affects how performance can be measured and managed ((Vining 
& Globerman, 1999; Preker et al., 2000; Deber, 2004; Rico & Puig-Junoy, 2002).  This thesis 
will focus on the three production characteristics that influence accountability approaches: 
contestability, measurability, and complexity.  
Contestability 
The concept of contestability as defined by Preker and Harding states that:  
“Contestable goods are characterized by low barriers to entry and exit from the market, 
whereas non-contestable goods have high barriers such as sunk cost, monopoly market 
power, geographic advantages, and “asset specificity” (Preker and Harding 2000).” 
In the delivery of medical laboratory services, an important question to ask is: how easy 
is it for a new provider to enter the market, set up a laboratory, and begin to provide services? 
The ML sector is categorised in the literature has non-contestable because there are many 
barriers to entry (Deber, 2012).  Some of these are: licensing requirements, regulations, 
monopoly market power (e.g., more than 90% of the for-profit market is controlled by three 
companies), geographic location, trust, high sunk costs (e.g., the cost of laboratory equipment), 
and asset specificity (e.g., laboratory equipment can only be used in a laboratory) (Deber, 2002).   
In Ontario, anyone wishing to open a laboratory must obtain permission from the government 
and fulfill the conditions set out in the Laboratory and Specimen Collecting Center Licensing Act 
1984. Only licensed laboratories are allowed to bill OHIP. The fact that since 1973, no new 
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laboratories have been opened in Ontario (Sutherland, 2011) suggests that laboratory services are 
non-contestable goods.  
 Nearly all medical laboratories operating in Ontario must be accredited by Ontario 
Laboratory Accreditation (OLA). The exception is the unregulated laboratories that operate out 
of physicians’ offices.  Other organizations (e.g., Accreditation Canada) are involved in the 
accreditation of laboratory services. Accreditation requirements present as a barrier to entry 
making laboratory service non-contestable. The high capital investment and licensing 
requirement need to start up a laboratory (especially community for-profit) serves a barrier to 
entry and make laboratory services non-contestable. 
    The existence of market monopoly and specialty testing also make laboratory service 
non-contestable. The majority of the large teaching hospitals in Ontario have fully functional 
laboratories that offer service in all five disciplines (microbiology, chemistry, histology, 
hematology, and transfusion science) as well as specialized testing such as flow cytometry and 
molecular technology.  Most hospitals, even in rural areas, have at least a rapid response (core) 
laboratory that provides stat testing (CIHI, 2012). There are 11 public health laboratories that 
provide specialized tests and assistance in disease surveillance and monitoring.  There is an 
extensive network of community laboratories across the province (Sutherland, 2011). Therefore 
finding a niche in the market to open a new laboratory is not going to be very easy. Likewise 
finding the right location and building trust of stakeholders (payers and patient) is something that 
will take considerable time and effort.  
  Another barrier to entry in the medical laboratory sector is the high cost of purchasing 
laboratory equipment and reagents. In addition, laboratory assets have high specificity, which 
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means it is difficult to transfer their use to another service. Another barrier to contestability that 
was found in the literature is the fact that some customers/patients may choose to remain with a 
certain provider even if they were able to find the same service elsewhere cheaper (Deber, 2002). 
In a highly competitive market there are usually few barriers to entry and exit (Deber, 2002). 
However, laboratory services have numerous barriers to entry and exit and therefore non-
contestable. As Preker and Harding concluded:  
“Once incumbents have invested in activities that result in expertise or generate trust, 
they enjoy a significant barrier to entry for other potential suppliers, thereby lowering the 
degree of contestability.” (Preker and Harding, 2000).  
 
Measurability 
Measurability is the term used to describe “the precision with which inputs, processes, 
outputs, and outcomes of a good or service can be measured” (Preker & Harding 2000). It is 
important in performance monitoring that we are able to account for inputs and outcomes.  The 
challenge that the healthcare sector faces it how and what should be measured. As Einstein said: 
“Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be 
counted” (Einstein, attributed). 
 
It is easier to monitor performance when measurability is high. This observation was 
confirmed by the findings of Bendick who compared private sector organization with public 
sector organizations. Bendick concluded that private for-profit organizations tended to be 
efficient at jobs where goals were measurable, easily monitored, and evaluated, while private 
not-for-profit organizations tend to better at providing service (Bendick, 1989). Based on his 
observation, complex organizations like healthcare that are service orientated are better suited for 
private not-for-profit delivery although some sectors within healthcare (e.g., laundry services) 
may be well suited for private for-profit delivery. In the healthcare environment, there are 
36 
 
variations as to how to precisely measure performance. Some sector such as medical 
laboratories, have a high degree of measurability.  For example, when performing a specific 
laboratory test, it is easy to set performance criteria such as reference range, accuracy, precision 
and turn-around time. On the other hand it is more difficult to itemize the activities to be 
expected from a visit to your family doctor, and therefore more difficult to monitor performance 
and ensure quality. 
Complexity 
  In the literature, complexity is defined as “whether the goods and services stand alone or 
require coordination with other providers” (Deber, 2002). Another term used to describe this 
same concept is “embeddedness”. Many of the services provided in healthcare gain their value 
by being embedded. For example, the food services of a hospital may not be easily contracted to 
a regular outside food provider because of the special dietary needs of the patients.  Similarly, 
most hospitals need in-house laboratory services in order to diagnose and treat patients in a 
timely manner. It is this idea of “embeddedness” that has been at the heart of resistance to any 
initiatives to amalgamate or centralize laboratory testing especially in the private not-for-profit 
hospital laboratories.   
2.5 Summary 
Accountability in health care has been identified as an area of interest in efforts to reform 
healthcare (Deber, 2011).  However, in the literature review, there were few definitions of 
accountability that were specifically related to healthcare.  Most of the definitions found were all 
borrowed from general definitions of accountability that have been used in many other sectors. 
There is need for more empirical evidence to guide the development of accountability 
mechanisms in public healthcare (Deber, 2011; Minkler, 2004; Health Professions Regulatory 
37 
 
Advisory Council, 2009). The traditional vertical and horizontal relationships between 
government and its citizens are also present in the health care sector but there are additional 
relationships created by the presence of health care providers and health care-specific public 
institutions (Schedler 1999 & Schacter 2000; Deber, 2011).  
 Recent discussions on accountability in healthcare in Ontario have been centered on the 
LHINs, healthcare facilities, and healthcare professionals. Canadians are demanding greater 
vertical and horizontal accountability from government and healthcare providers (Schacter, 
2000; Flood & Choudhry, 2001; Kirby, 2001; Maxwell, 2002).   According to Stein, two main 
themes that have emerged from a number of commissions examining the Canadian healthcare 
system are: a) financial and managerial accountability, which is a desire to know more about 
money, and performance and b) political accountability which is an increased capacity to classify 


















An Overview of the Canadian Healthcare and the Ontario Medical Laboratory Sector 
 
3.1: Introduction  
Canada’s healthcare model is largely referred to as a publicly funded and privately  
delivered system of care (Marchildon, 2012; Deber et al. 2010; Deber, Gamble & Mah, 2010).  
Financing addresses how healthcare is paid for while delivery addresses how healthcare is 
organized, managed, and provided (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
1987; Donahue 1989; Deber, Narine, Baranek et al., 1998). In Canada, the majority of healthcare 
(approximately 70%) is publicly financed through money collected from taxation (CIHI, 2012). 
The remaining 30% is private financed mainly through private insurance, employee benefit 
packages, or out of pocket payment (CIHI, 2012). In 2012, a forecasted total of C$ 207 billion 
was spent on healthcare (CIHI, 2012). Understanding the role of the public and private sectors in 
terms of funding and delivery is important to ensure accountability for the use of public money 
(Deber, 2002). Therefore the next section will discuss the role of the public and private sectors in 
the financing and delivery of healthcare in Ontario.  
Private and Public 
 A first step is to define public and private. According to Starr, the terms "public" and 
"private" are usually paired to represent such opposites as open and closed, government and 
markets, or the whole versus part (Starr, 1989). The term “public” is synonymous with 
government or the state, while “private” refers to that which lies outside of the scope of 
government, which usually is the market or family (Deber, 2002).  Deber et al. classified the 
public sector into four levels of government: 
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 Federal (national government) 
 Provincial (state, province or territory) 
 Regional (e.g., regional health authority) 
 Local (e.g., municipal) 
This is the typology that will be used in this thesis to define the public sector. 
 The private sector includes both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. Deber et al. 
classifies the private sector into four groups: 
 For-profit corporations (e.g., LifeLabs) 
 For-profit small business/entrepreneurial (e.g., labs located in physician’s office) 
 Not-for-profit organizations (e.g., hospitasl in Ontario)  
 Friends, family and individuals (e.g., at home point of care testing).  
While it is helpful to distinguish public from private, in reality the boundaries between the two 
can be blurred, especially in private organization that performs some public sector functions. For 
example The College of Medical Laboratory Technologist of Ontario (CMLTO) uses private 
money (i.e., member’s registration fees) to carry out a public function (i.e., protecting the 
public). 
 The public sector and the private sector are both involved in the Canadian healthcare 
model (Deber, 2010). As noted above, the majority of services are publicly funded and privately 
delivered. This thesis will focus on the delivery of publicly funded laboratory services by the 
public sector (e.g., Public Health Laboratories), the private not-for-profit sector (e.g., laboratories 
in hospitals), and the private for-profit sector (e.g., corporations). This thesis does not describe 
and examine the for-profit laboratories in physician offices. This sector does not come under the 
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same licensing and regulations, as do the laboratories indicated above. Using the typology found 
in the literature (Donahue, 1989; Deber, Narine & Baranek et al. 1998), the following table 
provides an overview of the relationship between public/private sectors and the 
financing/delivery dimensions in the Canadian healthcare model. 






Public The public sector both funds and 
delivers services (e.g., 
communicable disease testing 
done by public health units). 
 
 
The public sector delivers 
services (public ownership) but 
private insurance, employer 
sponsored benefits or individuals 
pay for care (e.g., prostate- 
specific antigen (PSA) screening 





The public sector pays for 
services that are privately 
delivered (Hospital-based 
laboratories, Canadian Blood 
Services (CBS), Community 
(large corporation, small to 
medium sized owned and 
operated labs and small labs in 
doctor’s offices). 
Private insurance, employer 
sponsored benefits or individuals 
pay for care delivered by the 
private sector (e.g., speciality 




Private not-for-profit (NFP) delivery 
Private not-for-profit organizations vary in size from small (e.g., women’s auxiliary gift 
shop) to large multi-million dollar establishments with many workers (e.g., hospital). In order to 
be classified as NFP, an organization must have the some or all of the following features:  not 
part of the government, do not pay profit to individuals, receive charitable contributions, use 
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voluntary help, receive tax exemptions, can go bankrupt and have multiple objectives (Deber, 
2002). Private not-for-profit organization are often said to do a better job at representing the 
interest of the public (Bendick, 1989).   
Private for-profit (FP) delivery 
Private for-profit organizations also vary in size from small (e.g., laboratory in a 
physician’s office) to large multi-partner corporations with shareholders (e.g., LifeLabs). The 
characteristics of for-profit organizations are: making a profit for shareholders, able to access 
capital through issuing equity, cannot attract charitable donations or volunteer labour, and they 
have to pay taxes (Deber, 2002). Private for-profit organizations have as their incentive to 
maximize profit by minimizing cost. The dilemma that they often face is how to achieve this 
without compromising patient care (Cutler, 2000; Fuller, 2006).  
An understanding of the concept of public and private is important to this thesis as it 
relates to the way laboratory services are financed and delivered in this province. The distinction 
between financing (who pays for services) and delivery (who owns and operate them), was 
described in the literature by Gamble (Gamble, 2002). The majority of medical laboratory 
services in Ontario are publicly financed. The methods of delivery are: public-not-for-profit, 
private-not-for-profit and private-for-profit.  
4.2 An overview of the Ontario Medical Laboratory Sector  
The delivery of quality laboratory services plays an integral part in the quality of care that 
a patient receives (CMLTO, 2013). The medical laboratory sector provides approximately 80% 
of the objective data for diagnosis, monitoring, and treatment of patients (CSMLS, 2013). 
Laboratories also produce results that are useful in public health for disease control and 
surveillance. High quality laboratory services produce additional benefits to the healthcare such 
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as infection control, reduction in length of stay or re-admission, fewer public inquiries, and fewer 
mal-practice law suits (CMLTO, 2013). 
 Medical laboratory providers are a diverse group that incorporate the public, private not-for 
profit and private for profit sectors. As well, a wide range of professionals contribute to the 
delivery of medical laboratory services: medical doctors/pathologists, laboratory managers, 
scientist/researchers, owners, medical laboratory technologist (MLTs) and medical laboratory 
technicians (CMLTO, 2013). The members of each of these groups have different interests and 
expertise and work through inter-professional collaboration to ensure cohesiveness with the 
medical laboratory sector (CMLTO, 2013). The responsibility of managing and performing 
laboratory testing is largely the responsibility of medical laboratory technologists. Medical 
laboratory technologists are the third largest group of regulated healthcare professionals in 
Ontario. The College of Medical Laboratory Technologists of Ontario is the regulatory College 
for this profession with 7711 members (CMLTO, 2013). 
The majority of medical laboratory services in Ontario are publicly funded and are delivered 
as public-not-for-profit (public health laboratories), private-not-for-profit (hospitals-based 
laboratories, CBS) or private-for-profit (community-based laboratories).  This thesis will focus 
on public health laboratories, hospital-based laboratories and community-based laboratories. As 
stated earlier, the privately funded and privately delivered laboratories as well as laboratories in 
physician offices will not be covered in this thesis. The reason for this is because they have a 
different licensing and regulatory bodies. Note that Canadian Blood Services is a not-for-profit 
entity. However, it is not accredited by the Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA) but by 




  Financing of Medical Laboratory Services  
  For the 2005/06 fiscal year (based on the most recent publicly available data), the 
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care spent $1.4 billion on laboratory services (Auditor 
General Report, 2007). Hospital-based laboratory expenditures accounted for $824 million; $572 
million was paid to community-based laboratories, with three companies receiving over 90% of 
these payments. $4.4 million was paid to the OMA to operate its quality-management program 
for laboratory services on the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care’s behalf (Auditor 
General Report, 2007).  
Delivery of Medical Laboratory Service  
There are two delivery methods: 1) public and 2) private.  Delivery can be further sub-
divided into for-profit and not-for-profit as shown in Table 4.2. The term not-for-profit (NFP) 
covers most of the medical laboratories operating in hospitals and the public health laboratories.  
 




Private For-profit Community-based laboratories 
1. Large commercial labs 
2. Small to medium owner operated labs. 
3. Labs in physicians’ offices 
Not-for-profit Hospital-based laboratories 
(Note that hospital-based laboratories vary in size 








In the literature, private for-profit organizations are broken down into two categories: 1) 
Private for-profit small business (FP/s).  This includes small business/entrepreneurs which are 
privately owned (often by the health professionals delivering the service), but need not answer to 
shareholders (Deber, 2002). Private small businesses tend to closely resemble the private-not-
for-profit in the way they are structured and operated. The main difference is that their surplus is 
considered a profit. Many small laboratories that operate out of physicians’ offices are usually 
categorized as small for-profit. As indicated earlier, laboratories located in physician’s offices 
were not a main focus of this thesis. 2) Private for-profit Corporate (FP/c). This includes the 
community-based laboratories that are privately owned and return a profit to shareholders. The 
three mains providers in terms of market share are LifeLabs, Gamma-Dynacare, and CML 
Healthcare. 
 The type of services delivered will vary from one laboratory to another depending of the 
license issued by the MOHLTC and the accreditation awarded by the Ontario Laboratory 
Accreditation (OLA) team.  
What are the approaches to accountability in the medical laboratory sector? 
Based on the typology of Deber et.al, approaches in the Ontario ML sector will be 
discussed using four major approaches to accountability: 1) financial incentives, 2) regulations, 
3) information, and 4) professionalism/stewardship.   
1) Financial Incentives 
  Deber et. al., defines financial incentives as an approach to accountability, which adjusts 
payments to induce providers to behave in the desired manner.  As noted in Chapter 2, an 
understanding of the role of the public and private sector in the financing and delivery of medical 
laboratory services is important in this study. The majority of medical laboratory services in 
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Ontario are publicly financed (Deber, 2010). Some services which are not deemed medically 
necessary are privately funded. For example blood testing for insurance policies and drug testing 
for truck drivers are not covered under the publicly insured system. Financial incentives vary 
across the different sub-sector with the ML sector. 
Public not-for-profit laboratories 
 Publicly delivered laboratory services include the 11 public health laboratories that 
operate in Ontario. Public health laboratories (PHL) receive funding directly from the provincial 
government. The Ontario Agency for Health Promotion and Protection (OAHPP) responsiveness 
to fiscal responsibility is found in its commitment to the citizens of Ontario to “apply wisdom in 
managing and allocating these resources to ensure the best possible outcomes” (OAHPP, 2013).  
Private not-for-profit laboratories 
Private-not-for-profit (e.g., hospital-based) laboratories are usually funded under what is 
refers to as a “public-contract model,” in which public payers contract with private health-care 
providers (Deber, 2010). This means that there is an accountability arrangements are between 
government and the “third sector” (e.g., hospital), and the laboratory, which presents an 
additional layer of complexity (Schwartz 2003).  This in turn affects who will be accountable, to 
whom, and for what. For example, the hospital-based laboratory is accountable to the hospital 
administration and the physicians who order laboratory test for patients. The hospital is 
accountable to the provincial government who provides the funding. 
Hospital-based inpatient and outpatient laboratory testing is funded through the hospitals’ 
global budget. Hospitals control expenditures for their laboratories, which are a part of the 
budget submissions to the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-term Care (MOHLTC). All 
laboratories are required to submit the number of reportable tests conducted each year to the 
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MOHLTC. In addition, hospital laboratories are required to calculate and submit workload unit 
reports to the MOHLTC (CADTH, 2013). 
Private for-profit laboratories 
 Private community-based laboratories submit claims to OHIP on a per-test basis. There is 
a cap to funding for private laboratories (CADTH, 2013). In 1993 the MOHLTC, recognizing 
that it needed to allocate a finite amount of health care dollars effectively, introduced a ceiling 
(“industry cap”) on the total amount payable by OHIP for community-based laboratory services 
carried out in a particular fiscal year. In 1996-7 the MOHLTC and the Ontario Association of 
Medical Laboratories (OAML) introduced the corporate cap payment to address the issue of 
fairness in funding distribution on a geographic basis. Under the corporate cap model, the 
Ministry only pays each individual laboratory up to its threshold amount (“corporate cap”). A 
corporate cap is the maximum total amount that a particular laboratory could be paid by OHIP in 
a fiscal year. This means that the amount a laboratory bills over its corporate cap is not funded 
by OHIP and is therefore absorbed by the laboratory (Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, 2013). 
 Every two years the government negotiates a new agreement with the OAML. Under this 
new policy of corporate cap there has been guaranteed market share for community labs. This 
has resulted in lack of financial incentives for competition for market share. Corporate capping is 
an incentive to for-profit laboratories to take on mainly high volume, low unit cost testing. 
Therefore they do not offer the range of services that a laboratory situated in an academic 
hospital would. The challenges to the hospital-based laboratories, as noted in the British 
Columbia laboratory review (BC Laboratory Services Review, 2003) is that most hospitals 
perform low volume, complex, high unit cost tests. If hospital laboratories are able to generate 
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revenue based on fee-for-service billing for low cost outpatient services, this would offset the 
cost of the high unit cost tests that they perform (BC Laboratory Services Review, 2003). 
 
2) Regulation, Licensing, Inspection and Legislations that governs the practice of Medical 
Laboratories in Ontario. 
Regulation 
  The use of regulation as a policy instrument is deeply entrenched in the Ontario ML 
sector. The ML sector relies heavily on regulation. Most laboratories in Ontario are directed by a 
medical doctor with specialized training in laboratory medicine (MOHLTC, 2012). Doctors are 
members of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).  As noted, medical 
laboratory technologists are members of the College of Medical Laboratory Technologist of 
Ontario (CMLTO). Regulatory Colleges exist to protect the public interest and ensure the highest 
standards of medical care through regulation of the professions (CMLTO, 2010). Both the 
CMLTO and CPSO have accountability to the public as part of their mandate.  
The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care works through its appointed agency, the 
Ontario Medical Association (OMA), to provide accreditation for medical laboratories. The 
OMA was founded in 1880 as a voluntary association of the province’s physicians. One of the 
roles of the OMA is to provide guidance in the development and promotion of healthcare in 
Ontario. The organization has professionals in a number of fields, including laboratory 
proficiency testing, and was legislated by the MOHLTC to carry out a quality management 
program (OMA, 2013). This program is called the Quality Management Program–Laboratory 
Services (QMP–LS). The Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA) is part of the total quality 
management program operated by QMP-LS. OLA provides information about the accreditation 
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program and describes the rights and duties of accredited laboratories (QMP-LS, 2010). A 
discussion on the role of QMP-LS as a provider of information will be presented later in this 
chapter. 
 The medical laboratory sector is also regulated by numerous other organizations such as: 
Accreditation Canada, Industry Canada, Revenue Canada, Canada Nuclear Safety Commission, 
Office of the Fairness Commissioner and the College of American Pathologists (CAP). CAP is a 
medical society serving doctors, patients, and laboratory communities all over the world since 
1947. One of its goals is to “promote quality in the practice of pathology” (CAP, 2013). One of 
the ways that it does this is by offering ISO 15189 accreditation to participating laboratories. In 
Ontario, CAP accreditation is not mandatory but many laboratories chose to participate on a 
voluntary basis.  A further discussion of the role of Accreditation Canada as it relates to the 
delivery of laboratory services will be presented below. The other organizations are not 
discussed in this thesis as they are not mandatory and are only used by some laboratories 
depending on their licensing agreement and accreditation submission.   
Accreditation Canada 
Accreditation Canada is an established organization responsible for accrediting 
Regional Health Authorities, hospitals, and community-based programs and services, from 
both private and public sectors, not only in Canada but around the world (Accreditation 
Canada, 2012). Patient safety is an integral part of the assessment. Accreditation Canada 
“employs standards that assess governance, risk management, leadership, infection 
prevention and control, and medication management, as well as services in over 30 sectors, 
including acute care, home care, rehabilitation, community and public health, laboratories 
and blood banks, and diagnostic imaging” (Accreditation Canada, 2012). Participating 
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organizations are surveyed once every three to four years. Many hospitals in Ontario chose 
to accredit by Accreditation Canada and the laboratories operating in these institution are 
usually a part of this exercise. Obtaining accreditation from Accreditation Canada provides 
the public with additional evidence that the laboratory is performing to industry standards. 
 Licensing  
The licensing and inspection of medical laboratories falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. The Laboratory and Specimen Collection 
Center Licensing Act sets out the guidelines that are used to own, operate, and license a specimen 
collection center or a laboratory in Ontario. All hospital-based and community-based laboratories 
and specimen collecting centers must be licensed and the license must be renewed every year. 
The application process involves paying the appropriate fee and providing the MOHLTC with 
relevant information which should include details on a laboratory’s staff number, staff 
qualifications, and laboratory equipment.  The type of laboratory license determines what kind of 
tests the laboratory is licensed to perform. Laboratories can only bill for tests that it is licensed to 
perform. For example a hospital-based laboratory that is given a series 4000 license will only be 
allowed to bill for tests done on patients admitted to the hospital. With a series 5000 license, the 
hospital is allowed to bill for inpatient and outpatient tests.  
The responsibility of licensing and inspection of licensed laboratories lies with the 
Director of Laboratory Branch in the MOHLTC. Under the Act, a license may be revoked or its 
renewal refused if specimen collections or laboratory tests are incompetently carried out, or the 
owner/operator does not comply with the Act and related regulations (The Laboratory and 
Specimen Collection Center Licensing Act, 2012) There has not been any new  laboratory 
license issued since 1973 (Sutherland, 2011). There has been a reduction in the number of 
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community-based laboratories due to mergers and buying up of smaller laboratories. This 
practice has proven advantageous since buying a smaller laboratory also means acquiring their 
market share or corporate cap. The number of specimen collection centers has increased steadily 
from 1974 to 2008; while the number of community laboratories has steadily declined over the 
same time period. See Table 4.3. 
Table 3.3 Number of Licensed Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centers in Ontario 
Year Hospital- 
based labs 




1974 227 288 13 188 
1993 216 159 13 273 
2008 175 32 12 420 
 
Source: Sutherland, 2011, Laboratory branch of MOHLTC 
Physical Inspection 
The laboratory branch of MOHLTC is also responsible for the physical inspection of all 
licensed laboratories. They are expected to conduct an on-site visit every 18 to 24 months. There 
is a standard inspection worksheet that is used to document findings.  A written report is given 
and any laboratory found to be not compliant is required to take corrective action to rectify the 
deficiencies (MOHLTC, 2013). 
Legislation 
 Tables 4.4 and 4.5 will provide a summary of the major legislations, reviews, and 






Table 3.4 Summary of Legislations directly related to ML sector 
Year Legislation  Impact on the healthcare / 
ML sector 
1958 Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act 
(HIDS Act) 
Federal government 
provided matching funds to 
Provinces for healthcare. 
Laboratory services falls 
under the “comprehensive” 
clause which provided 
funding for diagnostic 
services. 
1990 Public Hospitals Act 
 
 Provide the framework 
within which hospitals 
operate. Laboratory services 
were included under the 
clauses which relate to 
diagnostic services. 
1990 Laboratory and Specimen 
Collection Centre Licensing 
Act 
 
Provides the legislations 
governing the licensing of 
Laboratory and Specimen 
Collection Centres in 
Ontario 
1991 Regulated Health 
Professions Act 
 
It includes a general Act, a 
Procedural Code for all the 
regulated health professions, 
and profession-specific Acts. 
The ML sector was included 
as one of the 23 regulated 
health professions. 
1991 The Medical Laboratory 
Technology Act 
Provide the guidelines for 
the operation of the College 
of Medical Laboratory 
Technologists of 
Ontario(CMLTO) 
1997 The corporate cap model is 
set out in Regulation 2/98.  
 
The goal was to prescribe 
the industry-wide cap and 
set out the formula for the 
calculation of the corporate 






2001   
Laboratory and Specimen 




The OMA appointed the 
QMP-LS with special 
responsibilities to improve 
the quality of lab medicine 
through external quality 
assessment (EQA) and 
accreditation to the OLA 
15189Plus™ standard.  
 
2004 Commitment to the Future 
of Medicare Act 
One component of the Act is 
Public Accountability. It 
states that the health system 
is governed and managed in 
a way that reflects the public 
interest and that promotes 
efficient delivery of high 
quality health services. This 
is area of interest in the ML 
sector.  
  
2004 Quality of Care Information 
Protection Act 
 
Designed to encourage 
health professionals to share 
information and hold open 
discussions to improve 
patient care, without fear 
that the information will be 
used against them. 
 
2010  Excellent Care for All Act. Recommends putting 
patients first by improving 
the quality and value of the 
patient experience through 
the application of evidence-
based health care. This is in 
keeping with the goals of the 
ML sector to a total quality 
management with patient 





The following section will provide a summary of the four latest pieces of legislation 
because they contain significant policy directives which focus on accountability.  
 The Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act (2001). 
The QMP-LS began operating in Ontario in 2000 under the O. Reg. 682 of the Laboratory 
and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act. It replaced the Laboratory Proficiency Testing 
Program (LPTP) (Gamble, 2005). The LPTP was established in 1974 by the OMA. Its role was 
to examine and evaluate the performance of publicly funded (hospital, public health and 
community) laboratories. In 2005, the LPTP was renamed QMP-LS. The Quality Management 
Program-Laboratory Services is a mandatory program operated by the Ontario Medical 
Association (OMA) and funded by Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 
(MOHLTC) in order to improve patient safety. QMP-LS achieves this by assessing the quality of 
laboratory test results and ensuring laboratories meet international and national standards of 
excellence through the OLA 15189Plus™ accreditation program (QMP-LS, 2013). The QMP-LS 
provides the following description of OLA 15189Plus™ International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) guidelines: 
       “ISO 15189 is an international accreditation standard for medical laboratories. Laboratories 
accredited to ISO 15189 demonstrate that they meet comprehensive international standards 
for quality and competence. Accreditation bodies around the world have signed an 
International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) arrangement that fosters 
laboratory recognition of quality, competence and capability through ISO 15189 
accreditation. These accreditation bodies are evaluated to ensure rigorous conformity 
assessment standards are met. Only those accreditation bodies that are part of the ILAC 
recognition arrangement may issue an ISO 15189 certificate. OLA’s partnership with 
Standards Council of Canada (SCC) makes an ISO 15189 certificate from SCC possible for 
OLA accredited laboratories” (QMP-LS, 2013) 
  The work of QMP-LS is conducted under two umbrellas: 1) External Quality Assessment 
(EQA), and 2) Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA). 
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 1) External Quality Assessment (EQA) 
 The EQA program plays a critical role in the laboratory quality system.  Quality in the 
medical laboratory sector is defined as a having technical and clinical proficiency and 
performing the correct test (Tulloc, 1998). It complements the laboratory quality control and 
quality assurance programs that ensure the test results physicians use to make a diagnosis and 
prognosis are accurate and reliable. Laboratory results are peer reviewed and examined for 
reliability. Appropriate steps are taken to address unsatisfactory performance in EQA. 
Laboratories that are not able to implement corrective action may be considered non-proficient 
and referred to the MOHLTC for further remedial action that may include suspension of testing. 
An important advantage of the EQA is that it evaluates not only analytical but pre and post 
analytical issues that can affect laboratory test results. 
 2) Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA) 
Mandatory OLA accreditation of the majority of medical laboratories that operate in the 
province guarantees that laboratories in the Ontario have a world-class quality management 
system. A laboratory’s accreditation certificate provides recognition that the laboratory is 
competent and gives staff and the public confidence that its system will identify and correct 
mistakes before they affect patient care. To be considered for accreditation, a laboratory must 
undergo an assessment visit conducted by a team of trained assessors accompanied by an OLA 
staff technologist. If areas of non-conformance are cited, the laboratory is expected to take 
corrective action within 90 days of the visit. A panel then determines if the laboratory meets the 
criteria for an accreditation certificate. The OLA accreditation is a very rigorous exercise as 
laboratories are examined based on 509 OLA requirements. However the benefits of being OLA 
accredited far outweigh the drawbacks. Being OLA accredited increases the willingness of 
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patients and payers to purchase laboratory services. In Ontario, medical laboratories are 
accountable to provincial governments to ensure public protection. 
Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act 2004 
This Act was passed in 2004 in acknowledgement of the commitment of the government of 
Ontario to Medicare (the provinces system of publicly funded health services). The highlights 
of this legislation centered on patient care, delivery of services, and accountability as important 
issues in healthcare. These issues are also important for the medical laboratory sector because 
public funds should be used efficiently and effectively to provide the best quality of care 
possible for the patients. Laboratories must be held accountable for the quality of the results 
they produce. Some of the items covered in legislation were: 
 Commitment to the principles of the Canada Health Act 
 Support the prohibition of two-tier medicine, extra billing, and user fees 
 A consumer-centered health system that ensures access is based on assessed need, not 
on an individual’s ability to pay 
 Recognition  that pharmacare for catastrophic drug costs is important to the future of 
the health system 
 Access to community based health care, including primary health care, home care based 
on assessed need and community mental health care are cornerstones of an effective 
health care system 
 Public accountability to ensure that the health system is governed and managed in a 
way that reflects the public interest and that promotes efficient delivery of high quality 
health services 
 Recognition that the promotion of health, and the prevention of and treatment of disease 
includes mental and physical illness 
 Recognition of  the importance of an Ontario Health Quality Council that would report to 
the people of Ontario on the performance of their health system to support continuous 
quality improvement 
 Collaboration between the community, individuals, health service providers and 
governments, and a common vision of shared responsibility (Commitment to the Future 




The Quality of Care Information Protection Act (QCIPA) 2004 
 
This law came into effect November 1, 2004. As stated in the legislation “QCIPA will 
promote quality care and patient safety in Ontario by enabling hospitals and other health 
facilities to carry out a review of any incident or event with the assurance that the information 
generated by the review is protected from disclosure” (Ontario Hospital Association, 2013).  
This law does not “prevent legal action resulting from adverse outcome of care but rather 
provide a safe forum for healthcare professionals to discuss errors and potential solutions and 
well as ways to prevent medical errors”. This is in line with the definition of accountability as 
“the process by which one justifies and takes responsibility for actions” (Emanuel & Emanuel, 
1996). 
 The Excellent Care for All Act 2010 
The Excellent Care for All Act became law June 2010. The MOHLTC took this step to 
improve the quality of Ontario’s health care system and make sure every health care dollar is 
used to provide the best possible care. The government took this step to demonstrate its 
commitment to the highest quality of healthcare by stating that: 
 The patient is at the center of the health care system. 
 Decisions about patient care are based on the best evidence and standards. 
 The health care system is focused on the quality of care and the best use of resources. 
 The main goal of the health care system is to get better and better at what it does 
(Excellent Care for All Act, 2012) 
Under this new law, all residents of Ontario will be guaranteed the following: 
 Doctors, nurses and everyone working in health care will put their needs as a patient first. 
 The best available evidence will be used to make decisions about the care they receive. 
 The experience that they have as a patient will be an important part of health care quality. 
 They will have more information and greater choice in the health care they receive 
(Excellent Care for All Act, 2012). 
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Table 3.5 Summary of reviews and mandates directly related to ML sector  
Year Reviews and Mandates  Impact on the healthcare / 
MLS 
1992 Laboratory Services Review 
 
This report made 
recommendations that 
impacted the cost and 
utilization of laboratory 
services. 
1996-1999 Healthcare and Hospital 
Restructuring  
The goal was to foster 
progress toward the 
development of a genuine, 
rational, health care system 
in which hospitals work 
efficiently both with one 
another and with all the 
other players that together 
provide the range of services 
needed by vulnerable people 
facing or experiencing risks 
to their health. The ML 
sector was re-structured 
under this initiative 
 
The following section will provide a summary of the contribution of these two mandates to the 
Ontario medical laboratory sector. 
Laboratory Services Review 
The Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) launched an 
initiative to review laboratory services in 1992. This was done to address the increasing 
utilization and cost of laboratory services. A team of advisors representing major interest 
group, stakeholders, and providers of medical laboratory services from the public health, 
private not-for-profit (i.e., hospital-based laboratories) and private-for-profit (i.e., 
community-based laboratories) sectors participated in this committee. A final report was 
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released in 1994. The recommendations made called for the implementation of: 1) quality 
improvement programs, 2) centralized database and interactive information system, 3) an 
interactive delivery system, 4) human resource management, 5) regulatory system that is 
enabling rather than controlling, and 6) the establishment of the Laboratory Services 
Restructuring Secretariat (LSRS) which was later renamed the Ontario Regional Laboratory 
Services Planning in 2000 (Lab review, 2012). 
One of the main accomplishments of the LRSR was to get the different sectors that 
are involved in the delivery of laboratory services talking and working on initiatives that 
would improve service and enhance patient care.  
Healthcare and Hospital Restructuring Commission 
The Health Services Restructuring Commission (HSRC) was established in April 1996.  It 
was given a mandate to: 
 “Make decisions on restructuring Ontario's public hospitals”  
 “Make recommendations to the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care on reinvestments 
in and restructuring of other parts of the health system and other changes required to 
support restructuring generally, and the creation of a genuine health services system in 
the province.”( HSRC, 2000)  
 
The HSRC made several recommendations which resulted in the closure or amalgamation 
of several hospitals in Ontario. This resulted in closure of some hospital-based laboratories. 
The HSRC also recommended that not-for-profit hospital laboratories and for-profit 
community laboratories in the same vicinity work together in the delivery of medical laboratory 
services (HRSC, 2012). This resulted in several attempts within the laboratory sector to form 
public-private partnerships between hospital-based and community-based laboratories. Based 
on the typology used in this study; these partnerships were publicly financed and privately 
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delivered.  The success of these partnerships was limited and resulted in the dissolution of the 
partnerships (Gamble, 2002).  
3. Information directed towards potential users (patients, public, and private payers)  
This approach to accountability was defined by Deber at el., as allowing market forces to 
work more effectively by encouraging rational choice of the ‘best’ care (Deber, 2010). There are 
many ways of providing information. In this thesis special attention will be paid to publicly 
available reports.  The document review highlighted the work of the Quality Management 
Program- Laboratory Services (QMP-LS) which operates under the auspices of the Ontario 
Medical Association (OMA). The QMP-LS play a dual role of regulatory (discussed earlier in 
this chapter) and providing information. QMP-LS produce an annual report that is available to 
the public. The report contains comprehensive information on the performance of all 
participating laboratories on both the OLA accreditation and external quality assessment 
programs administered throughout the year.  
A number of advocacy groups and professional organization such as : Clinical Laboratory 
Managers Association (CLMA),  Canadian Society of Medical Laboratory Science (CSMLS),  
Ontario Society of Medical Technologists ( OSMT), and the College of Medical Laboratory 
Technologists of Ontario( CMLTO), share information to the public and providers though 
different means such as journal publications,  periodic reports, annual reports, and media 
publications. On a smaller scale, most laboratories produce regular reports that highlight their 






4.  Reliance on professionalism and stewardship 
The use of reliance on professionalism and stewardship as an approach to accountability 
is embedded in the belief that providers, as a group, wish to do the right thing ((Lemieux-Charles 
& Champagne, 2004). The document review highlighted the role of regulatory colleges and 
professional associations to which most of the physicians and medical laboratory technologists 
belong as playing a role in shaping stewardship. 
1) The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) 
 It is the responsibility of the CPSO to regulate the medical profession by ensuring that 
only individuals who have graduated from an “accredited” medical school or an “acceptable 
unaccredited” medical school are certified to practice medicine in this province. In addition to 
meeting the academic requirements and technical skills, all physicians must be mentally 
competent, practice with honesty and integrity, and be able to communicate effectively with 
others in the scope of their practice (CPSO, 2013). 
   The CPSO has in place a disciplinary committee that investigates complaints made by 
the public relating to professional misconduct or incompetence by one of its members. Upon 
conviction by the CPSO, a physician may face a range of penalties, including: revoking or 
suspension of certificate, restriction of scope of practice, or payment of a fine of up to $35,000. 
Another regulatory mechanism employed by the CPSO is peer assessment and continuing 
education requirements. 
2) The College of Medical Laboratory Technologist of Ontario (CMLTO) 
In order to become a member of the CMLTO, the applicant must be successful in passing 
the national certification examination administered by the Canadian Society of Laboratory 
Sciences (CSMLS).  All members of CMLTO are expected to maintain their competence 
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throughout their career, continually enhance their knowledge and skills, and participate in the 
quality assurance program. All members must complete an annual registration. This process 
involves providing the College with information pertaining to scope of practice, professional 
portfolio, hours worked, and hours of continuing education completed. CMLTO members are 
also required to share their knowledge and information with other members of the health care 
team, thus enhancing inter-professional collaboration.  
The CMLTO is mandated to deal appropriately with complaints and concerns about the 
conduct of member medical laboratory technologists. Once a complaint is received it is the duty 
of the College to investigate and take appropriate actions which may include a reprimand, fines 
of up to $35,000, suspensions, terms, limitations, and conditions on a certificate of registration, 
or revocation of registration (CMLTO, 2012). In addition, employers are required to report to the 
College any employee that was terminated, suspended or restricted to practice for reasons of 
professional misconduct, incompetence, or incapacity (CMLTO, 2012). 
 
Canadian Society of Medical Laboratory Sciences (CSMLS)   
The CSMLS is the national certifying body for medical laboratory technologists and 
medical laboratory assistants, and the national professional society for Canada's medical 
laboratory professionals. They are a not-for-profit organization that is funded entirely by 
membership dues and revenues from goods and services. They do not receive operational 
funding from governments or other organizations. The CSMLS has over 14,500 members in 
Canada and in countries around the world. Its purpose is: 
 “To promote and maintain a nationally accepted standard of medical laboratory 
technology by which other health professionals and the public are assured of effective 
and economical laboratory services.” 
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 “To promote, maintain and protect the professional identity and interests of the medical 
laboratory technologist and of the profession” (CSMLS, 2013). 
Membership with CSMLS is voluntary but many medical laboratory technologists choose to 
belong to a professional group that will lobby on their behalf.   
Medical laboratory technologists belong to many other professional organizations based 
on their scope of practice. Many medical laboratories participate in a variety of mandatory and 
voluntary regulatory and licensing organizations as a part of the total quality management 
program. Reliance on professionalism/stewardship as a variant of the exhortation governing 
instrument is an effective approach to accountability within the ML sector.  
The document review suggested that in the medical laboratory sector a blended approach 
of policy instruments is often used. For example, the requirement that medical laboratory 
Technologists belong to the CMLTO can be viewed as regulatory. It is regulatory because there 
is a signed agreement with legal consequences. On the other hand belonging to the College can 
also be viewed as sharing information with potential users on the suitability of medical 
technologists to practice in the province of Ontario. 
 3.3 The Role of Independent Variable in the ML sector 
The literature review identified policy goals, governance/ownership and the goods 
and services being delivered, and their production characteristic as independent variable that 
affect various approaches to accountability. The following section will look at how each of 
these is represented in the medical laboratory sector. 
3.3.1 Policy Goals 
The majority of medical laboratory services in Ontario are publicly funded and 
delivered as public not-for-profit, private-not-profit and private for-profit. The main 
63 
 
difference in policy goals is based on whether the services are delivered as not-for-profit or 
for-profit. The public health laboratories, Canadian Blood Services and laboratories found in 
hospitals are all examples of not-for-profit organizations. These organizations focus on 
maintaining a balanced budget and are not concerned with generating a profit. Their policy 
goals are centered on issues such as quality accountability, transparency, efficiency, and 
cost-effectiveness (Gamble, 2005). Governments at all levels are requiring greater 
accountability for cost and quality of service (Forest, Marchildon & McIntosh, 2004). 
Quality in the medical laboratory sector should take into consideration pre-analytical, 
analytical, and post-analytical phases of testing. An example of pre-analytical quality 
measures includes the correct identification of the patient from whom a sample is taken. An 
example of analytical measures is the production of accurate test results. Examples of post 
analytical measures include interpretation and reporting of results.  
 Private for-profit community laboratories are different from not-for-profit 
laboratories because they have as a policy goal to make a profit for the shareholders. The 
scope of the services that they deliver is primarily tests that are routine, high volume, and 
easily automated. They may discontinue offering services that are too costly because they 
are concerned with profit-making (Deber, 2002). 
3.3.2 Governance/Ownership structure in place 
There are two types of ownership structure in place in the medical laboratory sector: 
public and private. The public health laboratories are owned and operated by the 
government. They had been in operation since 1890 when the Ontario government 
established the first public health laboratory in North America (MOHLTC, 2012). Public 
Health Laboratory services are paid for and delivered directly by the government. The 
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employees are civil servants. The government is responsible for the day to day operation of 
the laboratories that provide a variety of specialized testing and epidemiological services. 
 The privately owned medical laboratories can be further subdivided into private for-
profit and private-not-for-profit. Two examples of private not-for-profit organizations that 
are of interest for this thesis are the Canadian Blood Services (CBS) and hospital-based 
laboratories. The CBS operates as a charitable not-for-profit incorporated organization. It has 
a Board of Directors that is responsible for its day to day operations. The Minister of Health 
or its representatives are members of the board but do not have power to direct the operation 
of the CBS. The board of the CBS is responsible for maintaining a safe blood supply and for 
operating within its prescribed budget (CBS, 2013).   
 Hospital-based laboratories are privately owned by the hospital in which they are 
located. Most hospitals are privately owned and operate on a day-to-day basis without the 
interference of government.  Most hospitals receive public funding from the government 
through transfer payment from the MOHLTC based on the hospital global budget. Hospital-
based laboratories are funded from the hospital’s global budget. In 2006 the Ontario 
government spent $824 million on hospital laboratories (Auditor’s General Report, 2007). 
The range of services and structure of the laboratory depends on the type of hospital. For 
example, many small rural hospitals will have small laboratories that offer stat tests and 
many esoteric or routine tests may be referred out. The organizational structure in these rural 
laboratories may also be very simple.  On the other end of the spectrum are the large 
laboratories located in teaching “Group A” hospitals (Public Hospital Act, 2012). These 
laboratories offer a wide range of routine, esoteric, specialized tests, infection control, 
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research, and teaching. The laboratory hierarchal structure tends be more complicated to take 
into account the academic, research, and clinical work that is being done.  
Private for-profit laboratories are owned by either small corporations (e.g., 
physician’s office or owner operated small to medium laboratories) or large corporations 
(LifeLabs, Gamma Dynacare, and CML Healthcare).  The governance structure tends to 
depend on the size of the corporation.  Typically, small corporations are owned by 
professional with no shareholders and large corporations are investor-owned with 
shareholders. 
3.3.3 Production Characteristics 
This section of the thesis will only examine the difference between hospital-based 
and community laboratories. The public health laboratories will not be included because of 
the specialized nature of the testing that they perform. 
Generally speaking, both hospital-based and community-based laboratories deliver 
services that are publicly funded. However, some important distinctions (there are a few 
exceptions) can be made in the way services are produced.  Fagg et al. noted that many of 
these distinctions serve to identify and separate the two (Fagg et al., 1999).  
 Hospital-based laboratories are not-for-profit while community-based laboratories 
are for-profit. 
 Hospital-based laboratories provide testing for critically ill patient usually on a stat 
basis. Community-based laboratories provide routine tests for community and long 
term care. 
 Hospital-based testing is manual or semi-automated. Community-based are fully 
automated or semi-automated. 
 Hospital-based laboratories offer more esoteric tests that support teaching and 
research but may not be profitable. Community-based laboratory tend to be involved 
in cream-skimming i.e. offer only tests that are deemed to be profitable. 
 Hospital-based laboratories samples are usually for inpatients or outpatient clients. 
Community-based laboratories have many specimen collection centers from which 




3.4 Unregulated or Under-regulated Medical Laboratory Services 
  The majority of medical laboratory services in Ontario take place in a highly 
regulated environment. The literature review revealed that there is a small unregulated 
sector. This sector is made up of: privately funded, publicly delivered uninsured for-profit 
laboratories such as those run by fertility clinics (Ministry of Children and Youth Services, 
2013) and private insurance company. Unregulated medical laboratory services will not be 
the primary focus in this thesis.  
3.4.1 Publicly Uninsured Services 
Some of the services offered by this sector are not covered by Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan (OHIP). For example the Anti-Mullerian Hormone (AMH) test measures the 
level of a hormone in a woman’s blood and is a good way to assess egg supply but this test is 
not covered by OHIP. The major concern is that there is no mandatory licensing or quality 
assurance mechanism put in place by the MOHLTC to govern this sector.  The organization 
may choose voluntary accreditation by Accreditation Canada. However, without mandatory 
provincial accreditation there are no standards for the services offered (Ministry of Children 
and Youth Services, 2013). 
3.4.2 Physicians’ Offices 
Physicians in Ontario are covered under the Laboratory and Specimen Collection 
Center Licensing Act to perform simple laboratory tests in their office. The major concern is 
that these tests are not subjected to Ontario Laboratory Accreditation quality assurance. In 
the Auditor’s General’s Report of 2007, the report stated that the “The Ministry indicated 
that it had initiated discussions with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
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regarding options for monitoring the quality of testing being performed in physicians’ 
offices” (Auditor’s General’s Report, 2007). 
3.4.3 Point-of-care-Testing 
Point-of-care-testing is the term used to describe laboratory tests that are conducted 
outside of a laboratory. Testing may take place in the hospital, clinic, doctor’s office, 
ambulatory care, pharmacy, or at home (Accreditation Canada, 2012). The aim is to deliver 
test results that are fast and accurate very close to the patient. The methods used range from 
simple (dry chemistry) to more sophisticated testing. One of the most common POCT 
available is the glucose monitors. The concern with POCT is making sure there is 
appropriate accreditation and regulation. 
3.5 Summary 
Canada has a healthcare system that is mainly publicly funded and privately 
delivered. Most of the planning and delivery of healthcare takes place at the provincial and 
territorial levels. The federal government plays a role in funding, information, research, and 
regulation of healthcare. The Ontario medical laboratory sector falls under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. The medical laboratory sector is mainly 
publicly funded and privately delivered as not-for-profit or for-profit entities. Many 
organizations are involved in the licensing, accreditation and regulation of the sector. 
Medical laboratories provide approximately 80% of the objective data for diagnosis, 
monitoring, and treatment of patients. As users of public funds, they are accountable to the 







4.1       Methodological Approaches 
The goals of this thesis are to: 
1. Identify and describe the accountability mechanisms used in the Ontario Medical 
Laboratory Sector (ML sector);  
2. Determine if the accountability mechanisms vary by sub-sector within the Ontario ML 
sector; and 
3. Examine stakeholder views on the advantages and disadvantages of the accountability 
mechanisms used. 
To answer these questions, document reviews of peer review, grey literature, and semi-
structured interviews were conducted. The term grey literature is used to describe information 
that has not been peer reviewed, published or indexed by major databases.  Key stakeholders 
were identified from a cross-section of Ontario’s ML sector. 
Note that this project is part of a larger study examining and comparing the approaches to 
accountability across a number of different healthcare sectors. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the approaches taken by the Ontario ML sector.  The author’s specific role in this 
research project included a) collaborative participation with an interdisciplinary team, working in 
partnership with senior policy makers in the Ontario ML sector ( Dr. Gregory Flynn, Managing 
Director QMP-LS) to assist in the development of research questions and research design 
specific to this study, b) completion of information for the research ethics board, c) data 
collection, d) data entry, e) data analysis, f) presentations at local conferences, g) preparing a 
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paper for publication; and a registered medical laboratory technologist with the College of 
Medical Laboratory Technologists of Ontario (CMLTO).  
4.2   Research design 
  The research design is a case study approach. This approach allows the researcher to 
obtain an understanding of the complex issue of approaches to accountability in healthcare and 
specifically the medical laboratory sector as little information exists at the present time (Johnson 
& Reynolds, 2005). As noted in the literature review, the delivery and financing of medical 
laboratory services in Ontario includes both the public and private sector resulting in a number of 
different funding models and delivery structures as described in Chapter 4 (see pages 76 and 80).  
According to Yin, the case study method is relevant when addressing a descriptive question such 
as “what happened and/or an explanatory question such as “how or why did something happen” 
(Yin, 2003). The goals of this study are to describe the accountability mechanisms used in the 
Ontario ML sector and how these approaches vary by sub-sectors as described in Chapter 1 (see 
page 16). Noting the advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms used provides further 
clarification as to why certain approaches to accountability are used and others are not.  
The benefit of using a case study design is the ability to incorporate data from a variety of 
sources including documents, artefacts, interviews, and observation (Merriam, 1998). This study 
uses document review and semi-structured interviews for data collection. A case study approach 
is also useful in obtaining specific information about the human side of an issue, including 
options, behaviors, and beliefs (Mack at el, 2005). As indicated, semi-structured interviews were 
used to determine the views of stakeholders on the accountability mechanisms used in Ontario 
ML sector.  
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Another benefit of a case study approach is that it confirms information that was 
presented in previous research or found in the literature review (Yin, 2003).  Data collection 
included document review of peer review and grey literature. Using a case study approach was 
helpful in this study because there was very little research available on examining the 
accountability mechanisms used in Ontario’s ML sector. 
4.3 Data collection 
Data was collected through document review and semi-structured interviews. The 
following section will describe the process. 
4.3.1 Document Review  
A description of the document review process will be presented in the sub-sections 
below.  
 
4.3.1.1 Literature Search Strategies 
The focus of the literature review was to identify articles related to accountability in 
health care. The research strategy included using different sources. The first search was done 
using the computerised library resources at University of Ontario Institute of Technology 
(UOIT). The search engines used were: Pub Med, Ovid, EBM Reviews, and Medline. These sites 
tend to capture different literatures, and thus helped ensure that key references were not missed 
(Walters, 2007). 
The collection of data from documents was done through electronic index searching, 
citation searching, and purposive collection from stakeholder websites. Most of the data was 
collected from documents dated 1995 to present. The researcher decided to use 1995 as a starting 
point as this was the year that the Ontario healthcare sector underwent major restructuring. It was 
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also at this time that many changes in the parameters of public policy affecting the delivery of 
laboratory services were made.  Using this year as a baseline, the researcher hoped to be able to 
keep track of future policy changes and their effect on the ML sector. A few older documents 
were used mainly because they provided historical/longitudinal perspective on approaches to 
accountability. Most of the documents accessed were publicly available and readily obtainable in 
electronic (PDF) format. 
 The inclusion criteria used were English Language articles only because of the 
lack of access to bilingual translators. The problem with this decision is that this thesis cannot be 
applied to French speaking Canadians.  Articles from Canada, USA, England, New Zealand and 
Australia were mostly chosen because these countries have a publicly funded healthcare system 
or had the same economic status as Canada, thus making it easier to make comparisons (Deber, 
2010; Marchildon, 2013).  Only scholarly peer review articles were chosen because they ensured 
that the author’s work, research, or idea have been scrutinized by others in the field that are 
qualified to perform an impartial review. 
 Citation chains from key articles were then analysed both backward and forwards; that is 
checking the relevant articles cited by that paper (backwards) and the materials citing that article 
(forward) to ensure accuracy (Kuper, Lingard, & Levinson, 2008).  
 The second literature search method employed was an internet search using the Google, 
and Google Scholar. Although these sources are not usually recognized as appropriate scholarly 
sources, they were chosen because of the nature of the research that was being conducted. The 
search strategy employed using such keywords as: indicators, accountability, accreditation, 
balanced scorecard, evidence-based laboratory medicine, funding for laboratory services, 
performance measurement, performance standards, and public health laboratories, alone and in 
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combination.  The abstracts obtained were then screened for relevance.  Articles and other citable 
material were then entered into a computerized searchable bibliographic data base, using the free 
software package Refworks. 
 A search for “grey literature” was conducted by visiting selected websites such as Public 
Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), College of 
Medical Laboratory Technologists of Ontario (CMLTO), The Canadian Society of Medical 
Laboratory Sciences (CSMLS), Ontario Society of Medical Laboratory Technologist (OSMLT) 
and the Clinical Laboratory Management Association (CLMA). Grey literature or unpublished 
articles are important because they provide a wealth of information that may not generally be 
found in published work. There not many scholarly papers on approaches to accountability 
written by Canadian medical laboratory professionals. Most of the information on accountability 
in the medical laboratory sector was obtained by looking at the original document archived in the 
different stakeholder organizations. 
Data collected from documents was organized using two methods.  The first was using an 
Excel spreadsheet to maintain a detailed record of all documents that were accessed.  The second 
method was to save PDF copies of some documents deemed very important to a computer hard 
drive.  A second excel spreadsheet was created using typology from the research questions to 
make it easier to track documents on file. A summary of data sources accessed is provided in 
Table 3.1 (see below). In addition to the summary of documents outlined below, certain websites 
were searched and read for organizational structure information and relevant website links to 
information related to accreditation or accountability. The decision on valuable websites to 
access was based on the literature review, suggestions from research partners and supervisors, 
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and the researcher’s own knowledge of the ML sector. A complete list of websites accessed can 
be found in the references section of this thesis. 
Document Review  
 The list of document sources reviewed are summarised in Table 4.1  
Table 4.1    A summary of Documents reviewed 


































































Ontario Government, Ministry of Health 




on legislations and 
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Type of Source Sources Accessed Data Used 
 recommendation 
relating to medical 
laboratories 
 
Legal Database Canadian Legal Information 










Canadian Medical Association(CMA) 
www.cma.ca/ 
 




College of Medical Laboratory 
Technologist of Ontario(CMLTO) 
www.cmlto.com/ 
 













1. PubMed (MEDLINE)    
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed 
Google Scholar  scholar.google.ca 




















Type of Source Sources Accessed Data Used 
www.nationalpost.com/ 
 
The Toronto Star www.thestar.com/ 
 
Each document was analyzed for its contribution in informing the research questions in 
this study. This information was placed into three board categories: historical perspective, 
governing instruments and independent variables. See Appendix H for a comprehensive list of 
documents reviewed and the contribution of each document.  
4.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants in the medical laboratory 
field.  Qualitative research methods, such as key informant interviews, helped to obtain answers 
to questions on a broader level. These methods also helped to further expand and elaborate on 
areas that they felt were important to the issue being discussed (Bowling & Ebrahim, 2007). The 
use of semi-structured interviews allowed both the key informant and the researcher to ask for 
clarification in order to get a better understanding of the questions asked or the answers given. 
Sample 
The study took place in Ontario. Twenty individuals from, not-for-profit public health 
laboratories, private-not-for-profit hospital laboratories (large urban and small rural), and private 
for-profit community laboratories, educational and professional organizations were interviewed. 
Data design was guided by the categorization of the ML sector according to the delivery 
typology of Deber et al. (2010).  
Sampling technique 
  In this study, snowball sampling, also known as chain referral sampling, was used to 
identify the individuals for the interview. This is a non-probability (non-random purposive) 
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sampling technique used to obtain information and knowledge, from extended associations, 
through previous acquaintances (Bowling & Ebrahim, 2007). Snowball sampling uses 
recommendations or referrals to find people with the specific range of skills that has been 
determined as being useful.  
 Inclusion criteria for this study were professionals working in the Ontario ML sector. 
The initial selection of informants was based on their position and/or role within the medical 
laboratory sector. As a result the following positions were identified: a) laboratory professionals 
with experience in supervisory or managerial positions, b) individuals representing laboratory 
professional organizations and c) individuals from academic programs responsible for training 
medical laboratory technologists. Key informants were chosen based on their position, 
knowledge, and experience with accountability approaches in the ML sector. According to 
Kumar (1989), they would provide the most valuable information in regards to our study.  
Participation in the study was voluntary. No incentives were given for participating.  
Forty individuals were contacted and 23 consented to be interviewed. Those individuals 
who did not consent gave no reason for their refusal. There were three individuals who consented 
to an interview but did not respond to the follow-up email to schedule an interview date and 
time. As a result, only 20 persons were interviewed.  
 The interviews were conducted between May 2010 and October 2011. Individuals 
interviewed were from public not-for-profit (Public health laboratories), private not-for-profit 
(hospital laboratories), private for-profit (community laboratories), academic institutions, and 
professional organizations. The positions held by those interviewed included administrators, 
managers, physicians, educators, representative from professional organizations, and medical 
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laboratory technologists. Table 4.2 shows informants interviewed based on their profession and 
sub-sector. 
 Each informant was assigned a letter identifier and then assigned a chronological number 
based on their main position. For example laboratory manager was designated LM and assigned 
a number 01 (e.g., LM-01, LM-02). 
Table 4.2 Number of Informants Interviewed by Position with Letter Identifiers 
Sub-sector Position Letter identifier Number interviewed 




For-profit LM 2 















As evident, the majority of persons interviewed were laboratory managers. This is not 
surprising since laboratory manager are usually responsible for regulation and accreditation, 
which is an important approach used to monitor accountability in the ML sector. 
 
4.4 Interview Questions 
The interview questions were designed to address the research goals in this study. The 
interview questions were developed in conjunction with the research team members from the 
Partnership for Health System Improvement (PHSI) on Approaches to Accountability. As 
previously stated, this is a research project funded by CIHR and features collaboration among an 
accomplished interdisciplinary team, working in partnership with senior policy makers across 
multiple healthcare sectors. The purpose of the overall study is to ascertain the factors affecting 
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the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to accountability and whether these will 
have differing variation across sub-sectors depending on independent variable such a policy 
goals, governance structure, and production characteristics (Deber, 2010).     
The interview questions were discussed over a series of meetings with the research team 
members.  The questions were developed such that they could be generally applied across 
different samples and to allow for comparability across the different sub-studies, and across 
jurisdictions. To ascertain the factors affecting the strengths and weaknesses of various 
approaches, this study concentrated on four currently-used approaches to accountability: 
financial incentives, regulations, information directed towards patients/payers, and 
professionalism/stewardship (Deber, 2010). The interview questions guide was reviewed and 
approved by the researcher’s supervisor. 
The following questions were asked during the interview: 
1. a. What are the accountability requirements for each of the defined function areas? 
             b. To whom is your organization accountable? 
2. What types of services does your organization contract out? 
3. Are there services your organization would NEVER contract out?  Why? 
4. What approaches (internal and external) are/were used by your organization?  For each 
approach state where it is used, how often it is used in that area, and who is holding ‘you’ 
accountable? 
5. Were consultations carried out or was the approach imposed on your organization?  If 
imposed, who was it imposed by? 
6. If consultations were used, how were they carried out?  How much input did your 
organization have? 
7. Do you feel this process led to a better/worse approach to accountability? 
8. What are (were) the strengths of the approaches?  
9. What are (were) the weaknesses/challenges of these approaches? 
79 
 
10. Do the approaches used help your organization achieve its goals (are they aligned with 
the goals)?  
11. How well do you think each approach ensures performance, equity, and financial 
stewardship? 
a. Has there been a change in your organization’s ability to achieve these goals since 
the introduction of the accountability measures? 
b. Do the accountability measures help reveal, or address problems, and then fix 
them if identified? 
12. Is it difficult for your organization to achieve accountability? Is there variation? If so, 
why?  
13.  Is there CEO – board accountability? 
14. Who pays to meet the requirements or monitor compliance with the requirements (i.e., 
evaluation)? 
15. Why do you think the performance measures used in the HSAA were chosen? 
16. What activities do you think are important to be measured but are not currently being 
measured in HSAA or OLA? 
a. Why are these activities not being measured? 
b. Are these the same reasons why they excluded from the HSAA/OLA? 
17. What activities are not measured in any way?  Why? 
18. Do you use these accountability measures to make decisions on performance? 
a. What do you use to make decisions about performance? 
19. How easy is it for an organization like yours to enter your sector and provide services in 
targeted areas (or market)/specialized services? 
a.  (If easy) Why is it easy to enter the system? 
b. (If difficult) What makes it difficult for an organization to enter?  
20. Is it difficult for an organization like yours to leave target markets, make changes in 
service provision, or stop providing services?  
21. Are there any consequences or rewards that result from not meeting performance criteria 
or accountability criteria? 
a. If so, what are the consequences or rewards? 
22. Are the accountability/performance indicators tied to financial indicators/rewards? 
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23. Are there any unintended consequences that occur due to the accountability approach 
being used?  
4.5 Conducting the Interviews 
A total of 23 questions were developed (see above).  Key informants, once identified 
were sent an email by the researcher and invited to participate in a semi-structured interview to 
provide their views on approaches to accountability in the ML sector in Ontario (See Appendix 
B). Informants were asked to forward their acceptance or declination to the email address of the 
researcher. A response declining to participate was followed up with a thank you letter. A 
response to participate was followed up with an email of the interview questions and a copy of 
the consent letter (See Appendix A for interview questions and Appendix C for consent letter). 
The researcher then followed up with subsequent emails and/or telephone calls with the intention 
of setting a date, time, and place for the interview. No response to the first email was followed 
up with a second email approximately two to four weeks afterwards. There were no incentives 
offered for participating in the interviews. 
The time and place of the interviews varied based on the availability of the informants. 
Most of the interviews were conducted during the regular working hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m. The researcher travelled across Southern Ontario to conduct sixteen face-to-face interviews. 
The remaining four were conducted by telephone.  
At the time of face-to-face interview, the researcher first went over the consent form with 
each informant and obtained a signed copy of the consent form from the informants. Informants 
who participated by telephone were also briefed on confidentiality at the start of the interview. 
Verbal consent was obtained and the participant was asked to return their signed consent forms 
to the researcher by fax or email. 
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  Each interview began with a short introduction of the researcher and the purpose of the 
study. The researcher obtained consent to tape the interview and to take notes. Eighteen 
informants consented to be tape-recorded; the other two hand-written notes were taken by the 
researcher. The interview then proceeded with the researcher asking the questions, using the 
interview guide (see Appendix A). As the need arose, the researcher was able to ask for further 
clarifications or elaborations. The researcher would skip over a questions that the participant was 
not comfortable answering or that was already answered while answering another question. At 
the end of the interview, the participants were thanked for their willingness to participate. 
Participants were also asked if there was anyone else that they think the researcher should talk to. 
Any suggestions received were followed up by the researcher alone. Every effort was made to 
ensure confidentiality and avoid coercion. A thank you letter was sent to all participants (see 
Appendix D). 
The interviews ranged in length from 45 minutes to 75 minutes, with the majority of 
interviews lasting 60 minutes. The interviews were either voice tape-recorded or hand written, 
depending on the preferences of the person being interviewed. A manual Sanyo 2-Speed 
dictation microphone and a digital Sony ICD-PX820 tape recorder were used to tape the 
interviews. All interviews were conducted by the researcher. 
4.6 Ethics Approval 
Ethics approval for the interviews was obtained from the University Of Ontario Institute 
Of Technology Office Of Research Ethics (REB # 10-036). See Appendix F and G.  
   Confidentiality and anonymity of the data was an important aspect of this research 
design. The data from the interview transcripts was removed of identifying information and the 
audiotapes were deleted immediately after transcription.  This information was relayed to 
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informants in the consent forms and again prior to the interview by the researcher. All informants 
will be given a summary of the findings at the completion of the thesis.   
 
4.7        Data Saturation 
 The sample size was determined by data saturation.  Data saturation is achieved when 
further sampling does not generate any new data (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). In this study 
data saturation was achieved when further interviews were not revealing any new information 
but merely repeating what was heard before. 
4.8          Data Triangulation 
This research was designed to incorporate the principles of triangulation. Triangulation is 
a useful technique that aids in the authentication of data through cross verification from more 
than two sources with the aim to increase the credibility and validity of the results (Yin, 2003). 
Triangulation goes beyond repetition of data gathering to a deliberate effort to find the validity of 
data, observe its meaning and interpretation (Jick, 1979). In this study a combination of data 
triangulation and methodological triangulation were used. 
4.8.1 Data-source triangulation  
Data- source triangulation is the collection of data from different examples of similar 
cases (Yin, 2003). The purpose of data-source triangulation is to see if the phenomenon remains 
the same under different circumstance bases of the parties that are involved (Yin, 2003). Denzin 
described three types of data triangulation; time, space, and person (Denzin, 1989). In this study, 
data was collected at different points in time (May 2010 to October 2011) and in different spaces 
(across the Southern Ontario). The advantage of using data-source triangulation was that the 
researcher was able to compare and contrast the response of key informants based of 
geographical location (urban versus rural laboratories). The key informants were drawn from a 
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variety of professionals and sub-sectors within the ML sector, hence providing breadth and depth 
to the information received. Table 4.3 provides an example of person triangulation. 
Table 4.3   Example of person triangulation.  
Position Geographical 
Location 
Sector Number interviewed 
Laboratory managers Urban For-profit 2 
Laboratory managers Rural For-profit 0 
Laboratory managers Urban Not-for-profit 4 
Laboratory managers Rural Not-for-profit 2 
 
4.8.1 Method source triangulation  
Methodological triangulation involves the collection of data using different methods. The 
purpose of using multiple data collection methods is to provide greater confidence in the 
interpretation of the findings from the data analysis. This study uses two data methods: document 
reviews (e.g., Legislation and Regulation) and key informant interviews to illustrate the 
“converging lines of inquiry” (Yin 2003). Table 4.4 is a summary of the methodological 
triangulation that was used in this study. The reason for using triangulation was to assure 












 Historical documents and reports from organizations, 
 governments and associations 
 Newspaper articles 
 Presentation from conferences 
 Reports from inquiries 
Key Informant Interviews 
 Administrators 
 Educators 
 Laboratory managers 
 Laboratory physicians 
 Medical laboratory technologist 
 Representatives from professional organizations 
 
 
4.8 Data Analysis 
A description of data analysis will be presented in the sub-sections below. 
4.8.1 Data analysis of documents 
 In order to guide the document analysis, the following questions were asked using the 
framework established by Deber et al. (Deber 2010). 
1. What types of laboratory services presently exists? 
2. How are the services delivered? 
3. What type of governance structure is in place? 
  The approach taken in data analysis is what Miles and Huberman call a “mid-level” 
approach. The mid-level approach combines the creation of a detailed provisional structure (a 
priori approach) based on the conceptual framework, following which the coding approach is 
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revised, refined, and/or expanded (inductive approach) based on emergent themes (Miles & 
Huberman ,1994). 
 Documents of interest were manually coded and analysed. Documents were coded into the 
following broad categories: 1) policy events (timelines), 2) organizational shifts, 3) legal 
excerpts, 4) government performance reports, and 5) government laboratory expenditure. Interim 
themes and analysis were reviewed regularly with the thesis supervisor, following which coding 
was refined further to reflect emergent themes. Appendix H provides a comprehensive list of the 
documents reviewed and  Appendix E provides a summary of categories into which documents 
was sorted and coded.  
4.9.2 Data analysis of semi-structured interviews. 
Eighteen semi-structured interviews were recorded using a tape recorder. The researcher 
took detailed notes with two of the interviewees. The first step in data analysis is transcription of 
the data. For the two interviews in which notes were taken this involved typing the notes into a 
word document and later re-checking the word document against the written notes.  
For interviews that were recorded, the first step was to transcribe the audio files into a 
word document. For the first two interviews this was done by repeatedly listening to the tape 
while typing text into a word document. This was a very time consuming measure. With the help 
of the Information Technology department at UOIT a special software program, Dragon™, was 
located that would be used to convert voice directly into text. An amendment to the REB 
application was submitted and permission was obtained to use this software (see Appendix G for 
amendment to REB application). 
 The data was transcribed using the services of a paid transcriber. REB amendment was 
obtained to use a transcriber. (See Appendix I). After the data was transcribed using computer 
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software, the taped interview was then replayed several times to allow the researcher to make 
corrections for any translation error due to voice recognition. In accordance with the 
transcription process described by Denzin and Lincoln , the data analysis involved listening to 
the recorded sessions and writing down each word, pause, remark and statement to capture non-
verbal behaviours during the  interview, such as laughter and pauses made by both the researcher 
and the informant. Such details are considered an important part of the research process because 
they allow the reader to gain a sense of how the actual conversations took place and give a sense 
of the ease with which questions were answered (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).  
Upon completion of the transcription, the transcriptions were removed of any identifying 
information and replaced with identifying codes (e.g., the first manager interviewed was coded 
LM-01).  The transcriptions were stored in a password-protected computer in the research 
supervisor’s office.  The list of identifiers was stored in a locked filing cabinet separate from the 
tapes, consent forms, and transcripts. 
4.9.3 Data analysis and coding using computer software NVivo9™ 
NVivo9™ is a qualitative data analysis computer software package produced by QSR 
International. It has been designed for qualitative researchers working with very rich text-based 
and/or multimedia information, where deep levels of analysis on small or large volumes of data 
are required. One special feature of NVivo9™ is that it allows the analysis to put themes in 
‘nodes’ which are like virtual filing boxes  that allow the researcher to see all the information on 
a theme summarized together.  The identification of themes is one of the most fundamental tasks 
in qualitative research (Ryan & Bernard, 2003).  
 NVivo9™ was used to analyze the transcripts from the key informant interviews. The 
transcripts were uploaded onto NVivo9™ on a password protected computer. Only the 
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researcher had access to the data base. The researcher had no previous experience using 
NVivo9™ and so in order to become familiar with the software, participated in two peer-training 
sessions and one on-line Webinar.  
 Using NVivo9™, the researcher created themes based on the analytical framework 
(Deber, 2010). The transcripts were then analyzed line-by-line, coded using key words or phrases 
and placed into the appropriate nodes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). The nodes were compared with 
each other in order to put them into sub-categories. The researcher then compared the sub-
categories back and forth in order to put them into the main categories or themes (Cutcliffe, 
Stevenson, Jackson & Smith, 2006). The themes were chosen according to the four governing 
instruments as well as core independent variables obtained from the analytical framework. The 
analytical framework includes four approaches to accountability; financial incentives, 
regulations, information directed at users (one form of exhortation instrument) and reliance on 
professionalism and stewardship (Deber, 2010). The core independent variables were policy 
goals (access, cost and quality), governance/ownership (including the public-private mix) and 
production characteristics (contestability, measurability, complexity) of the goods and services 
being provided in the ML sector (Deber, 2010).   
4.9.4    Validation and Reliability of Data 
   Once the data analysis was completed, the researcher then went back and re-read the 
interview transcript and coding to ensure consistency and accuracy.  In order to ensure reliability, 
one transcript in NVivo9™ was coded by another researcher not involved with the study. The 
result from the coding comparison query was found to within 85% agreement with that of the 
researcher. This step ensured validity of the coding process and reduces the chances of 
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researcher’s bias (Richards, 2005). A summary of coding categories is available as Appendix E. 
The detailed analyses, including quotations, are provided in Chapter 4. 
4.9.5 Storage of Research Data 
 At the completion of the thesis, hard copies of the consent forms and other interview data 
were sealed in an envelope and securely locked in a cabinet in the supervisor’s (Dr. Brenda 
Gamble) office at UOIT. These will be destroyed after seven years. Data from the password 
protected computer and audio recordings from the digital voice recorder were deleted by the 
researcher. 
4.10 Research Timelines 
Data collection for the research study began in June, 2010 with the first pilot interview 
held with a laboratory supervisor. After the interview, the researcher received feedback on the 
relevance of the questions and the level of difficulty. This was used to help create prompts to be 
used for future informants. The majority of data was collected in the spring/summer months of 
2011. Data analysis commenced in October, 2011 with completion in March, 2012. 
4.11    Limitations of the case study and measures taken to address them in this research. 
Bowling and Ebrahim define case study “as a research method which focuses on the 
circumstances, dynamics, and complexity of a single case, or a small number of cases” (Bowling 
& Ebrahim, 2007).  It is used increasingly in research on health and health services. However a 
key dilemma that researchers face is proving that their findings are of the quality as that of 
traditional researchers who perform quantitative studies. This is because there are three main 
limitations in the use of case studies. These are: the potential for bias, the question of 
generalizability (especially for single case studies), and the length of time required to collect and 
interpret data (Yin, 2003; Johnson & Reynolds, 2005). However, there are ways to minimize the 
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effects of these and thus improve the validity and reliability of the research.  The following is a 
description of how Yin’s techniques for improving validity were implemented in this thesis to 
minimize the bias of the case study (Yin, 2003). 
1. The potential for researcher bias.  
To control for this the research was designed with a number of checks and balances to 
minimize researcher bias and maximize validity, accuracy and reliability of the interpretation. 
The following checks were used in this study: 
 The sample was drawn from a wide cross-section of medical laboratory professionals 
representing a variety of different prospective from both for-profit and not-profit 
organizations as well as professional and accreditation bodies. These individuals were 
considered to be in a position to comment on accountability approaches in the laboratory 
services and were not coerced in any way to participate in the study. 
 The majority of interviews were voice taped and where this was not possible detailed 
hand-written notes were taken. 
 The data coding in NVivo9™ was validated by an independent coder and found to with 
85 percent agreement of the researcher. 
 The data collection source varied and included both document review and semi-
structured interviews. 
 Triangulation was employed to ensure accuracy of data collected and to validate the 
meaning and interpretation of data.  
2. Generalizability of findings is not the goal of the study 
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  Although this study provided useful information, no attempt will be made to generalize the 
insights gained to any province in Canada or globally. This is mainly because of the following 
limitations: 
 the possibility of data collection bias 
 sample size for the study was small (20) 
 geographical location( mainly GTA) 
 sub-sector bias( mainly not-profit) 
 attention bias( mostly face-to-face lengthy interviews) 
 researcher’s bias with data collection 
 
3. The length of time required to collect and interpret data. 
The use of documents allowed the researcher to be able to review records dating back for 15 
years. This time frame was chosen in order to track policy changes since the last major re-
structuring of the Ontario healthcare system in 1995.This information was validated in the semi-
structured interviews.  
4.12    Conduct of Analysis 
 An analysis of the data from documents review and semi-structured interviews was done 
in four stages. This iterative analytical process included a number of distinct and interconnected 
stages. The conduct of analysis was guided by the conceptual framework established by Deber 
(Deber, 2002). 
4.12.1 1 Stage I:  Policy Instruments 
The first stage of this research was to analyse policy instruments or governing instruments 
relating to accountability and how these affect the strengths and weaknesses of various 
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approaches to accountability in the ML sector.  The research concentrated on four currently-used 
approaches to accountability: financial incentives, regulations, information directed towards 
patients/payers, and professionalism/stewardship—which represent variations on the 
‘expenditure,’ ‘regulation,’ and exhortation’ governing instruments. The documents reviewed as 
well as the interview questions were structured to answer to the following questions:  
 
1. What types of laboratory services presently exists? 
2. How are the services delivered? 
3. What type of governance structure is in place? 
4. Who is being held accountable? 
5. To whom are they accountable? 
6. What are they accountable for? 
The conceptual framework established by Dr. Raisa Deber (2002) was used to draft the 
analytical framework for this thesis. The results are presented in Chapter Five.  
 
4.12.2 Stage II: Independent Core Variables 
 
Stage II of the investigation provides an overview of the three main independent core 
variables: a) policy goals being pursued, b) governance/ownership structure and, c) the goods 
and services being delivered. Under policy goals being pursued, issues relating to access and 
quality of laboratory service were examined.  Key informants views on cost control, cost 
effectiveness and customer satisfaction are found in Chapter Five. The impact of governance/ 
ownership on for-profit or not- for-profit laboratories, legal responsibilities versus practical 
enforcement and the enforcement mechanisms (OLA accreditation) are found in Chapter Five. 
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The results on the impact of the three main areas of production characteristic: contestability, 
measurability and complexity are presented in Chapter Five.   
 
 
4.12.3   Stage III: Healthcare Professionals’ Views on Benefits and Potential Barriers to the 
Implementation of Accountability Measures in the Medical Laboratory Sector. 
 
Stage III of the analysis examined healthcare professionals view on the potential barriers 
for the implementation of accountability measures in the ML sector. It examined the benefits, if 
any, of accountability approaches that are being used and how these may be adopted as best 
practices across the laboratory sector. It also analysed key informants views in order to 
determine if approaches vary by sub-sector (hospital versus community lab). 
 Some of this information was present in documents but was validated during the semi-
structured interviews. The interviewees also provided new information that was not found in any 
of the documents that were reviewed.  This information is presented in Chapter Five. 
4.13      Summary 
 A mixed methodology including both document review and semi-structured interviews 
of key informant interviews was used in this research. The use of the case study approach 
allowed the researcher to place data examined from organizational documents such as 
administrative reports, missions and vision statements, and news clippings into the appropriate 
themes. The researcher formulated the themes using the analytical framework described earlier. 
The next step was a back and forth comparison of themes from both data collections methods 
(document and semi-structured interviews) in order to compare and contrast themes (Yin, 2003).  
 Documents provided historical as well as current information on approaches to 
accountability in the ML sector. These documents are useful in investigating past and current 
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legislation and regulation relating to the delivery of laboratory services. Further, the documents 
have the additional benefits of being unobtrusive, nonreactive, unbiased, and objective. In 
selecting the documents to be used for this thesis, special care was taken to avoid reporting bias 
by selecting peer reviewed documents or those from credible websites. 
  Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted in accordance to the REB approval 
obtained from UOIT. The information generated from these interviews validated some of the 
information found in the documents reviewed as well as provided new fields of information 



















Results from Qualitative Data Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results from the key informant semi-structured interviews. The 
semi-structured interviews were conducted to get a better understanding of the views of medical 
laboratory professionals on the approaches to accountability in the Ontario ML sector.  
  The data collected from the semi-structured interviews were designed to answer the 
following questions: 
1) What types of laboratory services presently exists?  
2) How are the services delivered?  
3) What type of governance structure is in place?  
4) Who is being held accountable?  
5) To whom are they accountable?  
6) What are they accountable for?  
7) What are best practices approaches to accountability in the Ontario ML sector? 
 
5.2 Semi-structured Interview Results 
 The data from the semi-structured interviews was organized into categories and common 
themes (see Table 5.1 below). The categories identified were guided by the analytical framework 










Financial incentives  Functional area of work 
 Accountability requirements to whom 
 Accountability requirements for what 
 Termination or reduction of contracts  
 Fines 
 Public reporting 
Regulations  Accreditation 
 Regional bodies (Local Health 
Integration Networks, or LHINs) 
 Regulatory and medico-legal bodies 
Information directed to users 
 
 Client satisfaction 
 Evidence-based practices 
 Internal and external indicators 
 Information directed to payers or care 
providers 
 Report cards 
Professionalism/Stewardship  Regulatory Colleges 
 Report cards 
 
 Core Independent Variables 1. Policy Goals 
 access 
 quality (including safety) 
 cost control/cost effectiveness 
 customer satisfaction 
 
2. Governance/Ownership 
 private versus public 
 not-for-profit (hospitals, Public health 
labs, CBS) 
 small business for-profit  
 investor-owned for-profit corporations  
 








Views on Benefits and Potential Barriers  Training 
 Funding 





5.2.1 Description of the Key Informants 
Twenty individuals participated in the semi-structured interviews. Eight (40%) laboratory 
managers, five (25%) medical laboratory technologists,  three (15%) educators,  two (10%) 
medical doctors, one (5%) participant from a professional organization and one (5%) 
administrator. Seventeen (85%) of the respondents were female and three (15%) were male. This 
is not surprising as the medical laboratory sector is female dominated. According to the CIHI 
workplace survey done in 2011, 85.4% of MLTs are female and 14.6% are male (CIHI, 2013). 
Three (15%) participants were from private-for-profit laboratories, 14 (70%) were from 
the private-not-for-profit laboratories. Two (10%) were from public health laboratories and one 
(5%) was from a private not-for-profit professional organization. (See Table 5.2). 









Directors (D)   D1,   D2, D3 
Managers (M) M1, M2 M3, M4, 
M5,M6,M7 
M8 , M9, 
M10 
M11, M12 
 Medical laboratory 
technologist (MLT) 
 MLT1, MLT2, 
MLT3 




The following sections will present the data collected from the semi-structured interviews.  
5.3   The role and the importance of accountability 
Accountability plays an important role in the medical laboratory sector. The relationships 
are complex and multifaceted.  For example the CEO of a national not-for-profit professional 
association indicated:  
“We are required to follow the laws that govern not-for-profit associations. We are 
responsible for things like our certification seal and that’s to industry Canada. So the 
actual seal that goes on certificates of registration we own the seal and the crest…… one 
of the things we are legally obligated to have clearly defined to industry Canada is how 
we handle this to prevent fraud.  The other thing that we are responsible for under 
industry Canada is our bylaws; so because we’re a national corporation we are 
responsible to industry Canada. We are also responsible to the laws of Ontario for 
workplace, the status of the disability act, occupational health and safety.  We’re also 
responsible for financial accountability to industry Canada. We do file reports with them 
as well as Canada Revenue Agency and we have some exemptions for some of our not-
for-profit status ……. so for instance some things we collect GST or HST on another 
things we don't.”   
 
A manager of a regional hospital laboratory said: 
“We are accountable fiscally first to our executive vice president for maintaining a 
balanced budget….. accountability for performance to meet the anticipated customer 
demands and align ourselves with the strategic plan….we are accountable through 
performance indicators which are chosen and monitored to ensure that we are meeting the 
performance of expectations of our customers have includes things like turnaround time 
and  accuracy…… So from a patient safety point of view we have direct accountability to 
the medical director and from the operational piece around fiscal management and 
performance to the EVP, we have a dual accountability.” 
 
 A community laboratory manager states: 
“Accountability in its simplest form is to account for. This is supposed to be a neutral 
term not blame or shame. A constructive approach is to look at how we make decisions 
and who make this decision. Patient care is central to what we do.” 
Key informants often emphasized the complexities of the relationships with other organizations 
within which they operate and the different agencies to which they are accountable. One 
manager from the community laboratory sub-sector said: 
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“There have a number of laboratory and diagnostic organizations to which we are 
accountable: Canada Nuclear Safety Commission, Ontario Medical Association and Ontario 
Laboratory Accreditation program, College of Medical Laboratory Technologist of Ontario, 
New York State department of Health, Blue Cross, Blue Shields, E- health Ontario, Health 
Canada, College of Physicians and Surgeons, College of Radiation Technologist of Ontario, 
FDA of America.”  
Another manager from regional program describes the role of their organization in terms of 
accountability this way:  
“Our mandate is to provide education and education resources and under that we develop 
education resources and also functional resources that hospitals can use to help improve 
utilization. We plan and facilitate educational events. And, one of our key roles is in 
communication.” 
 
In terms of accountability, one respondent from a hospital laboratory gave this perspective as an 
educator: 
“My role of educator, I am responsible for coordinating student lab technicians’ rotations 
within our department. So, I am accountable, I am a partner with the academic institutions 
that we take the students from. So I am accountable to making sure the student cover the 
objectives set by the schools. I am also responsible for staff education. So, in that case I am 
accountable to my director of my department who is responsible or accountable to the VP 
and all the way up to the CEO.” 
 
A director of a teaching institution responsible for training medical technologists stated: 
“The primary goals of the organization are to be accountable to the employer for the 
appropriate education of marketable graduates.”  
 
This statement by a manager working in the hospital laboratory further illustrates the complexity 
of relationships: 
“Well, we are accountable to the physicians; we are accountable to the nursing unit. We are 
accountable to physicians, nursing units, to our partners, and our requirements are to provide 
timely testing results and high quality standards and we have to be fiscally responsible. So I 
am also accountable to the CEO and the budget. And, who are we accountable to? We are 




5.4. What are the views on internal and external approaches to accountability used in the 
ML sector? 
The literature review indicated that governments can use a number of governing 
instruments to ensure that private providers achieve accountability (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). 
These include: exhortation, taxation, expenditure, regulation, and public ownership. The choice 
of policy instrument will depend on the sub-sector and the policy goals that are to be achieved. 
The approaches used may be internal or external. 
 
5.4.1 Internal Approaches to Accountability 
 
 When asked what their experiences were on internal approaches used by their 
organization to achieve accountability, respondents cited numerous examples.  There were 
variations in the responses depending on the sub-sector within the ML sector.  Speaking from an 
administrative point of view, one manager from a not-for-profit professional organization said: 
“We have HR contracts with staff and volunteers for handling sensitive information, 
conflict of interest, IT policies.” 
Another key informant from the hospital laboratory shared this view: 
“Internally, we have policies and procedures as an organization; we have delegations of 
authority so we have financial accountability through delegation of authority. 
Organizational structures that are quite rigid that help with that accountability by being 
clear as to who you go to, we set annual goals and objectives as an organization, we have 
a business plan and an operating plan that guides how we behave, how we practice, what 
we produce, and in a sense those tools hold us accountable for our outputs. So, operating 
plans in particular, goals and objectives you know, those things will be tools, who we 
report, you know holds us accountable for output.”  
One director of laboratory services made this comment: 
 “We are accountable for the financial aspects, to the board of directors, labour laws and 
            real estate laws.” 
 
A manager with responsibility for the quality assurance programs of a large hospital laboratory 
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shared this strategy: 
“One of my own strategies around accountability at the bench level is to make sure that 
people have an awareness of what the goals are, how things are monitored, who is 
looking at the information, and ensuring that people are working towards the same goal 
and meeting an expectation. When something does not meet the expectation there can be 
individual accountability and there can be process accountability. So, my job is to make 
sure that the process is working effectively so now my job is also to make sure that 




Reflecting on the fact that the technologist who works at the bench level should be held to a high 
level of accountability, one manager from a hospital sub-sector had this to say. 
“I would have to say that people know when they are to report things and people do 
report things. People self-report things. I had someone ask me once, it wasn’t that long 
ago, they asked me the question about when I disclosed the number of events we were 
reporting they said, really do think that is low because people are not reporting events the 
way they should be? And, my comment was absolutely not. I believe that the number of 
things that we are seeing I am certain that at least 80 percent of the things happening are 
being reported through that system. Because people understand their accountability to the 
system.” 
 
One of the most frequently cited internal approach used was surveys. There were several types 
indicated during the interview process such as staff, clients and patient surveys.  In one hospital 
the laboratory manager had this to say about patient surveys: 
“Yeah! We have patient satisfaction surveys and those are through our outpatient 
department. There are client cards there asking for feedback.” 
 
One key informant from the hospital laboratory had this to say about getting internal feedback 
from clients such as physicians, nurses or other healthcare professionals: 
“Every two years we do a physician’s survey. It is also tied into the employee opinion 
survey but they also survey our services so we get feedback on that. So, ours was just 
done in 2010 and we got 89% physician satisfaction. So, they were happy with our 
services and we were happy with that.” 
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In reference to internal approaches to accountability, a key informant from a community 
laboratory stated that: 
 
“What we do, we have a comprehensive competency program that ensures that our 
employees are competent to perform the tasks that they have been assigned to. But, what 
we also do is provide some continuing education funding that motivates the employees to 
take courses but then we also provide some continuing education tools such as the ASCP 
lab program which provides 18 hours of continuing education and we also provide them 
with the opportunity to do the Colorado courses.”  
And when asked about how they got feedback from staff, one manager from the private for-profit 
sub-sector shared the following: 
“Every year we also do a staff survey, an engagement survey to see how staff are 
engaged, to see how comfortable they are working in this environment. And, then we 
disseminate the information. The patient survey results go always on our website and the 
staff survey results, each manager would use their own area, the results where they work 
on things if they do need to be improved.” 
 
Many of the key informants indicated that they had internal mechanism in place to tract and 
analyze data relating to specific patient focused quality indicators. For example one manager 
from a hospital laboratory talked about a practical way in which this is done: 
“Ok, so we track our error rate. It is a new indicator that we are tracking now and it is just 
not our error rate, it is external so all the pre-analytical errors rate so anything 
that...things like unlabelled specimens, unsuitable specimens so all that, so we are just 
learning to track and looking at trends and seeing not only trends in the types of errors 
but where are they coming from. So, then we can use that data and go to that area….” 
 
 Although education is not a primary focus of this thesis, there is a direct link between what is 
taught in schools and what is practiced in the clinical sites. Managers who are directly involved 
in teaching are also interested in internal approaches to accountability. Reflecting on their 
program, one director indicated: 
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“Internally, we have endless student evaluation documents. Course documents take place 
in every course on a schedule. We also have a student satisfaction survey that is held…… 
before they write their CSLMS exam.” 
Many key informants also reported that they depend on an electronic device as an approach to 
provide or receive internal accountability. One manager from a hospital provided this feedback: 
“We have intranet. Specifically, the blood and tissue bank as it is called. One of our 
physicians has written a book, it’s a guide actually, to help with transfusion call Bloody 
Easy. So, on the intranet we have something called Bloody News so if there is anything 
that we are trying to communicate in that way. We also do education, there are 
educational rounds to get the information to the clinicians and there is also, the final sort 
of it, the last resort is to broadcast key emails to all key persons etc.”  
 
Another key informant reflecting on the use of technology as an internal accountability measure 
said: 
 
“The outside vendors will have sometimes do teleconferences or webinars so you can 
access those later so you can put on a webinar for people that is particularly good but we 
do try to do something once a month.” 
The importance of professionalism was also highlighted as a key area to maintaining internal 
accountability. Many respondents stated that this was fulfilled by having all MLTs graduating 
from an accredited school, passing the national certification examination and become members 
of the College of Medical Laboratory Technologists of Ontario (CMLTO). One manager the 
public health sector stated:  
“The College of Medical Laboratory Technologists of Ontario (CMLTO) protects the 
public’s right to safe, competent, ethical health care. They do this by regulating the 
professionals who conduct lab tests across the province. It is self-regulation.”  
Similar sentiments were expressed by another respondent from the hospital laboratory who said: 
“Every technologists, for the CMLTO, you’ve got the college that regulates our practice 
and we have to make sure that we maintain our quality assurance on an annual bases. 30 
hours of quality assurance and then pay our licensing fees and ensures that we follow the 
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ethical guidelines and practice guidelines that the College sets out for us. And, obviously 
the College is the public’s protective agency, exactly, and that’s their outlet for 
complaints.” 
 
5.4.2 External Approaches to Accountability 
The views of key informants on external approaches to accountability will be presented 
in the sub-sections below. 
 
5.4.2.1 Financial incentives for performance  
Financial incentives can be defined as a monetary reward provided for performance 
above targeted objectives or offered to encourage behaviour or actions that otherwise would not 
occur (Wodchis, 2004). This practice is becoming increasingly popular in some sectors of 
healthcare.  All of the key informants said they were not recipients of any financial incentives for 
performance.  
This response referring to financial incentives came from a medical director of laboratory service 
at a large academic hospital laboratory: 
“We make a budget every year and we submit to the government and then they say yes 
you may have this money or no you have to cut out this and every quarter you do 
variance reports you see how much you are off from the budget and then it gives you 
time to adjust to makeup in the next quarter. So certainly financial……..the manager does 
the financial pieces so I don’t know what accountability may do. All, I know is that if the 
costs are too high, I am asked to review some tests to see if they need to be done or if we 
are doing too many. Things, like that. But, the actual details, I don’t know.”  
 
 Commenting on the financial approaches used in the organization, one key informant from the 
hospital laboratory had this to say: 
“We have an obligation to operate within the budget that we’ve been given. Are those 
always adequate? Sometimes yes, sometimes no, but I think you can always try, it 
challenges you to look at the activities that you are doing and the processes that you have 




5.4.2.2   Information directed to payers, care recipients or providers 
The literature review identified that the information is best disseminated in healthcare 
setting through instruments such as report cards, balanced score card, or best practices guidelines 
(Howells, 2005; Morris & Zelmer 2005). Many participants reported that they were familiar with 
these tools in their practice. Commenting on balanced score card, one manager from the public 
health sector had this to say: 
“I am big supporter of balanced scorecards, a big supporter of quality indicators, but I 
think, I don’t want them to be so exclusive that we focus on only those and then we 
forget that we have other things we need to do as an organization in order to provide 
quality care. I am also a big supporter of best practices, of course being in a lab 
environment you and I both know that having to adhere to OLA requirements. There are 
CAP requirements; I mean those are all good things that provide structure to a lab and our 
primary responsibilities in labs is to maintain process control. So structure is a benefit to 
us because we can standardize practices, we can standardize how things work and so, I 
am very supportive of those types of structures that provide accountability.”  
Another key informant from the private not-for profit professional organization supported this 
view stating: 
 
“We have a business plan and an operating plan that guides how we behave, how we 
practice, what we produce, and in a sense those tools hold us accountable for our outputs. 
So, operating plans in particular, goals and objectives you know, those things will be 
tools like what we report, you know who holds us accountable for output.”  
 
Another manager from the hospital laboratory sub-sector reflecting on accountability indicator 
had this to say: 
“So, in the role of Operational Manager, and I have another partner who is also  another 
Operational Manager here, so essentially we are accountable to, fiscally first, to our 
executive vice president for maintaining a balanced budget. So we have primary 
accountability to the EVP of the organization. So we are expected to operate within the 
budget allocation that we are given every year. We do participate in the budget planning 
process. We participate in strategic planning which is the next piece so along with fiscal 
accountability comes accountabilities for performance to meet the anticipated customer 
demand and align ourselves with the strategic plan.” 
 
The responses from community laboratory were similar. One manager stated that in their 
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organization, financial reports are shared with: 
 
“Everyone!  The Government, CEO, Board of directors, shareholders and the public.” 
 
 
Another manager from a not-for-profit professional organization made this comment about 
information sharing: 
“We do a national report card which is essentially a report to the public and to our 
membership about how educational institutions are doing on the national certification 
exam. We also share that with deans and presidents of institutions.”  
 
 
A manager from the hospital laboratory commented on the use of balanced scorecards to 
maintain a patient focus:  
“Where I always looked at, regardless of what we did is we put ourselves into the 
position of the patient and tried to do what was best for the patient even if it meant it 
wasn’t as efficient at least it was more effective for the patient. So, in a sense, having 
these balanced scorecards and external indicators may put pressure on us to focus on 
those things when in fact we should be really looking at patient centred care.  That’s the 
bottom line.” 
5.5 Regulations and Accreditation 
 All participants identified regulations and accreditation as the most frequently used form 
of external accountability approach used in the laboratory sector. There are 209 OLA accredited 
laboratories operating in Ontario (QMP-LS, 2013). Key informants were asked several questions 
in order to get their views on this subject. 
 
 
5.5.1    Views on OLA consultations 
 When asked whether they thought appropriate consultations were done before OLA 
accreditations began in 2003 or if OLA standards were imposed on their organization, 
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respondents gave a number of different perspectives. Some managers were quite forthcoming 
with their views stating that OLA was imposed. Others felt that there were some consultation 
before OLA was implemented. One manager from the hospital laboratory sector stated: 
“Regulations by nature they are imposed. They are imposed on organizations.” 
 
 
Similar thoughts were shared by another manager from the public not-for-profit laboratory 
sector: 
 
“All of us may have a slightly different approach to how we are responsive to regulatory 
requirements and how do we get other people to be accountable to them but that is all 
about strategy. The reality is you don’t have a choice.”  
 
Another key informant from the private for-profit laboratory commented: 
 
          “So was it imposed? I would say yes.” 
  
One manager from public health laboratory sector shared similar views: 
“Initially some the accountability requirements such as OLA accreditation were 
externally imposed on our organization by the OMA”. 
 
There were also some disciplines, who found OLA standards easier to comply with than other 
disciplines. Speaking from a transfusion science point of view one manager from the hospital 
laboratory had this to say: 
“I think that it is better. There was a lot of work and there was a lot of resistance in the 
beginning. For example in the blood bank it really is no big deal because we’ve always 
followed standards, we have always been compliant with the  AABB and CSTM and we 
have being do this for years even though it has been voluntary we have been going 
through the same assessment to make sure we are compliant. So, for us OLA was no big 
deal it was like polishing up some pieces to make sure.” 




“I can only talk about the area of transfusion medicine for OLA. There were 
consultations but the consultations were mainly for the AABB standards and CSTM 
standards. So, I see OLA just taking what was always there and just put in. I don’t really 
remember OLA carrying out consultations themselves.”  
Another respondent from the public not-for-profit sector shared similar views that OLA 
regulations were not imposed: 
“But I don’t think it was imposed. I think it was the way to go and I think the way they 
did it was very good. Early on they had information sessions, they tried to educate 
everybody as much as they possibly could about the process, the impact etc. So, I think it 
was a good step.”  
 
5.5 2    Views on the impact of OLA 
  
Key informants were asked if they felt that the OLA accreditation led to a better or poorer 
approach to accountability.  A hundred percent of the participants responded that OLA 
implementation was for the better. Respondents also indicated that OLA accreditation was not 
only required but vital to their continued existence. This is how a manager from the hospital 
laboratory sector puts it: 
 
“I think what it has done it has raised a different level of awareness for our profession 
and on some level has put on the map in terms of a more cutting edge approach to 
regulatory standards.” 
 
Similar thoughts shared by another manager from the hospital laboratory sector: 
 
 “I believe that we are better off in Ontario. I believe we are producing a better outcome 
for our patients as a result of a program like OLA. I think that there are very tangible 
things that come along with that demonstrate for me and my organization that we are 
actually doing something better for our patients.”  
 
One key informant from a hospital laboratory shared this view: 
 
 
“I think in the overall it is extremely better because it covers every aspect of the organization, 




Another manager from the hospital laboratory sector who also has experience as an assessor had 
this to say: 
“I think in general it is making everyone rise to a level of quality that is admirable and I 
really think Ontario is further ahead  because I go around for Accreditation Canada, the 
other provinces, some of what I see in the other provinces they are not quite held to the 
same standards. They are coming up to it now because Accreditation Canada is going in 
there  but because of OLA I think laboratories in Ontario are much further ahead.” 
 
One key informant from the community laboratories sector also confirmed what many managers 
in the hospital sector had been saying by stating that: 
“In the majority of cases it was better. Change is constant as we strive towards 
improvement. Part of our responsibility is to accept that we are accountable to society for 
mutual respect.”  
The views of a medical laboratory technologist who has not worked in any management 
positions were captured in this comment: 
“The OLA requirements are not unreachable and I think it sort of prompted the senior 
manager team to pay attention to the lab and to also make sure that they had an invested 
interest in making sure that we do well on our OLA. So, they make sure that we have the 
resources that we require to, in order to do well on the OLA. So, I think it was definitely 
a good thing.” 
 Even organizations that are not directly involved in the OLA accreditation thought it is a very 
useful exercise. One educator had this to say: 
“Regulation is what really drives our business. You know we have the Ontario 
Laboratory Accreditation process and then there are also other regulations just for best 
practice, people are following and when you are a leading academic institution, you need 
to follow those, you need to be aligned with your peers.” 
 




 “My preference is that all jurisdictions in Canada have a model similar to Ontario with 
accreditation of program, certification of program, personnel, and continuing education 
requirements in both hospital and teaching facility. Accreditation is a best practice.”  
 
5.5.3    Views on the strength of OLA approaches 
 
  Several key informants also indicated what they felt were some strengths / benefits of the 
approaches used in OLA accreditation. One director of laboratory services spoke about the 
strengths of the QMP-LS program: 
“Everything that we do is measured against a set standards that are international 
recognized and are based on best available evidence that the international committee 
through international standardization (ISO) can achieve… So OLA and EQA themselves 
are both accountable to a higher authority, which tells us whether or not we are meeting 
the standards for organizations that do proficiency testing and accrediting bodies. So we 
too walk the walk of accountability at QMP-LS. There are not many examples to match 
the degree of accountability that you see in diagnostic laboratory services.” 
 
  One community laboratory manger shared that was considered some of the major strengths: 
“Ease of measurement in term of faster turn-around-time; more cost effective; getting 
frontline workers to buy into the plan and feedback from physicians and patients.” 
  
For another manager from the hospital laboratory sector stated that it was ensuring that things 
were standardized: 
“The whole point of it is to make things, to make it difficult to make an error. Right? So 
you want to make things very standardized, so people know what they doing, not 
difficult, not complicated, simple processes and procedures.” 
 
Another key informant from the hospital sector commented:  
“One of the strengths was the level of flexibility that was built in the process especially 
when it came down to interpreting the standards…for interpretation and to be able to 





5.5.4    Views on the challenges of OLA approaches 
 
Barr et al. (2005) stated that “collaboration is about working together in the face of both 
commonality and difference”. When asked about what they felt were weakness or challenges of 
OLA accreditation approaches, many respondents cited lack of collaboration. They saw 
collaboration as working together not just alongside the team or worse, just being told what to 
do. As stated above, some managers thought that OLA accreditation was imposed and there was 
very little or no collaboration. There were also other issues that were identified by key 
informants. One manager of a large regional hospital laboratory with three sites spoke about the 
challenge of interpreting the standards: 
   
“When people have the appreciation of the why and sometimes when you are dealing 
with large number or regulatory requirements some of them don’t always make sense to 
the people that have to implement….I struggle with that sometimes with the standards but 
overall, really at the end of this the intent is to have a safe system.”   
 
 Commenting on the accreditation document, another respondent from the hospital sector had 
this to say: 
 
“I found them very, very difficult to interpret. To know exactly the depth and what 
exactly the documentation was looking for.”  
 
There was one manager from the hospital sub-sector who saw the way that OLA communicated 
its finding to the laboratory sector as a challenge to the organization: 
 
 “I think about the program itself their accountability to the public on tangibles on what 
has 10 years of Ontario Lab Accreditation done for the public in Ontario. What is that? 
Specifically, show me some data……if we really wanted to measure something about the 
effectiveness of the program, the program should be coming up with some tangible data 
that demonstrates that they’ve actually achieved something by imposing that level of 
regulatory standard on clinical labs in Ontario and they have not done that to date.” .  
 
 In reference to the challenges that were faced with the OLA standards, another respondent from 
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the public health laboratory shared a similar view: 
 
“I would say that there are probably some grey areas……their regulations maybe a little 
stringent.” 
 
 Although agreeing that OLA accreditation was a good thing, one manager from the hospital 
sector reflected on the amount of human resources that it entails: 
“The downside I would say is that it just took so much time. The manager was 
responsible for updating all the SOPs. I probably had about 500 and that’s basically a full 
time job.” 
 
Having been though the OLA accreditation twice, one manager from the hospital sub-sector felt 
that the over-riding weakness was of lack of communication: 
“I think where there is a problem is that there is not enough dialogue, not enough 
discussion about what exactly they are looking for. They either say yes it meets their 
criteria or no it doesn’t and there is no, in some cases it doesn’t seem like there is a lot of 
helpful material coming from the QMPLS or OLA  assessors to help organizations fix the 
problems that they have.”  
In responding to this question one manager from the hospital sub-sector voiced what was their 
organization’s concern with preparation for OLA accreditation: 
“There are more than 502 regulations for effective practice for all the testing that goes on, 
from pre-analytical to post-analytical. It covers the entire spectrum of what and how. 
Really they don’t tell you how, but what you have to do in order to become an accredited 
facility and we are beholden with that because without accreditation we don’t get our 
license to perform testing. So that’s another stack in the chain for the Ministry of Health. 
Licensing through Ministry of Health and Long Term Care is tied to laboratory 
accreditation and every four years we are audited.” 
One hospital laboratory manager provided an example of a set of standards that were hard to 
achieve: 
 
“Another one is, is the space adequate? Well, no it is not but we don’t really have control 
over that but you know that helps leverage us, gives us leverage in the future for trying to 
get extra space.”  
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The ML sector is often characterized as a support service.  Their biggest clients are the doctors 
who order laboratory tests. One medical laboratory director reflected on the challenges of 
making physicians more accountable for laboratory test: 
“OLA only controls the lab. But, the accountability of lab tests, part of it depends on the 
physicians. So, I don’t think there was enough physician education to tell them when a 
test needs more work or what tests need more time, which tests cost more...they just order 
them and I feel that really there is no accountability for physicians ordering the tests. 
They just go down to requisitions and just order whatever they feel like and sometimes 
they are not what are needed.”   
 
Key informants also disclosed that although their primary focus is OLA, because it is mandatory, 
they are inspected, regulated, or accredited by other organizations. One manager from the 
hospital sub-sector was able to explain the possible duplication that occurs with Accreditation 
Canada: 
“Accreditation Canada, we are also obligated to meet those requirements and there is a 
lot of overlap. So, we have a very elaborate, a very robust accreditation process with 
OLA and so in my mind we should be coordinating that and looking at the requirements 
and if we meet OLA do they really need to come in and look at the labs again? Just sort 
of to check that off, I really don’t think that they should be doing that because a hospital 
is a huge place and there are areas where there are no standards and this is the only kind 
of process for any accreditation to happen and I think they should be focusing more on 
those areas as opposed to duplicating what has already been done.”  
 
5.5.5    Views on whether accountability approaches help to ensure performance, equity 
and financial stewardship. 
 
Several of the key informants interviewed stated that they believed that the accountability 
measure introduced by OLA and those that were in place before OLA has helped their 
organization achieve its goals. A manager from the hospital laboratory sector stated: 
“We were more diligent on staff training and quality control, it leads to a lot more paper 




Another response to this question came from a key informant in charge of the quality assurance 
program in a hospital laboratory sub-sector: 
“So, I think we are seeing quality improvements because we are actually having to 
produce the evidence, we are actually having to show what we do we say we do whereas 
in the beginning it was just really do you have the policies and procedures in place and 
now it is like show me, show me you are doing these things, where is the evidence.”  
 
   Institutions that are involved in training medical laboratory students are subject to a different 
kind of accreditation by the CMA.  When asked if this process actually helped their organization 
accomplish its goals, one director had this to say: 
“Yes, for a number of very simple reasons. We are a market driven, employer driven 
institution and that is one of our primary goals and our students could not work without 
this program being accredited. So it was kind of, we had to be accredited for our students 
to successfully graduate and enter the workforce.”  
 
5.5.6    Who pays to meet the accountability requirements? 
 
Many of the key informants identified sufficient resource support as an important factor in 
meeting accreditation requirements. Resource allocation, though often expressed in terms of 
monetary value, should be broadened to include human expertise. All key informants felt that an 
important piece was overlooked in the preparations leading up to OLA accreditation. When 
asked who pays to meet the accountability requirements, one manager from the hospital 
laboratory sector said: 
“One of the regulatory requirements for the OLA program is: Has the lab management 
sufficiently allocated appropriate resources with which to carry the functions of the 
quality management system? There is actually a regulatory requirement that says you 
demonstrate to us, if you put the right amount resource into your organization to support 
and sustain a quality system. So we absolutely, the lab service every activity we do in 
terms of meeting a regulation, sustaining a quality system, and all of the components of 
that including the purchasing of external quality assessment. That absolutely comes out 
of our global budget for lab.” 
 




“Accreditation is very expensive. Our accreditation fees on an annual base are ten 
thousand dollars, because it is a very expensive process and we have to support it. It used 
to come out of our Med Lab budget directly, which you know meant it had a significant 
impact on our operational costs. We pay for some of the ones from some of the external 
quality assurance that we do and we pay for that and it comes out of the lab budget. So, it 
comes out of the lab budget, yes.” 
 
One manager of a community laboratory stated that when it came to covering the cost for 
accreditation, their organization received no exemption. The simple answer to the question asked 
was: 
 “The organization pays.” 
Another respondent from the hospital sub- sector replied by stating: 
 
“There was nothing in the whole structure of the accreditation process and the creation of 
OLA that gave any financial support.” 
 
5.6 Core Independent Variables 
The following sub-sections will present the views of key informants on core independent 
variables. 
 
5.6.1     Contestability 
Deber et al. (2010) states that contestable goods are characterized by low barriers to 
entering and exiting markets. Non-contestable goods may be characterized by some or all of: 
monopoly market power, geographic advantages, high sunk costs, and/or “asset specificity” (a 
term meaning that it is relatively difficult to transfer assets intended for use in a given transaction 
to other uses). This particular question was answered differently depending on whether the key 
informant came from a community or hospital laboratory. One key informant from a community 
laboratory shared their organization’s view on the contestability: 
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 “Extremely difficult. Since 1975 the MOHLTC has not issued any new Laboratory 
licenses. Anyone wishing to enter the market would have to do so by acquisition, 
consolidation or merger. Prior to 1992 there was no cap on laboratories services.  The 
then government introduced an industry cap on community lab. This allowed for 
completion thus increasing market share for labs that were able to perform well. In 1999, 
the government policies change to one of individual cap which was retroactive to 1995. 
Under this new policy there has been guaranteed market share for community labs. This 
has resulted in lack incentives for completion for market share. This can only have 
negative consequences for patients as there is the possibility that the focus may shift from 
patient centered to care to making a profit for shareholders. Ultimately the MOHLC is 
accountable for the existing policies that govern laboratory services. For many persons 
who work in community lab, adopting a policy that allows for industry cap and removes 
cooperate individual cap would be a responsible policy decision.”     
Many respondents from the hospital laboratories also had their own views on contestability. One 
manager from a large hospital with three sites spoke the challenges that contestability (in terms 
of ease of entry and exit of the market) would present: 
“Ok, so I would just quickly say that there is a tremendous amount of resistance to taking 
away lab services from any one of our campuses. And, the resistance comes from 
physicians who expect increasing service levels not decreasing service levels. When you 
are part of a growing health network whose mission is to provide at home care, when I 
say that it means care in your community, access to the services that people need in their 
own communities it is always very challenging if you make decisions, operational 
decisions that testing can move from one location to another because it is going to be less 
expensive. To do that you always have to be; no ,yeah ;it is a moving services or 
relocating services or referring out services it is a very, very difficult thing to do in this 
climate because people have expectations and their expectation is that you do it faster and 
better.” 
 
For one key informant from the hospital sector, the driving factor behind any decision to enter or 
exit a particular market is all based on finances: 
“So, the issue is about how laboratories are funded. So, funding for labs has been a 
problem for many, many years. And, it is a problem in the sense that if you are not 
advocating appropriately for your own service in terms of you’ve got a long term plan 
and trying to fit in changes to technology and methodologies and what the organization 
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may be doing in terms of provision of programs and services. That’s the biggest 
challenges in terms of making the rights choice for what may be emerging in the next two 
or three years and being an advocate at the senior administrative level for the things that 
you need for the projected need that way.”  
 
Another hospital laboratory manager expressed similar views: 
“Everything had to be cost justified and approved. Unless you could build a business case 
for it, it didn’t happen. Regardless of whether it improved your services or patient care if 
there wasn’t the justification for the cost of doing it in the first place it would not 
happen.”  
Commenting on the ease to enter the market, one manager from the public health laboratory 
sector stated: 
“I would think that it would be very difficult for start- up costs for initially testing all the 
kits, that’s what we call them, where we do all the testing you would have to have 
research and development section.” 
 
Another hospital manager had this to say: 
“I would like to think that there is a gap left and that the hospitals would be upset to see us 
go.” 
 
For some key informants, contestability was only an indirect way of speaking about the need for 
re-structuring and consolidation of laboratory services. One manager from a large academic 
(teaching and research) hospital sector said: 
 
“I think there is need to consolidate services. I don’t think there will be a problem as long 
as we can still hit turnaround times and so each hospital may need to maintain some kind 
of lab but there are lot of testing that we should be able to consolidate. If it is not 
something that is needed STAT. Microbiology, histology, I think, especially downtown 
Toronto there is a lot of duplication of services that is expensive and it’s not cost 
effective. So, I think we need to consolidate services and I think by doing that we can 
improve the service and take the best of each organization that comes together and build 
a stronger unified organization that is more accountable and more cost effective to run 
long term.”  
 Another hospital laboratory manager was a bit more apprehensive about the impact on patient 
care: 
“I think you are going to impact client/patient care. The type of care delivery that you can 
give without having the processing and turnaround times and certain tests, can the 
turnaround be very, very quickly, so in terms of your emergency wait times, if you don’t 
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have any laboratory services on site you are waiting because there is transit time involved 
with the specimens, right? And, you are not going to send them one at a time; you are 
going to batch them. So you are already at least a couple of hours on to your turnaround 
time. So if it is an ambulatory care facility sure you can send it out but if it is an acute 
care facility, I don’t think that is very feasible to entirely close down a lab.”  
For one manager from the public health laboratory sector, the process that would be involved in 
setting up a laboratory serves is a barrier to entry: 
“I would say no. It is not easy to enter the system. Not everyone can open up a licensed 
location. If you are licensed through the ministry of health there are certain requirements 
that you have to abide by.”  
 One key informant from the hospital laboratory sub-sector thought that geographical location 
would definitely be a factor in determining the ease to exit the market: 
“It is a, it depends kind of answer, because it depends where you are located. If the 
market is super saturated in that area and the ministry feels that if you leave, the service 
of care for the patient will not be affected, then they would allow you to close. But then if 
you are the only show in town, no it would be very difficult to leave the market.” 
A medical director from a hospital laboratory shared this perspective on the ease of entry and 
exiting the market: 
 
“It is easy to leave the market. You can just decide that you are not doing this test 
anymore but it is hard to enter the system because labs are mostly funded by the MOH, 
right? And, you don’t bill patients for it so you can’t just start a lab and say I am testing 
vitamin D if you come and pay 200 dollars for that test. Nobody is going to do that. We 
rely on the government to pay you the money for the lab test. So, it is hard. Ontario does 
allow private labs. So, OHIP will pay private labs to do certain tests but it is only 
lucrative for them to do cheap ones, easy ones and also ones that are suitable for lab 
testing. They will do a whole bunch of tests like that because the cost is variable but they 
might not do antibodies investigations because it is very time consuming and if in a 
hospital OHIP pays to do a panel it is not worth their time to do it, so they don’t do it. So 
they might do screens and if it is positive they might send it back to hospital for 
investigation and they would do the panels. So, yes. There are private labs and they have 
to rely on OHIP paying them, so yes, it is difficult to start up if you don’t have, if you 
don’t already have an infrastructure.” 
One key informant from the hospital sector thought that the type of service required would 
definitely be a factor in determining the ease to enter the market: 
118 
 
“Ease of entry is pretty much dependent on the service you will be talking about. Ease of 
entry could be providing a new point of care service, right? Or it can be building a new 
laboratory on the east wing.” 
5.6.2    Performance Measurement 
An important function of performance measurement is to ensure that all relevant 
information is being captured. Many of the key informants expressed the feeling that the very 
vigorous and stringent laboratory regulations and requirement have proven to be sufficient in 
capturing the activities that need to be measured. One manager from the hospital laboratory sub-
sector spoke candidly about it this way:  
“I really can’t think of anything that is not being measured because I think that with all of 
the requirements that OLA goes through it is pretty well measures everything. So, I’ve 
never really thought of anything that is not being measured. I think it is pretty thorough”.  
Another perspective was shared by a medical director who reflected on some of the pre-
analytical accountability that needs to take place outside the laboratory settings: 
“So, I don’t think there was enough physician education to tell them when a test needs 
more work or what tests need more time, which tests cost more...they just order them and 
I feel that really there is no accountability for physicians ordering the tests. They just go 
down to requisitions and just order whatever they feel like and sometimes they are not 
what are needed.” 
5.6.3 Complexity 
Complexity was identified as one of the core independent variables that can influence 
how a laboratory achieves accountability (Deber, 2010). Complexity refers to the ability of the 
goods and services to stand alone or whether they require coordination with other providers. 
Laboratory services are viewed as having high measurability but gain much value by being 
embedded in the service that they offer (Deber, 2010).  Key informants were asked about their 
views on contracting out services and were asked to provide examples of services that are 
contracted out. The majority of respondents acknowledged that contracting out was a fairly 
common practice within the ML sector. The rational for this practice ranged from financial 
119 
 
resources, lack of expertise, sample volume, to plain common sense.  A laboratory manager from 
the hospital laboratory sector listed a number of things contracted out in their organization:  
“Not laboratory testing. We have a human resources professional on contract now to help 
us with things like compliance with the Ontario Disabilities Act and compliance with 
Occupational Health and Safety to help us make sure we are functioning 
appropriately……. We have contracted out an organizational redesign……….. 
Contracted out a governance review to experts in the governance world …. waste 
management, office cleaning…………. legal is contracted out………….. contracted out 
research services………… professional development for our staff.” 
Another hospital laboratory manager spoke of factors that are usually taken into account before 
deciding to contract out laboratory tests this is laboratory testing: 
“Anything that does not, that we deem to be not feasible here would have to be referred 
out and paid for elsewhere and feasibility comes into it when we talk about the volume 
of, the complexity, do we have expertise in house to do it? Do we have medical support 
to do the testing? Do we see it as area of growth and of course that all plays into the 
strategic plan and how we relate our services to other programs.”  
 
Commenting on the impact of contracting out laboratory tests on patient care, one manager of a 
hospital laboratory had this to say: 
“The testing that we could potentially contract out would be testing that is more in the 
nature that you could transport specimens and not run the risk of degrading sample 
integrity. Typically, although our organization doesn’t look at things like this, but 
typically when you talk about contracting out things like that, that would be more like 
microbiology services are often the first thing that people look at or the esoteric type of 
testing like  Cytogenetic, which many laboratories in Ontario do not offer.” 
 
Another hospital manager stated that when it came to the matter the contracting out test the 
bottom line was: 
 
“So, again small volume, complex, or things that are large volume and that can be 
transported without running the risk of integrity issues with sampling those are the types 
of things that are traditionally looked at.” 
 
Similar views were shared by yet another key informant from the public health laboratory: 
“Tests that are not performed at the public laboratory that are beyond our scope or 
requires a test that does not have enough support at the lab we would put forward to other 
places like CDC in Atlanta or the Institute of Parasitology in Quebec which tests for all 
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these weird and wondrous diseases that people get when they are travelling, to a class 
three laboratory in Winnipeg because we do not have a class three lab so when they are 
doing cultures for H1N1 they would forward those off there so that’s the type of testing 
that we would forward on.” 
 
Interestingly, there were few organizations that reported that they were reference centers for 
work that that been contracted out.  One manager from a large academic laboratory shared this 
view: 
“Typically because of the nature of the work we do and the specialized reference testing, 
organizations tend to send work to us rather than we sending work out. Realistically, 
there are times when we have to send certain work to other public health labs, like the 
NML, the national microbiology lab in Winnipeg or the CDC, but typically we don’t 
contract out our work.” 
 
5.6.4. Never Contract out 
In the present climate of fiscal accountability that appears to drive the need for greater 
efficiencies, laboratory managers were asked about services that they currently offer and would 
never contract out and why they felt that these services were so integral to their operations. The 
responses varied across sectors.  One manger of a hospital laboratory gave this comprehensive 
list: 
“Oh for sure. The main chemistry tests, the main haematology tests, things like your 
bread and butter like glucose, your calcium’s, functional panels, we wouldn’t send those 
out, cardiac we would probably not send out,  CBCs, certainly not 
coagulations...probably also not groupings and screens, blood bank, we would have to 
keep some sort of service here. I would say those for sure Chemistry, haematology, blood 
bank.”  
 
Reflecting on the list of “never contract out” a manager from an academic hospital stated: 
“One that comes to mind would be our phlebotomy services. We need the specialized 
skills in house for our patient population so I can’t imagine ever contracting it out.”  
From the public health laboratory perspective, one manager stated: 
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“Well, there are certain services that we provide that are legislated to provide, such as the 
HIV viral testing and tuberculosis testing. We would never contract those out.” 
5.7   Consequences for not meeting accountability requirement 
 
Key informants were able to identify a number of consequences for not meeting 
accountability requirements. These include personal, financial, operational, and patient care. One 
manager of a not-for-profit professional organization identified their highest level of 
accountability: 
“From the financial aspect, Canada Revenue Agency obviously, even for individuals and 
for corporations carries force of law if standards are not met, audits or financial 
statements do meet criteria.”  
From an organizational point of view, a key informant from a not-for-profit professional 
organization spoke of the accountability to their members to deliver the services that they pay 
for: 
“Penalties for non-compliance could include voting in a new board of directors. They 
could result in, the easiest one being people could just not renewing membership; people 
could not contribute financially to your organization anymore if you don’t deliver what 
you say you will.” 
 
All of the respondents indicated that they were personally responsible for meeting their job 
description and face personal consequences. One manager from the laboratory sector puts it this 
way:  
“My personal accountability is to the board of directors. I have a contract of service, just 
like any employee where it is clearly outlining my areas of responsibility. I have work 
that is assigned to me and failure to meet that could result in termination like any 
employee.”  
Another hospital laboratory manager expressed similar thoughts: 
“In a role like mine...consequences, yes there are you don’t stay in a role like this unless 
you are performing at a certain level. And that’s, really when you talk about 
accountability at this level of management in an organization like this that is part of the 
reality. You are a performer or you run the risk of not being in an organization anymore.”  
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Commenting on their ultimate responsibility to patient care, one manager from the public health 
laboratory cited the most undesirable consequence: 
“Well, consequences could be death. Getting written up in the newspaper.” 
From an operational perspective, all laboratories need to be OLA accredited in order to operate 
legally in Ontario. One manager from the community laboratory spoke of what the consequences 
of not being OLA accredited would mean for their organization: 
“In terms of accountability for the lab though there are definitely accountability issues 
with accreditation, losing accreditation status and being unable to do any lab testing that 
you want to do because now you are unable to do it.”  
In the ML sector, many professionals identified themselves as members of a regulatory college. 
The regulatory colleges (CMLTO and CPSO) have professional standards that members must 
maintain in order to obtain their license to practice. One respondent from the hospital sub-sector 
captured this with this comment: 
“At a personal level in terms of practice there is the College. If we don’t keep up our QA 
we don’t get our license.”  
One director from a teaching organization reflected on what the impact of not obtaining 
accreditation would be for their organization: 
“Externally, it is pretty straight forward. Accreditation, you don’t get it your program 
closes, you lose your students because they can’t work and to be quite honest the liability 
that imposes ….. If they lost their accreditation and students were in the program would 
be really inconceivable to imagine because the students invest an awful lot of time in 
getting their education and if it closes down although you are allowed to continue to the 
end and write. It is still a big investment that to lose it isn’t something I want to even 
consider!” 
 Another key informant from the hospital sector spoke of losing the ability to perform some 
testing because accreditation requirements were not met: 
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“From a point of care bases, when I was unable to get the standards for a specific test in 
point of care we ended up losing that program.”  
 
5.7.1 Unintended consequences from not meeting accountability requirement 
 
Many key informants stressed the importance of accountability in the ML sector. Many 
also agreed that for accountability to be effective there must be suitable consequences for non-
compliance. When asked whether they thought there were any unintended consequences that 
occurred due to accountability approaches that are currently used in their organization, some 
respondents shared their views. One manager from the hospital laboratory sector shared a 
personal view:  
“This is my own personal experience and not necessarily in this organization but I have 
encountered elsewhere where the sole focus has been so much on the regulatory 
requirement that all the rest of the things are forgotten. So, it in some ways does not 
allow the innovation or the creativity that can happen when people don’t have to focus so 
much on that within their own job roles.”  
 
 Speaking of the conflicts with implementing their organization’s strategic goals relating to 
innovation, one hospital sector laboratory manager made this statement: 
“Yes. Oh, I agree. That’s a very big problem because I know our organization is very big 
on innovation but in the lab we are really constrained because everything that we do has 
to be within the regulations and it is very regimented and it is very difficult to think 
outside the box I guess because you’ve got so many constraints so it almost makes it 
difficult to see the big picture too and working with different professions because they 
have different accountability regulations and everything so it is a big issue.”  
Another key informant from the community laboratory sub-sector shared this comment: 
 
           “There is the possibility that meeting accountability standards may slow the pace at which  
           we proceed with some of our research and innovation, but we see this being more of a 
            good thing than a negative consequence.” 
. 
 One manager from the hospital laboratory sector provided this example of bureaucratic red tape 
that is involved in something as simple as purchasing equipment for the laboratory: 
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“The one thing I can think of is the new government regulations when you are buying. 
Ok this is good, another area of accountability outside of OLA capital equipment. The 
process, they will request information… so it is like a 300 page document basically when 
what we use to do was negotiate right with the vendor. So, that is really bogging down 
the process in the past we use to be able to make capital purchases within maybe a year 
so it was still a long process and you still had to go through, and I think there is fair 
practice in that. Now, you have to do the new purchasing process which has to sit there 
for so long and then you look at those from the purchasing department, so it is about a 
two year process. It is about a two year cycle before you can get any purchases, any 
capital purchases then also within the institution trying to get that money for the capital 
purchases you have to go through a whole ranking process, everybody goes and pleads 
their cases and you get a list of equipment and then you rank it and the directors do this 
but I have been fortunate to go so it really is like a voting process, so then it is ranked. 
So, basically they draw a line over the money, so we have this much money and they 
rank everything in order than they draw a line. So, anything above that line gets down 
and anything below it doesn’t then the deal making happens…..” 
A key informant from the not-for-profit laboratory sector gave an opposing view of how 
preoccupation with regulation can drive the need for innovation: 
“When you have a very good quality management system in place that is functioning 
well, so you are not putting fires all the time there is opportunity for you to be innovated 
and creative and improve on things.”  
Another manager from the public health laboratory shared the view that allocation of financial 
resources results in unintended consequences: 
“The unintended consequences are probably that you are spending a lot of money to meet 
the requirements and that money might be able to be better spent on other things that you 
do in the lab.”  
 A medical director felt that one unintended consequence of accountability was its negative 
impact on teaching and research: 
“Education might be at risk because they tell me that I have to cut so many millions of 
dollars so I have to cut so many staff positions so the work that has to be done, patients 
have to be treated, the tests still have to be done so what suffers? Teaching. In terms of 
teaching we get a lot of med lab students so if I need to meet the financial goals and I 
have to do something to satisfy them I am not to devote so much to teaching. So, that’s a 
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risk. Certainly, research is another risk because we don’t time for any more studies 
anymore. We don’t have time to do studies.”  
 Another manager from the hospital laboratory sector was able to look with optimism past the 
obvious challenges and point out an opportunity for advancement: 
“I think in some respects some of what we do perhaps should be transferred to other areas. 
One of the things, the quality system we’ve developed in the lab, we are probably leaps and 
bounds ahead of other areas in the hospital and they could look at that and learn from us. But, 
I don’t think it quashes things because you know, if you have a regulation and you don’t 
agree with it you can do research and validation and perhaps show that this is a better way 
and you can then convince people that that regulation can change.”  
5.8 Respondents Views on Additional Challenges to the ML sector 
Key informants from the medical laboratory sector were also asked to comment on any other 
area that was not covered in the interview questions but they felt was very important to the 
approaches used to achieve accountability ML sector.  These responses are presented below. 
5.8.1 Placement for medical laboratory students to ensure a future of highly trained 
workers 
A manager of a large academic hospital laboratory shared this concerns relating to training of 
medical laboratory technologists: 
“Placements all over, in all different areas, larger hospitals, smaller hospitals, public 
health, private labs everybody is just going to need to start taking students. In terms of 
saturation, I think the schools are going to need to really look at how many students do 
they really need to be putting out. I know that we say we have shortages coming up but 
depending on the geographical area we don’t actually have shortages. So, downtown 
Toronto we really don’t have a lot of staffing shortages right now, we have a lot of 
students coming out and getting jobs and there are a lot of students not getting jobs 
whereas the rural areas are struggling to recruit people. So, we need to make sure that we 
send students to those areas but the problem is if there is a hospital that has shortages 
they will be less likely to take students because of the workload issue. So, I hear that 
back-and-forth. I don’t know what the answer is, if we could change the educational 
system a bit so we can pump out more students without having to train them in all five 
disciplines that’s an idea. Training them up into specialities, core lab, microbiology, and 
histology genetics type of thing so that they are not having to do all the disciplines so 
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they can specialize so we can increase placement without increasing individual work load 
that might work.”  
5.8.2 Full time jobs for medical laboratory technologists 
 
One laboratory manager from the hospital sub-sector shared this view: 
 
“The issue is the lack of full time jobs for students that come out. I think that it is sad to 
find, to see students that are excelling in their field and they come out and they can’t find 
a job. We have one person here who is our bottom person on the totem pole and she’s 
young, she’s intelligent but there is not enough hours for her. She works at two places 
just to get enough hours to make a living but it’s sad that there are no jobs for these kids 
coming out and I know that there are going to be a lot of people retiring at the same time, 
here, within five years there is probably half the lab that is going to turnover but until 
then, it is not the lack of, the way the program is run, when they come out it is the fact 
that they can’t find a job which is too bad.” 
5.8.3   Educating doctors about ordering laboratory tests 
 
The views of a medical laboratory director are presented in the statement: 
 
“In the hospital, we can control them a little bit more, but in other labs they just do what 
tests are ordered and it could be part of our training. In medical school, nobody teaches 
you the costs of these things, who pay for these things. We just know that you order this 
test for this and if you are not sure you just order a few more but nobody ever said in our 
training what or I should say in my training, that is cost money to do these tests, or which 
tests are more costly than others. Now they are starting. They are starting to talk about 
tests and accountability in residence, during their training. But, in my days nobody talked 
about it in clinical terms so we just ordered whatever test we felt like.”  
5.8.4 The role of regulation in the ML sector 
A medical director responded to the question about regulation by sharing this perspective: 
“I think there is a role for regulation but I think regulation is the weakest tool even 
though it may appear to the strongest tool. How do you continually work to improve and 
minimize error and that I think has to be a living instrument inside the organization. For 
example, our management review and how we look for opportunities for tracking our 
shortcomings where the system breaks down. So what I think is the strongest approach is 
at high level require through regulation that players within a defined area like labs, the 
regulation provides an architecture for certain things to be accountable, and then how 
that’s done, I think, really has to reach a more fundamental human value which is people 
don’t do the right thing because you’re going to give them a few extra dollars. People 
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want somehow, want to do the right thing because they somehow connect with a positive 
outcome: That is they care. So I see regulation not as a caring thing. It does not appeal to 
the human spirit that is doing things the right way for the right reason. So I think for 
example, the way we are trying to promote quality and accountability with our clients is 
through accreditation to be embedded in their expectation that they will have a quality 
system. That they will develop the tools to help them care but if you don’t care about 
your outcome it’s just a paper exercise. So for us, we are looking at creating an 
atmosphere that is non-punitive and based on identification of opportunities to improve 
and the science of improvement, empowering staff at all levels and fulfilling the intent of 
the regulation.” 
5.8.5   Doctors working together with diagnostic medical laboratory. 
The introduction of electronic health records will allow for opportunities to improve 
patient care through on-line ordering of testing, the ability to add additional tests when required 
by doctors. The laboratories will have the ability to upload results directly to patient’s records. 
As one manager from the hospital sub-sector puts it: 
“In transfusion medicine nothing is basically changing until there is a LIS (laboratory 
information system) that talk to each other.”  
 
Another manager from the hospital sector expressed the desire to see the laboratory services re-
structured this way: 
 
“So, what I think should really happen is we should get a definition of what the service is, 
what the key programs are, and the different institutions where they are going to be 
located and then we can look at the services of the labs and do not I think we need to 
have an extensive lab offering every test under the sun in every hospital? No, I don’t. I 




In this study, key informants from both for-profit and not-for-profit laboratories identified 
patient care as their number one priority.  Regulation was cited as the number one policy 
instrument that is used in the ML sector. Community laboratories have as one of their goals 
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making a profit for their shareholders while public health and hospital based laboratories were 
not concerned with making a profit but rather operating a balanced budget. Key informants 
provided an extensive list of internal and external organizations to which they are accountable. 
There is considerable variation in how laboratories services are governed/owned financed and 
delivered. This has implications not only for the policy goals but also the production 
characteristics that organizations may use to achieve these goals. The decision to use fully 
automated versus semi-automated desk top analyzers is closely linked to the delivery mode. 
Another factor identified by participants is the ability to contract out esoteric tests.  Laboratory 
services can be classified as non-contestable, having high measurability and gain most of their 
value by been embedded in the system of care. 
  The experiences and perspectives of key informants on approaches to accountability were 
insightful and important for a more meaningful result. The fact that participants came from a 
cross-section of the ML sector (hospitals, community and public health laboratories, professional 
organizations and teaching institutions) as well as urban and rural settings gave breadth and 
depth to the wealth of information provided.  The results of the interviews support the belief that 
Ontario laboratories are highly regulated and accreditation is an important part of this process.   
The present system of laboratory services in this province is not seamless. There is room for 










 Discussion  
6.1 Introduction  
This study was conducted to obtain a better understanding of the approaches to accountability 
that is used in the Ontario ML sector. The goals of this thesis were to: 
1. Identify and describe the accountability mechanisms used in the Ontario Medical 
Laboratory Sector (ML sector).  
2. Determine if the accountability mechanisms vary by sub-sector within the Ontario ML 
sector. 
3. Examine stakeholder views on the advantages and disadvantages of the accountability 
mechanisms used. 
The conceptual framework constructed by Deber identified four major approaches to 
accountability that are currently used in the health care sector in Canada and internationally 
(Deber, 2010). These were described in this thesis as: a) financial incentives b) regulations c) 
information directed towards potential users and d) reliance on professionalism and stewardship. 
This framework was used to guide the analysis and presentation of results in Chapter 5. This 
chapter will discuss the findings from Chapter 5. It will also present suggestions from key 
stakeholders on the advantages and disadvantages to accountability. The chapter will end with 




6.2 Accountability Mechanisms 
This section will discuss the views of key informants on the four approaches to accountability in 
the Ontario ML sector and seek to address the first goal of this thesis which is: 
1. Identify and describe the accountability mechanisms used in the Ontario’s 
Medical Laboratory Sector (ML sector).  
6.2.1 Views on Regulations 
Key informants identified regulation as the main approach used to achieve accountability 
in the ML sector. This is an important finding because physicians rely heavily on laboratory data 
in the diagnosis, treatment and monitoring of their patients. Key informants identified several 
organizations that play different roles to ensure that ML sector is highly regulated.  The 
MOHLTC play an important role by creating legislations that defines what medical laboratories 
can do. The major piece of legislation used is The Laboratory and Specimen Collection Center 
Licensing Act which govern licensing and inspection of medical laboratories by the MOHLTC, 
and The Quality Management Program- Laboratory Service (QMP-LS) which is operated by the 
Ontario Medical Association (OMA). In reference to QMP-LS programs, one key informant 
stated, “I think what it has done it has raised a different level of awareness for our profession and 
on some level has put on the map in terms of a more cutting edge approach to regulatory 
standards.”  
 Key informants identified other organizations that are involved in the regulation of the 
ML sector: a) Industry Canada for bylaws, workplace disability act, and occupational health and 
safety, b) Revenue Canada for not-for-profit or for-profit status, c) Canada Nuclear Safety 
Commission for the safe use of nuclear material, and d) Regulated Health Professional Colleges 
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(CMLTO and CPSO) for licensing, continuing education assessment, and to protect the public 
interest.  
The majority of the ML sector is publicly funded and so the ML sector is accountable to 
the citizens of this province for the quality of the service that they provide. Laboratories ensure 
that they are providing high quality, safe, cost efficient, and effect service by maintaining 
technical and clinical proficiency. Laboratories demonstrate their technical competency by 
participating in, and achieving OLA accreditation. Many laboratories also participate in other 
voluntary accreditation programs such as CAP. These extra activities help to build confidence in 
the system. Key informants indicated that they used various indicators including quality control, 
quality assurance, turn-around times, and surveys to monitor their performance. 
  Key informants conceded that although laboratories traditionally have excelled at 
measuring quality using quality indicators, quality indicators are only an indirect measurement of 
quality. As note earlier in this thesis, there have been numerous cases where patients suffered 
adverse effects due to faulty laboratory results. Many clinical laboratories now have total quality 
management programs that are designed to reduce or eliminate laboratory errors. These include: 
quality assurance programs, accreditation, education, and the use of state of the art technologies 
to reduce human errors. The results have been a reduction in analytical laboratory errors in some 
places (Bonini, et. al, 2002). However recognising that the quality of the laboratory results are 
only as good as the quality of the specimens analysed, there is a new focus on pre and post 
analytical laboratory measures. To address and fix these challenges will require huge efforts and 
inter-professional collaborations across the healthcare sector. 
The responsibility of specimen collection is often outside of the jurisdiction of many 
laboratories. To address the problem of patient identification and proper specimen collection will 
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require collaboration with the phlebotomists, doctors and nurses etc. Another area identified for 
quality improvement is the ordering of appropriate laboratory tests by the patient’s physicians. 
On the post- laboratory analytical side, one of the challenges that key informants identified is 
using technology to communicate laboratory results to doctors in a timely manner. The safe 
transfusion of blood products was also cited as another area of concern. 
The Walkerton Inquiry determined that errors in the pre-analytical and post-analytical stages 
of laboratory testing contributed to the tragedy. Some of the key informants suggest that the 
mandate of OLA be expanded include more pre and post phases of laboratory analysis.    
6.2.2 Views on Unregulated Laboratory Sector 
  The majority of publicly funded laboratory have to be licensed by the Ministry of Health 
and accredited by OLA in order to operate in this province. The exception is publicly funded 
laboratories in doctor’s offices that are not covered under these guidelines. This is an important 
finding since key informants identified the OLA program as an important part of the approach to 
accountability in the ML sector. The Auditor’s General Report for 2005 recommended that: 
“To help ensure that laboratory tests conducted in physicians’ offices are properly 
performed and produce accurate results, the Ministry should assess whether the quality-
assurance processes required for other medical laboratories should apply to laboratories 
operated by physicians”( Auditor’s General Report for 2005) .  
 
All key informants in this study acknowledged that there were many benefits to be gained from 
being OLA accredited including the recognition that the laboratory is able to carry out tests in a 
credible, reliable, and accurate manner. Key informants felt that it constitutes best practice to 





6.2.3 Views on Point-of-care Testing 
 Key informants identified point-of-care testing (POCT) as one area of laboratory testing that 
needed to be more closely regulated. Point-of-care testing is laboratory tests that are performed 
outside the medical laboratory at locations such as the patient’s bedside, physician’s office, 
home, or in a drug store. Currently, accreditation for POCT is done by either Accreditation 
Canada or OLA.   Key informants believe that putting more POCT testing under the jurisdiction 
of OLA would ensure better standardization and greater accountability across the province.   
6.2.4   Views on the challenges of Regulations  
The current OLA accreditation document contains some 509 regulatory standards that 
laboratories must attain in order to become accredited.  Some key informants identified a number 
of difficulties with the accreditation process. One was interpreting some of the OLA regulations 
for their particular laboratory. It was felt that while OLA provided the standards, individual 
institutions were left to come up with how they would implement these standards in order to be 
compliant.  It was suggested by one key informant that OLA should provide more help to 
laboratories by making more human resources available to provide advice on implementing the 
standards before an actual accreditation inspection.  
 The cost for meeting various accountability requirements including proficiency testing 
and accreditation were mentioned as an area of concern.   Several key informants that were 
interviewed expressed disappointment that there were no financial allocations made for 
laboratories to implement the OLA program, especially in the early years when it took huge 
amount of human resources to get ready for an OLA inspection. Currently the cost for meeting 
accreditation is built into the laboratory budget.   
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 The QMP-LS program is based on total quality management principles, which encompass 
the pre-analytical, analytical, and post- analytical phases of testing.  During an inspection, OLA 
assessors determine if the laboratory is compliant by observing persons at work, asking questions 
and reviewing standard operating procedures and records. Key informants expressed their 
frustrations that OLA does not have the authority to address some of the pre-analytical phase of 
testing such as the ordering of the correct tests or patient identification.  Also some post-
analytical phase of testing such as the administration of blood products or the correct 
interpretation of laboratory results falls outside of the jurisdiction of OLA. This is an important 
finding because many instances of laboratory error occur at the pre-analytical and post-analytical 
phases of testing (Carraro & Plebani, 2007).  
 Some key informants from the interviews spoke what they consider to be “duplication” in 
the type of the accreditation that they participate in. This was particularly in reference to OLA 
and Accreditation Canada. For example all laboratories have to participate in the mandatory 
OLA program. However, if a laboratory is located in a hospital that is taking part in the 
Accreditation Canada program, the laboratory will automatically undergo a second round of 
accreditation. Key informants felt that a laboratory that is OLA accredited should be exempt 
from this, leaving the assessors with more time to look at other areas of the hospital that have no 
other accreditation standard.  
  6.3 Views of Financial Incentives 
   Financial incentives are defined in the literature as the adjustment of payments to induce 
providers to behave in the desired manner (Evans, 1984).  For example, Ontario’s hospital 
accountability agreements contain financial incentives for balanced budget. As stated earlier, the 
province publicly funds the majority of laboratory services. All of the key informants 
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interviewed in this study said they did not receive any financial incentives from the MOHLTC 
based on their performance as managers. There was some discussion as to whether community 
laboratories benefit from financial incentive in the form of the current corporate capping and 
guaranteed market share that exists with this sub-sector.  
6.4 Views of Information directed towards potential users (patients, public, and private 
payers) 
The literature identified information directed towards potential users such as patients, public 
and private payers as a valid tool for achieving accountability. The sharing of information is a 
key component of the ongoing activities in performance measurement and improvement 
(Barnsley 2005).  Some examples include report cards (e.g., for hospitals), audit reports, publicly 
available inspection reports, and quality indicators, including adverse events (Baker 2004). This 
study showed that information sharing is widely used in the laboratory sector to achieve 
accountability.  Many of the key informants identified the ways in which this was done: 
 Quarterly or yearly reports that are available to both internal and external stakeholders.   
  Audited financial reports for annual general meetings.  
 Publication of a list of all laboratories that are licensed, and which services or tests they 
are licensed to perform.   
 Development of quality indicators around key area such as performance measurement 
and improvement.  
6.5 Views on Professionalism/Stewardship 
According to the literature, this approach to accountability relies on high trust and the 
expectation that providers as a group wish to do the right thing, but may need support in 
clarifying best practices (Deber 2010). Many of the key informants interviewed indicated that 
this is a valid approach used in the laboratory services. The training received in educational 
institutions prepares individuals for entry to practice as professionals. The regulatory colleges 
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also play a role in maintaining continuing education and professional standards of practice as an 
integral part of the yearly licence renewal for all their members. 
6.6 Views on Independent Variables. 
This second section will discuss the key informants’ views on independent variable in 
order to address the second research goal, which is: 
2. Determine if the accountability mechanisms vary by sub-sector within the 
Ontario ML sector 
In this thesis, it is postulated that the approaches to accountability will have differing 
success when applied to various categories of services, and within various sub-sectors, with the 
likely outcomes depending upon: a) the policy goals being pursued, b) the governance/ownership 
structures and relationships in place, which in turn affect who will be accountable, and to whom, 
and c) the goods and services being delivered, and their production characteristics.  
6.6.1 Policy Goals 
The findings from the research data indicated that there were no variations in policy 
goals. All key informants identified patient safety as their number one priority. This is an 
important finding because the ML sector provides approximately 80% of objective data that is 
used in the diagnosis, treatment, and monitoring of patients (CMLTO, 2013). Key informants 
also indicated that laboratory testing plays an important role in epidemiology, especially in 
disease control and surveillance. As a result, high quality, accurate, and timely laboratory results 
are required to ensure timely, valid, and accurate tests beneficial to the healthcare system 
because they can result in reducing the length of stay, mal-practice cost, and inquiries. They are 




6.6.2 Governance/ownership structures in place 
This section discusses the governance/ownership structures and relationships in place, which 
in turn affect who will be accountable, and to whom and for what. An important finding of this 
thesis is that ownership is one variable in which a difference in the approach to accountability by 
sub-sector was seen.  
1) Accountable to whom? 
Key informants stated that they felt that they were accountable to the MOHLTC. The method 
of accountability varies based on the sub-sector. The public health laboratories have a direct 
accountable to the MOHLTC. Hospitals and community laboratories have what can be termed a 
“third party” agreement which is one in which funds from the MOHLTC are transferred to 
another party such as OHIP or the LHINs. 
 In terms of administrative accountability, key informants from the hospital and public 
health laboratories said they are accountable to their boards. Key informants in the community 
laboratory sector said they were accountable to their board of directors and shareholders. The 
findings from the interview data demonstrated that key informants from all sub-sectors had the 
following “accountability to whom” in common: 1) to their patients. One key informant even 
went further to say that this principle was so entrenched in their organizational culture that 
“everyone treats each sample as if it belonged to someone they love”, 2) The licencing and 
accrediting bodies, 3)The Regulatory Health Professional Colleges, 4) Frontline healthcare 
providers, especially doctors and nurses, and other professionals such as suppliers, 
manufacturers, and 5) To the students and new staff to provide them with a well-rounded training 
that is suitable for entry into the profession.   
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Some key informants indicated that they had dual accountability which made their jobs 
more complex. This is an important finding because the literature suggest that one of the nuances 
of approach to accountability is that one size does not fit all and there is a need to define 
accountability for what and to whom (Deber, 2012). For example, one participant stated that “so 
from a patient safety point of view we have direct accountability to the medical director and from 
the operational piece around fiscal management and performance to the VP, we have a dual 
accountability”. 
2) Accountable for what? 
Several key informants indicated that they were accountable for the financial resources 
that they managed. Respondents in the private not-for-profit laboratories spoke about the 
importance of maintaining a balanced budget. Respondents from the private-for-profit also 
identified maintaining a balanced budget as well as making a profit for shareholders. 
All key informants also indicated that they were accountable to providers and patients for 
timely, reliable, and accurate results. Some informants indicated that they were accountable for 
the persons (human resource) that they directly or indirectly managed. Key informants explained 
that they had performance indicators that were used to gauge how they were doing in terms of 
reaching policy goals.  Two examples of performance indicators shared were turn-around time 
for glucose test and the number of samples rejected in transfusion science because the patient 
was incorrectly identified. 
6.6.3 Production characteristics 
The ML sector is not homogeneous. There is considerable variation by sub-sector in how 
laboratories are organized. Key informants stated that the production characteristic chosen by a 
laboratory is influenced by whether it operates as a for-profit or not-for-profit entity. 
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  The data analysis revealed some important findings about community laboratories (there 
are exceptions) that operate as for-profit entities: 1) the population served is different than the 
hospital, 2) people in the community are generally healthier than those in hospital, 3) long term 
care homes represent another group -who generally have co-morbidities, and 4) the majority of 
testing done is routine, high volume, and low cost per unit tests.  
  Key informants provided some important findings on hospital laboratories(there are 
exceptions)  that operate as not-for-profit entities: 1) they provide service for patients who are 
admitted to hospital or those who use their out-patient clinics, 2) tests are required in an urgent 
manner, 3). they tend to perform a greater amount of esoteric testing to support the research, 
teaching, and innovation that is going on in that particular hospital, and 4). they perform many 
low volume tests that are not financially profitable but are medically important.  
The decision to use fully automated versus semi-automated desk top analyzers is closely 
linked to the type of testing required. Community laboratories that perform high volume routine 
tests are more likely to be fully automated. Hospital laboratories that perform urgent low volume 
tests are more likely to use semi-automated analyzers or do manual testing. 
Key informants were asked to comment on the practice of “contracting out” testing to 
other laboratories. The participants in rural laboratories said that they were more likely to 
contract out some of their esoteric tests because it was more financially viable and sometimes the 
expertise to perform the tests was not available in their laboratories. Another factor that drives 
the decision to contract some laboratory services is the need for additional accreditation for 
speciality tests from organizations such as OLA, CAP, and the Canada Nuclear Safety 
Commission (CNSC). Many of the key informants reported that they actively participated in this 
practice either as the laboratory that contracts out some of their tests or as the reference center 
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that accepts work from other laboratories. One key informant said “The only concern was 
ensuring that the facility to which you are contracting out services is accredited to perform those 
tests and that the turn-around times for results are compatible with your organization’s 
expectations”. 
     One of the most recent challenges to regulation is the availability of point-of-care tests at 
the bedside, pharmacy, at home, or in a doctor’s office.  The major challenge that these present is 
ensuring the level of accreditation is as rigorous as those that take place in the traditional 
laboratory settings. Another area of concern is the increasing use of new and emerging 
technologies such as molecular and genetic testing. The challenge is ensuring that individuals 
performing these tests have both the theoretical and technical competency to do so. The impact 
of these on accountability in the ML sector would be interesting area for future research.  
An important finding of this study was the confirmation (based on documents reviewed) 
that medical laboratories in Ontario have a high degree of contestability, measurability and 
complexity or embeddedness. Although laboratory tests have high measurability, they gain much 
of their value by being embedded within a system of care in which appropriate tests are ordered, 
accurate and timely analysis is done, and results are interpreted and acted upon in the correct 
manner (Deber, 2002).  
6.7 Key Stakeholders Views on Other Issues That Influences Accountability 
The following section presents the views of some of the key stakeholder in the ML 
sectors on topics that they view as directly or indirectly influencing the approaches to 




3. Examine stakeholder views on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
accountability mechanisms used. 
6.7.1 OLA Accreditation (regulation) 
The OLA program was introduced in 2003. During the interviews, all key informants felt 
that OLA should continue to be mandatory for the medical laboratory sector in Ontario. As one 
respondent stated, “I think what it has done it has raised a different level of awareness for our 
profession and on some level has put on the map in terms of a more cutting edge approach to 
regulatory standards.”  It was suggested that the role of OLA be expanded to include monitoring 
the quality assurance programs for unregulated laboratories such as those operating in 
physicians’ offices to ensure that they meet the same standards as other accredited laboratories. 
In addition, it is suggested that the mandate of OLA be expanded to include certain aspects of 
pre-analytical and post-analytical processes (e.g. phlebotomy and blood transfusion).  
6.7.2 Funding of Laboratories (financial incentives)  
During the interviews, some participants indicated that the government funding of 
hospital laboratories has not increased proportionately to match the increased cost of laboratory 
testing. As new and emerging technologies such as molecular and genetic tests are introduced, 
the cost of providing these tests has substantially increased laboratory costs. Key informants 
suggested that it was now time for the MOHLTC to conduct a detailed analysis of what the 
“true” cost of utilization of laboratory services is and that the funding of hospital laboratories be 
adjusted to meet the existing realities.  
 During the interviews, key informants suggested that the MOHLTC should review its 
position on individual cap. It is documented that since the implementation of this policy the 
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numbers of small community laboratories has decreased. There is need for a study to show how 
this has impacted patients, especially those that reside in rural communities.     
 Public health laboratories and other organizations such as the Canadian Blood Services 
(CBS) are directly funded by the MOHLTC. The suggestion from key informants was that the 
MOHLTC continue to provide adequate funding needed to ensure optimal operation for these 
organizations. 
 The allocation of financial resources in the ML sector is an important part of any 
approach to accountably because laboratories in Ontario are publicly funded.  The MOHLTC is 
accountable to taxpayers to ensure that their money is being spent in the most cost efficient and 
effective way. 
6.7.3 Integrated Laboratory Information System (LIS). (Information to potential users) 
Key informants identified the inability to share laboratory information among all the 
healthcare team members across the province as a barrier to better patient care. Participants felt 
that a fully integrated province-wide laboratory LIS is a key component in any effort to re-
structure laboratory services in Ontario. The benefits of an integrated LIS system to patients and 
healthcare service providers have been well documented. Patients benefit by having a smooth 
flow of information as they navigate through the system from family physician, to hospital, to 
homecare and long term care settings. Quick access to laboratory test results by practitioners 
translates into quicker decision making, faster turn-around times, and a reduction in duplication 
of laboratory test.  It will also eliminate the need for manual re-entry of laboratory test results 
that were done elsewhere, an exercise that is not only time-consuming but it is also error prone. 
This increases the cost to the healthcare system.  The benefits to the practitioners are better 
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opportunities for interprofessional collaboration among members of the healthcare team. The end 
result is better patient care and better outcomes.  
The introduction of new technologies such as an integrated laboratory information system 
and electronic medical records presents additional challenges in relation to accountability. Issues 
of high concerns include: high acquisition and ongoing maintenance cost, proper training and 
technical support, confidentiality and privacy concerns as it relates to who has access to patient 
information.  Despite these concerns, it is generally believed that overall, the benefits outweigh 
the risk that may be involved. The suggestion from key informants is that the MOHLTC expedite 
the process to have an integrated laboratory information system to fully implementation across 
the entire province of Ontario. An area for future research would be exploring what 
accountability measures are in place once the Ontario LIS is fully operational.  
 
6.7.4 Shortage of Human Resources (professionalism/stewardship) 
Many of the key informants interviewed expressed concern about the shortage of human 
resources in the medical laboratory sector. According to a recent survey, approximately 65% of 
MLTs working in Ontario are 45 years and older (CIHI, 2010).   Many of them will be eligible to 
retire at 55 years old. This presents a huge challenge as two-thirds of the current workforce could 
be retiring in the next 10 years. This potential human resource problem is further compounded by 
the fact that insufficient numbers of new MLT graduates from accredited schools have been 
entering the workforce (CMLTO 2010). The number of physicians with specialty in laboratory 
medicine is also declining. According to research conducted by Dr. Terence Colgan, a pathology 
professor at the University of Toronto, the number of laboratory physicians and pathologists 
decreased by 1.8% and 1.4% respectively, from 1998 to 2008 (The Canadian Journal of 
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Pathology, 2011). This could adversely affect accountability in the ML sector as laboratory 
physicians play a vital role in the quality and safety of laboratory tests results. 
There are several barriers to human resource sustainability in the current laboratory 
medicine system in Ontario. According to the CLMA, the current education, certification, and 
regulatory systems in Ontario are inadequate in sustaining human resource needs due to an 
inability to attract and sustain motivated individuals in a career in Laboratory Medicine (CLMA, 
2011).  
 Some key informants identified the lack of sufficient clinical placement sites as a 
challenge that they have to deal with on an on-going basis. This restricts the number of graduates 
that can be admitted into the program. Some of the key informants commenting on this issue said 
they simply would not be able to take more students unless they were given the financial and 
human resource support to do this.  
The difficulty for internationally trained medical laboratory technologists to enter the 
workforce was highlighted as a barrier. In 2010, The CSMLS received 230 applications for prior 
learning assessment (PLA).  The majority of the applicants (90%) did not meet Canadian 
standards immediately (CSMLS, 2011).  The gaps identified in their education/experience must 
be remediated before they are eligible to sit the CSMLS national certification examination. 
Currently, there is only one structured bridging program in Canada. It is offered at Mohawk 
College and only has eleven spaces because of the challenges to find enough clinical placements 
(CSMLS, 2013). The majority of internationally educated MLTs are left to address their 
deficiencies on their own. Many of them give up in frustration and end up working at whatever 
jobs they can find (CLMA 2010).  
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Key informants and the document review proposed a number of possible solutions to the 
human resource problems that were identified. The idea of a seamless continuum of education 
with clearly outlined career paths was presented by the CLMA (see Appendix H). This should 
follow a natural progression pathway, with no need for back-tracking.  The advantages of this 
system would be that laboratory professionals would be able to have easy access to career 
pathways without unnecessary bureaucracies. There would be clear career options such as 
moving into education, research, or management within reasonable timelines.   
 Addressing the human resource issues that were discussed above will not only foster 
greater accountability within the medical laboratory sector, but will ensure a sustainable 
healthcare system for future generations. In many developed countries such as Canada, patient 
safety is ranked high on the agenda of healthcare workers. However it is important to recognise 
that the quality of the laboratory results are only as good as the quality of the specimens 
analysed, and the technical competency of the individual performing the analysis.   Adequate 
investment in human resource in the ML sector will have huge impact on approaches to 
accountability. 
6.7.5 The need for Leadership and Policy Directions (Policy goals) 
The field of laboratory medicine is constantly changing as new technologies emerge.  There 
is need for leadership and policy direction from the MOHLTC to help laboratories keep up with 
the challenges they face. The ML sector look to the MOHLTC for policy directions on issues 
such as: What tests should be performed? Will the test be covered by OHIP? Who will be 
licensed to perform the tests?  Key informants suggest that the MOHLTC needs to have open and 
constant dialogue with experts in the field (pathologists, scientists, MLT etc.) to help them frame 
and implement the right policies.  
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6.8 Study Limitations  
The research provided valuable insights into the approaches to accountability that is being 
used in the Ontario medical laboratory sector. A mixed methods approach using a case study 
design with both quantitative (document review) and qualitative (semi-structured interviews) was 
used. The following limitations were experienced. 
 For this study, access to key informants was initially obtained by identifying key 
stakeholders, some of whom were already research partners with the study. In addition, key 
informants were asked to refer other potential interviewees. Although the researcher made every 
effort to maintain confidentiality there is the possibility of data collection bias. Although the 
researcher contacted each participant individually, potential respondents may have learnt about 
the study before they were officially contacted.  
The qualitative sample size for the study was small (20). This affected the diversity of the 
sample and limited the responses. The majority of the key informants were from the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) and worked in private not-for-profit hospital based laboratories. The 
majority of the respondents were also in management positions. Therefore this study may not 
have captured the views of the entire province of Ontario. It also may not have captured the 
views of all the professions represented in the medical laboratory sector. 
 Attention bias was one of the limitations faced during the key informant interviews. 
Attention bias refers to when people are aware of their involvement in a study and as a result of 
the attention received may give more favourable responses than those who are unaware of the 
study’s intent (Kumar, 1989). The majority of the data was collected as face-to face or telephone 
recorded interviews. This may have influenced respondents to not disclose their “true” views on 
some of the questions asked. The willingness of participants to disclose personal information or 
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views to persons they do not know or trust (including researchers) may be limited or absent. It 
takes time to build trust with participants that will lead to full and honest disclosures. Because 
the researcher only met with the participants at the time of the interview, there was limited 
opportunity to build trust. Because the researcher was also the data collector, it is possible to 
have researcher’s bias with data collection.  
Based on the literature review, this research is a starting point for looking at approaches to 
accountability within the Ontario medical laboratory sector. One study is not sufficient to answer 
all the questions that need to be answered.  Although this study provided useful information, it 
barely touched the tip of the iceberg.  The results of the data analysis and subsequent discussion 
strongly suggest that there is need for more quantitative and qualitative research. 
6.9 Recommendations for Future Use 
The purpose of this research was to study the approaches to accountability within the Ontario 
medical laboratory sector. This study helped to broaden the understanding of which approaches 
are been used and what are the perceived advantages and disadvantages of each approach. It also 
identified gaps within the present system that should be addressed in future research.  
6.9.1 Extending the study to cover all of Ontario and other provinces in Canada. 
The majority of the participants in this study were from the greater Toronto area. Other 
parts of the province were not well represented. Since some of those laboratories operating in 
rural Ontario may face a different set of challenges, it would be beneficial to get their views. A 
second step would be to extend the study to cover other provinces in Canada. Conducting such 
wide scale qualitative research may be time consuming and potentially expensive. Therefore the 




   6.9.2 Quantitative data collection. 
In this study only qualitative data was collected from key informants. This significantly 
impacted the number of persons that were interviewed. The inclusion of a quantitative survey 
will probably increase the potential of obtaining more information from a wider cross-section of 
medical laboratory professions. The information gathered would provide even more information 
on accountability approaches to laboratory medicine in Canada. 
  6.9.3 Inter-professional collaboration  
The question of accountability is not confined to the medical laboratory sector but has a 
much wider implication right across the healthcare sector. This study is a part of a larger study 
that is looking at “Approaches to Accountability” in eleven other healthcare sub-sectors.  Future 
research will provide information that can be used to create best practice accountability 
















  The ML sector in Ontario provides approximately 80% of the objective data for 
diagnosis; monitoring and treatment of patients. Almost all laboratory services are publicly 
funded. Services are delivered by the public (e.g., public health laboratories), not for-profit (e.g., 
hospital based laboratories, Canadian Blood Services) and for-profit (e.g., community based 
laboratories, physician offices) organizations. Accordingly, the governance and ownership 
structures as well as the actors involved (e.g., Boards accountable to shareholders) vary. Nearly 
all laboratories in Ontario are regulated by the Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA) body. In 
addition, several other stakeholders are involved in the ML sector: medical laboratory 
technologists, technicians, scientists, physicians, managers, owners, government (Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care), regulators (College of Medical Laboratory 
Technologist of Ontario), professional associations (CSMLS, OSMT), licensing bodies 
(MOHLTC), and accreditation bodies (Canadian Medical Association's Committee on Conjoint 
Accreditation, and QMP-LS).  
  A number of stakeholders inside and outside the MLS are involved in the delivery of 
quality laboratory services and are therefore accountable. Regulation is required to ensure the 
delivery of high quality laboratory services, which is important for patient care.  Regulation is 
the main approach to accountability in the ML sector. Ontario Laboratory Accreditation (OLA) 
and licensing by the Ontario government is mandatory in all laboratories except those found in 
physicians’ offices.  
Quality and safety are top priorities and concern for costs and resources exists within the 
sector as a whole. Laboratory services can be classified as non-contestable, highly measurable 
and high complexity. The validity and reliability of the analytical stage of testing is highly 
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measurable. Laboratory results gain much of their value by being embedded within a system of 
care, in which providers order tests appropriately and are aided in interpreting and acting upon 
their results. The pre/post analytical stages are just as important as the analytical stage in 
measuring performance and ensuring accountability.  
 While the ML sector is highly regulated, the implementation of more mechanisms to 
enhance accountability in the pre/post analytical phases is needed. The importance of this is 
further highlighted by the advancement of point-of-care testing at the bedside, the pharmacy and 
at home, which is not currently fully captured by the accountability mechanisms currently in 
place.  
The ML sector in Ontario is not homogeneous. There is considerable variation in how they 
are financed and organized. It is the responsibility of the MOHLTC to implement policies that 
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THESE ARE ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS BUT DIFFERENT PEOPLE MAY BE CHOSEN TO ANSWER 
DIFFERENT PARTS AS DEEMED NECESSARY.  PILOTING WILL HELP DETERMINE WHO THE BEST 
CANDIDATE TO ANSWER DIFFERENT PARTS IS. 
 
** At least 2 weeks prior to the ‘interview’ an email will be sent to the interviewee with a list of 
the questions s/he will be asked. 
 
** Any text in italics is for the interviewer, not to be read out to interviewee unless needed. 
 





“Thank you for agreeing to meet with me today.” 
 





- Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop it 
at any time. 
- Your name or any identifying information will not appear in any report or publication of 
this research unless you give consent or it is otherwise publicly available.  
- Your interview transcripts and recording will be safely stored on a password protected 
computer and only research staff will have access to this information. 
- Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law 
 
“I would be quite happy to send you a transcript of the interview, for you to correct or amend as 
needed.” 
 
“Remember, there are no right answers to any of these questions, I just want to talk with you and 




1. What types of services (key function areas) does your organization provide? 
 
2. What are the main goals of your organization? [PROMPT – mission, vision, values OR 
cost, quality, access] 
 






Accountability is defined as: 
 
“The obligation to answer to an authority that conferred a responsibility, by an agent who 
accepted it, with the resources and delegated authority necessary to achieve it, and with the 
understanding that inadequate performance will result in an intervention” (Shortt and 




1. For each of the functional areas of your organization in the following table please answer: 
a. What are the accountability requirements for each of the defined function areas? 
b. To who is your organization accountable? (there may be more than one possibility 
for each service) 
 




Whom accountable to? 
   
   
   
 
Resource Dependence: 
2. What types of services does your organization contract out? [PROMPT – core activities 








4. There are a number of approaches (governing instruments) that can be used to achieve 
accountability.  Some are external and others are internal.  Some examples are: 
 
External: 
a. Financial incentives – payment in the form of pay for performance, 
b. Regulations – including signed agreements 
c. Information directed to payers or care recipients – report card, or balanced score 
card 
d. Information directed to providers – best practices, and/or  
Internal: 
e. Accountability approaches used internally by your organization.   
 
What approaches are (were) used by your organization?  For each approach state where it 








Never Used Seldom Used Sometimes Used Frequently Used 
1 2 3 4 
 
Approach: Where Used (for what): Frequency of Use: Who Accountable To: 
  1 2 3 4  
  1 2 3 4  
  1 2 3 4  
  1 2 3 4  
 
For each approach find out where (for what) it is being used and who they are accountable to 
for that approach. [PROMPT – for what, to whom] 
 
In cases where there are multiple accountability requirements: 
 
5. Were consultations carried out or was the approach imposed on your organization?  If 
imposed, who was it imposed by? 
 
6. If consultations were used, how were they carried out?  How much input did your 
organization have? 
 
7. Do you feel this process led to a better/worse approach to accountability? 
 




9. What are (were) the weaknesses/challenges of these approaches? [PROMPT – e.g., 
difficulty of measurement] 
 
10. Do the approaches used help your organization achieve its goals (are they aligned with 
the goals)?  [PROMPT –  Need to know the goals – mission, vision, values] 
 
11. How well do you think each approach ensures performance, equity, and financial 
stewardship? 
a. Has there been a change in your organization’s ability to achieve these goals since 
the introduction of the accountability measures? 
b. Do the accountability measures help reveal, or address problems, and then fix 
them if identified? 
 
12. Is it difficult for your organization to achieve accountability? Is there variation? If so, 
why? [PROMPT – variation can be in terms of who is holding the 
organization/individual accountable, the level of accountability (organization or 
individual), the department or functional group being held accountable, etc.] 
 
13. CEO – board accountability? 
 








16. What activities do you think are important to be measured but are not currently being 
measured in HSAA? 
a. Why are these activities not being measured? 
b. Are these the same reasons why they excluded from the HSAA? 
 
17. What activities are not measured in any way?  Why? 
 
18. Do you use these accountability measures to make decisions on performance? 
a. What do you use to make decisions about performance? 
 
Contestability:  [ease of entry and exit from the ‘market’] 
19. How easy is it for an organization like yours to enter your sector and provide services in 
targeted areas (or market)/specialized services? 
a.  (If easy) Why is it easy to enter the system? 
b. (If difficult) What makes it difficult for an organization to enter?  
[PROMPT – sunk costs, high start-up costs, complexity of services 
provided, licensure, accreditation, etc.] 
 
20. Is it difficult for an organization like yours to leave target markets, make changes in 
service provision, or stop providing services?  
 (When easy, the organization can sell building, equipment, or other infrastructure 




21. Are there any consequences or rewards that result from not meeting performance criteria 




a. If so, what are the consequences or rewards? 
 
22. Are the accountability/performance indicators tied to financial indicators/rewards? 
 
23. Are there any unintended consequences that occur due to the accountability approach 





“Would it be okay with you if I contacted you later with a couple questions should any come to 
mind upon reflection?  We can address them over the phone.” 
 
“Are there any other areas we haven’t touched on that you want to comment on?” 
 









APPENDIX: B Invitation Letter 
 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology 








Invitation to Participate 
 
 
Dear Ms. /Mr. 
This is an invitation requesting your participation in a confidential research study based on your 
experiences with accountability measures within the medical laboratory community. This survey 
is being conducted at Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, 
and aims to determine what methods of accountability are been used and the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method. 
This study will be conducted in the form of a semi-structured interview where a series of 
questions will be asked about your opinion on accountability in health care as it relates to your 
sector. Some general demographic questions will also be asked. The interview should take 
approximately 30-60 minutes and participation is completely voluntary. 
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The interview questions will be sent before the scheduled interview so that there will be time to 
prepare the answers. Should you wish to withdraw, you may do so at any time and all of your 
responses will be completely destroyed. However, we do hope that you will participate and 
provide as much information as possible to help create a representative sampling of opinion from 
a diverse group of professionals working in the medical laboratory field. All of your responses 
will be held in strict confidence. 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me for more information about this 
study. Acceptance or declination to this invitation to participate can be communicated by email 
to lavern.bourne@uoit.ca 
 




Lavern Bourne BHA, MLT 
MHSc Graduate student 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology 
2000 Simcoe Street North 
Oshawa, ON L1H 7K4 







APPENDIX C:  Consent Letter 
 
 
Title:  Accountability in Health Care 
Investigator:  Ms. Lavern Bourne 
Research Supervisor: Dr. Brenda Gamble 
 
Background and Purpose of Research 
Accountability in health care is stressed by all levels of government and the tax-paying public 
with respect to the health outputs produced (i.e. patient outcomes, decreased wait times, cost 
containment, and quality of care) from the inputs used (public funds derived from tax revenue, 
medical services utilized).  Accountability requires that all parties know their roles, 
responsibilities, and performance expectations.  In the past there has been considerable variation 
in how accountability is defined and measured in the Canadian health care landscape.  In this 
interview, we are trying to understand your views on accountability in your sector of health 
care and the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols that you follow.   
This study is being conducted by researchers from the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology.  It has been approved by the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board at the 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology File #: 10-036.  The text below describes this 
study.  Please read this information carefully before you decide if you are willing to participate 
in this study.  
Who is participating? 
Stakeholders from the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Local Health Integration 
Networks, and acute care hospitals across the province of Ontario will be participating in this 




What does the study involve? 
You will be asked to answer a number of questions in the form of a semi-structured interview.  
These questions will ask you about your opinion on a number of areas related to accountability in 
health care as related to your sector, as well as some general demographic questions.  This 
interview should take 30-60 minutes to complete.  
Contacts 
This research is being conducted by Lavern Bourne as part of the requirements for the Master’s 
degree in Health Sciences at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology.  This research is 
being supervised by Brenda Gamble, PhD (University of Ontario Institute of Technology).  If 
you have any questions about the study, you may contact Lavern Bourne at 905: 721- 8668 ext. 
3612 or email at Lavern.bourne@uoit.ca or Brenda Gamble at 905: 721- 8668 ext. 2934 or email 
at brenda.gamble@uoit.ca. 
You waive no legal rights by participating in this study.  If you have any questions about your 
rights as a participant, you may contact the Ethics Review Office of the University of Ontario 
Institute of Technology at Tel: (905)-721 8668 x 2357 or email compliance@uoit.ca 
Benefits / Risk of the Study 
There are no personal benefits or risks to the study, but we anticipate that the results should be 
helpful to decision makers in improving how accountability is being implemented.  The 
questions included in the interview are of low sensitivity. If you feel uncomfortable at any time 
you are free to discontinue participation, either temporarily or permanently.  
What about confidentiality? 
The information collected will not be used to identify a particular organization or individual 
unless express consent is received or the information is already in the public domain.  You will 
have the opportunity to review your response to ensure that we have correctly captured your 
views. Your responses will only be used for the purposes of this research study and will not be 
accessed by anyone outside of the research team.  All electronic and paper records will be kept in 
a secure location and will be maintained for 7 years after study completion and then destroyed. 
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Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary.  If you choose to participate, you may exit the 
interview at any time without any consequence 
Compensation 
You will not receive any compensation for participating in the study. 
Publication of Results 
The results from this study will be published in academic journals and presented at conferences.  
It will also be shared with the participants in the study, including through workshops.  
Funding of Research 
This study is being funded through CIHR. 
Consent 
I have read the above information and by signing below I provide my consent to participate in 

















Dear Sir/ Madam, 
Thank you for participating in our research project. Your analysis of healthcare accountability 
models used in your organization was truly helpful and insightful. You have provided valuable 
information that will assist in the successful completion of this research project.  
If you know of someone who might be interested in participating in this study, please do not 
hesitate to share their contact information with me. We will be following up in the future with an 
invitation to attend a participant’s workshop where the result from the data analysis will be 
presented.  
Thank you again for your assistance.  
Sincerely,  
 
Lavern Bourne BHA, MLT 
MHSc Graduate student 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology 
2000 Simcoe Street North 
Oshawa, ON L1H 7K4 






APPENDIX E: CODE BOOK 
This coding structure is intended to pull out important themes from accountability 
documents including contracts, legislation, and accreditation. 




Identifiers Who is involved Which organizations are involved in the 
accountability relationship 
Creator Code for accountor (exp. 
CCAC or Accreditation 
Canada) 
Recipient(s) Code for accountee (exp. 
Service provider or physician) 
Document/tool The type of documents being coded 
Contract/agreement Service contracts or 
agreements used to 
purchase/procure services 
from service agencies, 
organizations or individuals 
Accreditation Any documents related to 
getting or maintaining 
accreditation from an 
accrediting body 
Legislation  
Duration of document Start date When the 
agreement/contract/legislation 





is no longer in effect 
Option to renew There is an option to renew for 
the 
agreement/contract/legislation 
In instances where there is an 
end date. Code yes/no. Can 
add sub-coding tree regarding 
rules regarding renewals (i.e. 
required amendments).  








Sector Hospital  
Primary Care  





(nursing homes and 
homes for the aged) 
 
Labs  
Public health labs  
















Stipulated requirement for communication 
procedures that are to be followed between 
organizations/individuals in the accountability 
relationship. (exp. The Service Provider shall 
immediately notify the CCAC regarding any client 
who contacts the service provider with any 
complaints).    
Monitoring Stipulated requirement for monitoring activities, 
general (not necessarily attached to reporting 
requirements) (exp. The CCAC may, during the 
Agreement Term, monitor the quality of the Service 
Provider’s performance of the Services.) 
Oversight Stipulated requirement for direct oversight of 
activities by an external body.  (exp. The service 
provider shall permit the CCAC to access the service 
provider’s premises in order to audit account and 
agreement records).  
Reporting Stipulated requirement for reporting. 
Consistent structure  Reporting follows a consistent 
procedure (exo. The Service 
provider shall follow the 
procedures for reporting a Risk 
Event).  
Training Training is required for the 
accountor in order to comply 
with reporting requirements 
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(exp. The service provider is 
required to attend a training 
session regarding how to fill 
out report forms prior to the 
start of the agreement).  
Routine  Reporting occurs at regular, 




Consequences of non-compliance with accountability requirements (i.e. not 
meeting indicators, not providing reports as requested). Relates to the type of 
sanctions discussed in the documents. 
Termination/reduction 
of contracts 
Loss or reduction of contracts which is due directly to 
either: poor performance, misconduct, non-
compliance with reporting requirements, or any 
breach of agreement. (exp. The CCAC may terminate 
a contract if the CCAC determines that a service 
provider has committed serious misconduct) 
Fines Accountees charged fines due to poor performance, 
misconduct, non-compliance with reporting 
requirements, or any breach of 
agreements/contracts/legislation.  
Public reporting Accountees are required to publicly report any poor 
performance, misconduct, non-compliance with 
reporting requirements, or any breach of agreement. 
Reduced funding Accountees will have reduced funding from 
accountor for poor performance, misconduct, non-
compliance with reporting requirements, or any 
breach of agreement. (exp. The service provider may 
suspend all or part of payments to the service 
provider if the service provider fails to perform any 
of its obligations under the agreement).  
Increased funding Accountees will have more funding from accountor 
for poor performance, misconduct, non-compliance 






Individual service providers will have license 
suspended and/or a reduced scope of practice for poor 
performance or misconduct.  
Purpose (the 
purpose of the 
accountability 
tool) 
Financial To ensure/support financial accountability 
Pay-for-
performance 
Pay-for-performance used as a 
means to ensure accountability 
of individuals or organizations 
Financial reporting  Accountor required to report 
financial information (exp. 
Annual or quarterly financial 
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reporting to accountor required 
as part of agreement). 
Performance To ensure/support performance accountability 
Access Performance related to access 
to healthcare (exp. The service 
provide must deliver services 
in geographic area identified in 
agreement. Exp. The service 
provider is responsible for 
providing services to a client 
as of the time that it accepts a 
referral).  
Quality Performance related to quality 
of care (exp. The service 
provider must be an 
established provider of health 
care services). 
Political, democratic To ensure/support political accountability (i.e. equity 
and fairness) 
Procedural To ensure/support procedural accountability; ensure 





Unit of analysis At what level is performance measured 
Client Performance measured at the 
level of the client (exp. 
Require client satisfaction 
surveys) 
Provider Performance is measured at 
the level of the provider (exp. 
Individuals delivering services 
must possess appropriate 
trainings and qualifications) 
Organization Performance is measured at 
the level of the organization. 
(exp. The service provider 
shall obtain appropriate 
accreditation) 




Quality performance identified through the use of 
evidence-based practices 
Professionalism Performance demonstrated  by association with 
professional body (i.e. college of physicians, nurses 
association) 
Experience Performance demonstrated through past experience 
Skill testing Performance tested by organization imposing 









Performance monitored using indicators set internally 
by the organization being held to account. 
Indicators, set 
externally 
Performance monitored using indicators set 




Indicators set by a professional 
organization or college (i.e. 
College of Physicians and 
Surgeons). 
Government Indicators set by government 
body 
Accreditation Indicators set by accrediting 
body 






Accounting practices Use of appropriate accounting practices. (exp. 
Service provider must keep accurate and systematic 
accounts using standard accounting practices). 
Auditing Regular auditing of financial statements required 
(exp. The Accountor may audit) 
Quarterly reporting Provision of quarterly financial statements (exp. 
Financial reports must be remitted quarterly) 
Annual reporting Provision of annual financial statements (exp. 
Financial reports must be remitted annually) 
Budget Did the organization stay within budget (exp. Service 
providers must stay within budget) 
Political, 
democratic 
Conflicts of interest All potential conflicts of interest must be identified 
and reported by one or all organizations within 
relationship. (exp. Service provider personnel do not 
use their position for personal gain).  
Promote values Accountability tool serves to promote common 
values and goals. 
Equity Accountability tool promotes equity, i.e. equitable 
access to services. (exp. Service providers must 
provide services to all referred clients).  
Procedural Will vary depending on sector and how services are delivered. For example in 
the home and community care sector accountability requirements include 
procedural rules around the procurement of services and the RFP process itself 
as a means to hold purchasers accountable for the awarding of contracts. 
Responsibility Will vary depending on sector, type of service and who is involved in the 
accountability relationship. This code will assign the types of responsibilities 
identified for each party within the accountability relationship.  
Transaction 
Costs  
Training Additional training of personnel required to meet 




Time Additional time required to meet accountability 
requirements 
Human resources Additional personnel required to meet accountability 
requirements 
Equipment/technology Require purchase of equipment or technology to meet 
requirements, exp. New computer systems to meet 
reporting requirements 
Accreditation Require accreditation to meet accountability 





































































































































































































Appendix K: Future map of Ontario Laboratory Education pathway 
 
